Response to Jackson, Stratton-Lake, and Schroeder
In: International Journal for the Study of SkepticismSearch for other papers by Bart Streumer in
Current site
Google Scholar
I argue that Jackson, Stratton-Lake, and Schroeder’s objections to my arguments for the error theory in Unbelievable Errors fail. I also argue that our inability to believe the error theory should affect our assessments of these arguments.
Purchase
Buy instant access (PDF download and unlimited online access):
Institutional Login
Log in with Open Athens, Shibboleth, or your institutional credentials
Personal login
Log in with your brill.com account
-
Boyd Richard . 1988. “How to Be a Moral Realist.” In Sayre-McCord G. (ed.), Essays on Moral Realism, 181–228. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
-
Dunaway Billy . 2015. “Supervenience Arguments and Normative Non-Naturalism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91: 627–655.
-
Ridge Michael . 2014. Impassioned Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
-
Sainsbury Mark . 2005. Reference without Referents. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
-
Streumer Bart . 2008. “Are There Irreducibly Normative Properties?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86: 537–561.
-
Streumer Bart . 2017. Unbelievable Errors: An Error Theory about All Normative Judgements. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
-
Sturgeon Nicholas . 2005. “Ethical Naturalism.” In Copp D. (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, 91–121. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
-
Wedgwood Ralph . 2007. The Nature of Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
-
Williams J. G. Robert 2018. “Normative Reference Magnets,” The Philosophical Review 127: 41–71.
| All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 384 | 49 | 7 |
| Full Text Views | 107 | 7 | 4 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 90 | 8 | 3 |
Response to Jackson, Stratton-Lake, and Schroeder
In: International Journal for the Study of SkepticismSearch for other papers by Bart Streumer in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
I argue that Jackson, Stratton-Lake, and Schroeder’s objections to my arguments for the error theory in Unbelievable Errors fail. I also argue that our inability to believe the error theory should affect our assessments of these arguments.
| All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 384 | 49 | 7 |
| Full Text Views | 107 | 7 | 4 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 90 | 8 | 3 |