Necessarily Coextensive Predicates and Reduction
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Bart Streumer argues that all normative properties are descriptive properties. His first argument is based on the principle that necessarily coextensive predicates ascribe the same property (N), and the claim that there is a descriptive predicate that is necessarily coextensive with normative predicates. From this Streumer concludes that normative properties are identical with descriptive properties. I argue that, even if we accept (N), this conclusion does not follow. Normative properties could only be descriptive properties if there is some descriptive way in which all instances of normative properties are similar. But Streumer does not show that, and the prospects for doing so are, I believe, not good. His second argument rests on the premise that the nature of normative properties cannot depend on which first order normative theory is true. I argue that this premise is false, and that the argument for it does not sit comfortably with (N).
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Necessarily Coextensive Predicates and Reduction
In: International Journal for the Study of SkepticismSearch for other papers by Philip Stratton-Lake in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Bart Streumer argues that all normative properties are descriptive properties. His first argument is based on the principle that necessarily coextensive predicates ascribe the same property (N), and the claim that there is a descriptive predicate that is necessarily coextensive with normative predicates. From this Streumer concludes that normative properties are identical with descriptive properties. I argue that, even if we accept (N), this conclusion does not follow. Normative properties could only be descriptive properties if there is some descriptive way in which all instances of normative properties are similar. But Streumer does not show that, and the prospects for doing so are, I believe, not good. His second argument rests on the premise that the nature of normative properties cannot depend on which first order normative theory is true. I argue that this premise is false, and that the argument for it does not sit comfortably with (N).
| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 744 | 120 | 15 |
| Full Text Views | 126 | 0 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 92 | 1 | 0 |
