In Unbelievable Errors, I defend an error theory about all normative judgements, I argue that we cannot believe this theory, and I argue that our inability to believe this theory makes the theory more likely to be true. This Précis gives a brief overview of my arguments for the error theory and of my explanation of our inability to believe the theory.
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Horgan Terry and Timmons Mark . 1991. “New Wave Moral Realism Meets Moral Twin Earth,” Journal of Philosophical Research 16: 447–465.
Horgan Terry and Timmons Mark . 2009. “Analytical Moral Functionalism Meets Moral Twin Earth.” In Ravenscroft I. (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals, 221–236. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jackson Frank . 1998. From Metaphysics to Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kim Jaegwon . 1993. Supervenience and Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Streumer Bart . 2017. Unbelievable Errors: An Error Theory About All Normative Judgements. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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In Unbelievable Errors, I defend an error theory about all normative judgements, I argue that we cannot believe this theory, and I argue that our inability to believe this theory makes the theory more likely to be true. This Précis gives a brief overview of my arguments for the error theory and of my explanation of our inability to believe the theory.
All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
---|---|---|---|
Abstract Views | 460 | 41 | 4 |
Full Text Views | 133 | 1 | 0 |
PDF Views & Downloads | 123 | 6 | 0 |