What Do Philosophers Do? Maddy, Moore and Wittgenstein

International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
浏览更多 浏览更少
  • 1

The paper discusses and presents an alternative interpretation to Penelope Maddy’s reading of G.E. Moore’s and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s anti-skeptical strategies as proposed in her book What Do Philosophers Do? Skepticism and the Practice of Philosophy. It connects this discussion with the methodological claims Maddy puts forward and offers an alternative to her therapeutic reading of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty.

  • Coliva A. 2010. Moore and Wittgenstein: Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense. London: Palgrave.

  • Coliva A. 2015. Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology. London: Palgrave.

  • Maddy P. 2014. The Logical Must: Wittgenstein on Logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Maddy P. 2017. What Do Philosophers Do? Skepticism and the Practice of Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    • 检索谷歌学术
    • 导出引用
  • Moore G.E. 1939. “Proof of an External World.” In his Collected Papers, 126148. London: Allen and Unwin.

    • 检索谷歌学术
    • 导出引用
  • Moore G.E. 1942. “A Reply to My Critics.” In P.A. Schillp (ed.), The Philosophy of G.E. Moore, 535677. Chicago: Northwestern University Press.

    • 检索谷歌学术
    • 导出引用
  • Putnam H. 1981. “Brains in a Vat.” In his Reason, Truth and History, 121. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    • 检索谷歌学术
    • 导出引用
  • Stroud B. 1984. The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Wittgenstein L. 1953. Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Blackwell.

  • Wittgenstein L. 1969. On Certainty. Oxford: Blackwell.


全部期间 过去一年 过去30天
摘要浏览次数 195 75 6
全文浏览次数 89 7 0
PDF下载次数 14 4 0