The article examines how informal networks inside the Russian state influenced the formation and further development of the country’s financial markets during the 1990s and 2000s. The main argument is that the activities of these networks made it difficult to implement any coherent state regulation policy in the field. At the same time, rivalry between competing informal networks and different organizations contributed to institutional development and some improvements. The result was a dualist institutional structure of the Russian speculative financial markets that reproduced itself throughout the period in question. The study is based on in-depth interviews conducted at Moscow-based financial institutions.
Alla Dvoretskaia“Capital Market Finance for the Nonfinancial Sector,”Problems of Economic Transitionno. 4 (August 2008): 49–50; Alexander Abramov “Rossiiskii finansovyi rynok v 2008–2009 godakh: dinamika antikrizisnaya podderzhka institutsional’nye problemy” in Rossiiskaya ekonomika: Tendentsii i perspektivy ed. Sergei Sinel’nikov-Murylev (Moscow: Prospekt 2010) 181–86.
Janine R. Wedel“Clans, Cliques and Captured States: Rethinking ‘Transition’ in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union,”Journal of International Development15 no. 4 (2003); Steen Political Elites and the New Russia 141–166; Andrei Yakovlev “Interest Groups and Economic Reform in Contemporary Russia: Before and after Yukos” in Politics and the Ruling Group in Putin’s Russia ed. Stephen White (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2008); Kononenko & Moshes eds. Russia as a Network State; Anton Oleinik Vlast’ i rynok: sistema sotsial’no-ekonomicheskogo gospodstva v Rossii ‘nulevykh’ godov (Moscow: rosspen 2011); Alena Ledeneva Can Russia Modernise?: Sistema Power Networks and Informal Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2013).
Sharon W. Rivera et al.“Interviewing Political Elites: Lessons from Russia,”Political Science & Politics35 no. 4 (December 2002); Sean P. Roberts “Research in Challenging Environments: The Case of Russia’s ‘Managed Democracy’” Qualitative Research 13 no. 3 (July 2012). A recent study reports a more positive experience of research interviewing: Jordan Gans-Morse “Threats to Property Rights in Russia: From Private Coercion to State Aggression” Post-Soviet Affairs no. 3 (October 2012): 294.
Viktor Gerashchenko“Kogda vse razmerenno – neinteresno,” in Ocherki istorii Banka Rossii: Tsentral’nyi apparated. Nikolai Krotov (Moscow: Ekonomicheskaia letopis’2011) 490; head of a media group affiliated with the rts brokers interviewed November 23 2011.
Mikhail Alekseev“Nam est’ chto vspomnit’…,”Depozitariumno. 1(47) (January 2007): 18–19. Alekseev was one of the most influential bankers from the privately owned oligarchic Oneximbank who helped Kozlov to launch the micex stock section. In this article he wrote that the cbr’s strong presence in the Russian financial markets was very much due to Kozlov’s energy and personal qualities such as his ability to undertake “unusual and nonstandard actions” that could transcend “unwritten ethical norms and notions that many people believed in.” This characterization corresponds well with judgements expressed by those market participants who knew Kozlov and whom I interviewed or had informal talks with.