Deprivation as Un-Experienced Harm?
A Critical Analysis of Tom Regan’s Principle of Harm
In: Society & AnimalsSearch for other papers by Külli Keerus in
Current site
Google Scholar
Search for other papers by Mickey Gjerris in
Current site
Google Scholar
Search for other papers by Helena Röcklinsberg in
Current site
Google Scholar
Abstract
Tom Regan encapsulated his principle of harm as a prima facie direct duty not to harm experiencing subjects of a life. However, his consideration of harm as deprivation, one example of which is loss of freedom, can easily be interpreted as a harm, which may not be experienced by its subject. This creates a gap between Regan’s criterion for moral status and his account of what our duties are. However, in comparison with three basic paradigms of welfare known in nonhuman animal welfare science, Regan’s understanding coheres with a modified version of a feelings-based paradigm: not only the immediate feelings of satisfaction, but also future opportunities to have such feelings, must be taken into account. Such an interpretation is compatible with Regan’s understanding of harm as deprivation. The potential source of confusion, however, lies in Regan’s own possible argumentative mistakes.
Purchase
Buy instant access (PDF download and unlimited online access):
Institutional Login
Log in with Open Athens, Shibboleth, or your institutional credentials
Personal login
Log in with your brill.com account
-
Algers, B. (1992). Natürliches verhalten—ein natürlicher begriff. Berliner und Münchener Tierärzliche Wochenschrift, 105(11), 372-374.
-
Appleby, M. C., & Sandøe, P. (2002). Philosophical debate on the nature of well-being: implications for animal welfare. Animal Welfare, 11(3), 283-294.
-
Broom, D. M. (1986). Indicators of poor welfare. British Veterinary Journal, 142(6), 524-526.
-
Broom, D. M. (1991). Animal welfare: concepts and measurement. Journal of Animal Science, 69(10), 4167-4175.
-
Dawkins, M. S. (2006). A user’s guide to animal welfare science. Trends in Ecology & Evolution, 21(2), 77-82.
-
Duncan, I. J. H. (1993). Welfare is to do with what animals feel. Journal of Agricultural & Environmental Ethics, 6(Supplement 2), 8-14.
-
Duncan, I. J. H. (1996). Animal welfare defined in terms of feelings. Acta Agriculturae Scandinavica, Section A: Animal Science (Supplement 27), 29-35.
-
The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union. (2010). Directive 2010/63/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2010 on the protection of animals used for scientific purposes.
-
Fraser, D., Weary, D. M., Pajor, E. A., & Milligan, B. N. (1997). A scientific conception of animal welfare that reflects ethical concerns. Animal Welfare, 6(3), 187-205.
-
Kiley-Worthington, M. (1989). Ecological, ethological, and ethically sound environments for animals: toward symbiosis. Journal of Agricultural Ethics, 2(4), 323-347.
-
Lund, V., & Röcklinsberg, H. (2001). Outlining a conception of animal welfare for organic farming systems. Journal of Agricultural & Environmental Ethics, 14(4), 391-424.
-
Regan, T. (1983). The case for animal rights. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
-
Regan, T. (2004). Preface to the 2004 edition. In The case for animal rights (pp. xi-xlix). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
-
Rollin, B. E. (1993). Animal welfare science and value. Journal of Agricultural & Environmental Ethics, 6(Supplement 2), 44-50.
-
Yeates, J. W., Röcklinsberg, H., & Gjerris, M. (2011). Is welfare all that matters? A discussion of what should be included in policymaking regarding animals. Animal Welfare, 20(3), 423-432.
| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 637 | 104 | 46 |
| Full Text Views | 61 | 6 | 1 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 77 | 13 | 1 |
Deprivation as Un-Experienced Harm?
A Critical Analysis of Tom Regan’s Principle of Harm
In: Society & AnimalsSearch for other papers by Külli Keerus in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Search for other papers by Mickey Gjerris in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Search for other papers by Helena Röcklinsberg in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Abstract
Tom Regan encapsulated his principle of harm as a prima facie direct duty not to harm experiencing subjects of a life. However, his consideration of harm as deprivation, one example of which is loss of freedom, can easily be interpreted as a harm, which may not be experienced by its subject. This creates a gap between Regan’s criterion for moral status and his account of what our duties are. However, in comparison with three basic paradigms of welfare known in nonhuman animal welfare science, Regan’s understanding coheres with a modified version of a feelings-based paradigm: not only the immediate feelings of satisfaction, but also future opportunities to have such feelings, must be taken into account. Such an interpretation is compatible with Regan’s understanding of harm as deprivation. The potential source of confusion, however, lies in Regan’s own possible argumentative mistakes.
| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 637 | 104 | 46 |
| Full Text Views | 61 | 6 | 1 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 77 | 13 | 1 |