View More View Less
  • 1 Miami Dade College

One common problem with anti-skepticism and skepticism alike is their failure to account for our sometimes conflicting epistemic intuitions. In order to address this problem and provide a new direction for solving the skeptical puzzle, I consider a modified version of the puzzle that is based on knowledge claims about appearances and does not result in a paradox. I conclude that combining the elements of both the original and modified puzzle can potentially guide us towards solutions that can fully explain the conflict of epistemic intuitions.

  • Audi R. 1988. Belief, Justification and Knowledge. Belmont: Wadsworth.

  • Audi R. 1991. “Justification, Deductive Closure and Reasons to Believe,” Dialogue 30: 7784.

  • Barsalou L. 1999. “Perceptual Symbol Systems,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22: 577660.

  • Barsalou L. 2010. “Grounded Cognition: Past, Present and Future,” Topics in Cognitive Science 2: 716724.

  • Bencivenga E. 1983. “An Epistemic Theory of Reference,” Journal of Philosophy 80: 785805.

  • Brueckner A. 1994. “The Structure of the Skeptical Argument,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54: 827835.

  • Chalmers D. 2005. “The Matrix as Metaphysics.” In Grau C. (ed.), Philosophers Explore the Matrix, 132176. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Chomsky N. 1980. Rules and Representations. New York: Colombia University Press.

  • Cohen S. 1986. “Knowledge and Context,” Journal of Philosophy 83: 574583.

  • Cohen S. 1987. “Knowledge, Context and Social Standards,” Synthese 73: 326.

  • Cohen S. 1988. “How to be a Fallibilist,” Philosophical Perspectives 2 , Epistemology: 91123.

  • Cohen S. 1999. “Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons,” Philosophical Perspectives 13 , Epistemology: 5789.

  • DeRose K. 1992. “Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52: 913929.

  • DeRose K. 1995. “Solving the Skeptical Problem,” The Philosophical Review 104: 1752.

  • Dove G. 2007. “Beyond Perceptual Symbols: A Call for Representational Pluralism,” Cognition 110: 412431.

  • Dretske F. 1970. “Epistemic Operators,” Journal of Philosophy 67: 10071023.

  • Dretske F. 1971. “Conslusive Reasons,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49: 122.

  • Dretske F. 1991. “Knowledge: Sanford and Cohen.” In McLaughlin B. (ed.), Dretske and his Critics, 185196. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Fantl J. and McGrath M. (2002). “Evidence, Pragmatics and Justification,” The Philosophical Review 111: 6794.

  • Feldman R. 1995. “In Defence of Closure,” The Philosophical Quarterly 45: 487494.

  • Fumerton R. 1990. “Metaepistemology and Skepticism.” In Roth M. and Ross G. (ed.), Doubting: Contemporary Perspectives on Skepticism, 5768. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Fumerton R. 1995. Metaepistemology and Skepticism. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

  • Hawthorne J. 2004. Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

  • Hinton J.M. 1973. Experiences: An Inquiry into Some Ambiguities. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

  • Klein P. 1981. Certainty. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

  • Klein P. 1995. “Skepticism and Closure: Why the Evil Genius Argument Fails,” Philosophical Topics 23: 213236.

  • Kornblith H. 2000. “The Contextualist Evasion of Epistemology,” Noûs 34: 2432.

  • Lewis D. 1996. “Elusive Knowledge,” The Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74: 549567.

  • Machery E. 2006. “Two Dogmas of Neo-Empiricism,” Philosophy Compass 1: 398412.

  • McDowell J. 1983. “Criteria, Defeasibility and Knowledge,” Proceedings of the British Academy 68: 455479.

  • Nagel T. 1986. The View from Nowhere. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Nozick R. 1981. Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

  • Prinz J. 2002. Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and Their Perceptual Basis. MIT Press.

  • Pritchard D. 2001. “Contextualism, Scepticism and the Problem of Epistemic Discent,” Dialectica 55: 327349.

  • Pritchard D. 2002a. “Recent Work on Radical Skepticism,” American Philosophical Quarterly 39: 215257.

  • Pritchard D. 2002b. “Resurrecting the Moorean Response to Scepticism,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10: 283307.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Sainsbury M. 1997. “Easy Possibilities,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57: 907919.

  • Sosa E. 1999. “How to Defeat Opposition to Moore,” Philosophical Perspectives 13: 141154.

  • Sosa E. 2000. “Skepticism and Contextualism,” Philosophical Issues 10: 118.

  • Stanley J. 2005. Knowledge and Practical Interests. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Stine G. 1976. “Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, and Deductive Closure,” Philosophical Studies 29: 249261.

  • Stroud B. 1984. The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Stroud B. 1989. “Understanding Human Knowledge in General.” In Clay M. and Lehrer K. (ed.), Knowledge and Scepticism. Boulder, CO: Westview.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Stroud B. 1994. “Scepticism, Externalism and the Goal of Epistemology,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 68: 290307.

  • Stroud B. 1996. “Epistemological Relfection on Knowledge of the External World,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56: 345358.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Unger P. 1971. “A Defense of Skepticism,” Philosophical Review 80: 198219.

  • Unger P. 1975. Ignorance: A Case for Skepticism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

  • Vogel J. 1999. “The New Relevant Alternatives Theory,” Nous-Supplement: Philosophical Perspectives 13: 155180.

  • Weiskopf D. 2007. “Concept Empiricism and the Vehicles of Thought,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 14: 156183.

  • Williams M. 1991. Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Scepticism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

  • Williamson T. 2000a. Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Williamson T. 2000b. “Comments on Michael Williams’ ‘Contextualism, Exernalism and Epistemic Standards’,” Philosophical Studies 103: 2433.

    • Search Google Scholar
    • Export Citation
  • Wright C. 1991. “Scepticism and Dreaming: Imploding the Demon,” Mind 397: 87115.

  • Yourgrau P. 1983. “Knowledge and Relevant Alternatives,” Synthese 55: 175190.

Content Metrics

All Time Past Year Past 30 Days
Abstract Views 120 72 2
Full Text Views 14 5 0
PDF Downloads 8 3 0