THE INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT OF PROFESSIONAL PLAYERS: ISSUES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW

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THE INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT OF PROFESSIONAL PLAYERS: ISSUES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW

in Spanish Yearbook of International Law Online

References

1. It is interesting to recall the controversy triggered in May/June 1997 when Ronaldo (then a player of Barcelona FC) was signed up by Milan's Inter. In a similar way to the Ronaldo case, consideration was also given to whether it was valid for Athletic de Bilbao player Lizarazu to be signed up by Bayem. See, in this connection, http://www.iusportes/casoslronaldo.htm. 2. See the judgment of 14 October 1996 by Social Affairs Court no. 2 in Santander (G.J.C.E., B-117, 1996, p. 55 et seq.) in a case of discrimination for reasons of nationality. 3. Hereinafter, ECJ. 4. Hereinafter, EEC Treaty. 5. ECJ Judgment of 15 December 1995, Bosman case, C-415/93, Rec. 1995, p. U4921 et seq. 6. This was stressed by the Commission (Marcelino Oreja's reply to written question E-2773/95, OJ C 137, 8 May 1996, p. 3) and the doctrine (see, especially, A. BANEGIL ESPINOSA, "La aplicacion del Derecho comunitario europeo al deporte despues de la sentencia del Tribunal de Justicia de la CE sobre el caso Bosman", Actualidad JurldicaAranzadi, no. 228, I I January 1996, p. 6).

7. Application of articles 59-66, 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty to the Deliège cases, C-51/96 (OJ C 133, 4 May 1996, p. 12) and C-191/97 (OJ C-21, 12 July 1997, p. 18) on preliminary rulings referred to the Court of First Instance of Namur (Belgium). For an approach to the content of the Deliege cases, see N. PARISIS, M. FERNANDEZ SALAS, "Le sportif individuel au regard de I'arr8t Bosman: les ordonnances Deliège", ft Af.{/£., 1996-1, p. 135 et seq. 8. Application of articles 6, 48, 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty, Gehtonen case, C-176/96 (OJC 197, 6 July 1996), preliminary ruling referred to the Court of First Instance of Brussels. 9. Analysing the arguments of case law pronounced at the time, see T. SALA FRANCO, El trabajo de los deportistas profesionales, Madrid, Mezquita, 1983, pp. 10- 11. 1.

10. See infm the section on the free movement of workers, which clearly states, in relation to the Bosman case, that federations have a set of regulations that are aimed at regulating exclusively the contractual relations between professional players and sporting bodies. 11. This problem has still been found in some sports such as basketball. See infm section 111. the Olssen case. 12. See the judgment of the TC of 24 June 1971, which marked a turning point in Spanish case law with respect to labour affairs. 13. See T. SALA FRANCO (El trabajo de los deportistas profesionales, op. cit., pp. 11-12), which contains the subsequent case law displaying the new approach of Spanish labour courts. 14. In this connection see the abundant doctrine cited by R. ROQUETA BUJ, El trabajo de los deporti.sras profesionales, Valencia, Tirant lo Blanch, 1996, p. 26, note 7. A. V SEMPERE NAVARRO, in the preface to the monograph by M. CARDENAL CARRO (Deporte y DerecHa Las relaciones laborales en el deporte profesional, Murcia, Universidad de Murcia, Eusko Jaurlaritza, Bilbao Bizkaia Kutxa, 1996, p. 18) attributes the change of direction of case law to the article by M. ALONSO OLEA ("Derecho y Deporte", CPS, n. 47, 1960), which was both triggered and directly inspired this change of viewpoint. 15. Ley 13/1980, 31 March, BOE, 12 April. 16. See article 8.1 of the aforesaid. 17. Royal Decree 318/1981, 5 February, establishing regulations for the special labour relations of professional players, BOE, 6 March 1981. 18. Royal Decree 1006/1985, 26 June, regulating the labour relations of professional players, BOE, 27 June 1985, errors corrected in BOE, 28 June and BOE, 4 July 1985.

19. Hereinafter, Brussels Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJL 299, 31 December 1972), ratified by the 6 founder states of the EEC. Later amended by successive accessions of new Member States. For the so-called consolidated version, or amended text, which has no binding force but contains and integrates the different amendments resulting from the 1968 BC, see OJC 189, 28 July 1990, text reflected in Legislaci6n btisica de Derecho internacional privado, A. BORRAS RODRIGUEZ et al., p. 116 et seq. See also the official report by Almeida Cruz, Desantes Real and Jenard, OJC 189, 28 July 1990. It should also be borne in mind that a new Accession Convention was signed to incorporate Austria, Finland and Sweden to the BC, signed on 29 November 1996 in Brussels (OJ C 15, 15 January 1997). 20. Ley Orgánica 6/1985 (1 July) del Poder Judicial, BOE 2 July 1985; corrected in BOE, 4 November 1985. 21. Hereinafter, RC. Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations, made in Rome on 19 June 1989, BOE, 19 July 1993, corrected in BOE, 9 August 1993. 22. The application of the BC does not depend on the nature of the court or tribunal hearing a case. The bulk of Spanish jurisdiction regarding individual employment contracts in Spain is governed by the BC, whenever this is applicable, even though in Spain these matters are dealt with by the labour courts. See article 1 BC and ECJ Judgment of 21 April 1993, Sonntag v waidmann, C-172/91, Rec. 1993, p. 1/1963 et seq.

23. It is also worth considering the Lugano Convention of 16 September 1988 relating to jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (BOE, 20 October 1994, errors corrected in BOE, 10 January 1995), which is very similar to the BC, to which it owes its content. See A. BORRAS RODRIGUEZ, "Comp�encia judicial internacional y ejecuci6n de resoluciones judiciales en materia civil y mercantil: del Convenio de Bruselas de 27 de septiembre de 1968 al Convenio de Lugano de 16 de septiembre de 1988", Noticias CEE, n. 50, 1989, pp. 92-103. The JenardlMöllerreport, OJC 189, 28 July 1990, p. 73, on the Lugano Convention, establishes that an employment contract is one which entails a link of dependence of the worker on the employer, availing itself of the case law of the ECJ established thitherto in developing article 5.1 BC. 24. See ECJ Judgment, 15 January 1987, Shenavai v Krei.rcher, n. 266/85, Rec. 1987, p. 239 et seq., point 16 of grounds. 25. As J. L. IRIARTE ANGEL points out ("El Convenio de Bruselas de 27 de septiembre de 1968 yla competencia judicial internacional respecto de los litigios derivados del contrato individual de trabajo", Relaciones Laborales, 1996, I, p. 1322), two notes emerge from the building of case law on this autonomous concept: the performance of work for an employer and the worker's dependence on the employer. For his part, H. GAUDEMETTALLON (Competence internationale, reconnaissance et execution des jugements en Europe, 2nd ed., Paris, 1996, p. 123) states that according to the new wording of article 5.1 BC introduced by the San Sebastian Convention, it should be a contract of employment in the strict sense where there is a relationship of subordination of worker to employer 26. The ECJ intmduced a forum specifically applicable to individual employment contracts based on the characteristic performance of the contract, that is, the place where the work is carried out, in order to protect the worker (ECJ Judgment, 26 May 1982, Ivenel v Schwab, 133/81, Rec. 1982, p. 1891 et seq.). Later confirmed by ECJ Judgment on 15 January 1987, Shenavai v Kreischer, 266/85, Rec. 1987, p. 239 et seq. Subsequently, the ECJ, in a judgment of 13 July 1993 (Mulox IBCLimited v H. Geels, C-125/92, Rec. 1993, p. 1/4075 et seq.), established that place is where or from which the worker mainly performs his duties towards the employer. The amendment was introduced into the regulatory text by means of the 1989 Accession Convention. 27. As regards the latter element, it should be borne in mind that owing to the very nature of the work and the characteristics of the environment in question, the work is habitually performed at the site where the sporting association has its headquarters (where the sports and training facilities and infrastructure are,

where most of the competitive or sporting events are played), even though some of the sporting activities may be carried out abroad, with varying frequency. The criterion contained in article 5.1 in fine BC or LC, which differ on this point, is not applicable See ECJ Judgment, 13 July 1993 (Mulox IBC Limited v H. Geels, C-125/92, Rec. 1993, pp. I/4105--4107), where the place the work is performed is established as being that in which or from which the worker mainly performs his duties with respect to his uadertakiag. See also ECJ Judgment, 9 January 1997 (Rutten v Cross Medical Ltd, Rec. 1997, p. 1/70 et seq. settled by applying the amendment included by the 1989 Accession Convention, which confirms the same case-law criterion. See M. CHECA MARTfNEZ's comment, "El foro del lugar de cumplimiento de la obligacion contractual en el Convenio de Bruselas: avances en el contrato de trabajo plu�localizado", La Ley. Union Europea, 25 March 1997, pp. 4-6. 28. In this precept the elements that make up labour relations are: regula�ty, voluntary devotion to playing sport for an employer (in the framework of the organisation and management of a club or sporting body) and remuneration of the professional player; the compensation of expenses arising from playing this sport cannot be considered remuneration. 29. Concerning this provision see E. ZABALO ESCUDERO "La competencia en materia de contrato de trabajo. El articulo 25.1 de la Ley Orginica del Poder Judicial de 1985", R.E.D./., 1986, p. 615 et seq. 30. Article 25 LOPJ contains other law courts but they are not relevant to this article. Indeed, this provision also includes the attribution "when the defendant is domiciled in Spanish territory", but in that case the BC and not the LOPJ is applicable. This is also the case when the defendant has "an agency branch, delegation or any other representation in Spain" but the sporting bodies do not operate through this type of establishment. In the same way, the Spanish courts have jurisdiction "when the worker and the employer are of Spanish nationality, wherever the services are provided or the contract was concluded", but in the sporting world if a Spanish club hires a Spanish professional player it does so in order for the player to perform his work in Spain. At any rate, this is an improper forum (for exorbitant) which it was feared could have been included in article 3 BC at the time Spain acceded to the BC, see E. ZABALO ESCUDERO "La competencia en materia de contrato de trabajo...", op. cit., p. 629. But this was not so, although it deserves to be included, also I. GUARDANS & CAMS(5, "Articulo 3", in (Comentario al Convenio de Bruselas...," op. cit., pp. 71-72. Finally, article 25 LOPJ provides for a law court with jurisdiction over shipping contracts.

31. Pursuant to article 12.1 CC, in accordance with which the classification in order to establish the regulations applicable to disputes shall always be done pursuant to Spanish law. See, above all, S. ALVAREZ GONZALEZ, "Articulo 12.1 Cc.", in M. ALBALADEJO & S. DIAZ ALABART (Dirs.), Comentarios al C6digo Civil y a las Compilaciones forales, 2nd ed., book I, vol. II, Madrid, Revista de Derecho Privado/EDERSA, 1995, pp. 842--880. 32. This is the position of A. KASSIS (Le nouveau drait europien des contrats internationas

39. See J. CARRASCOSA GONZALEZ & M. C. RODRtGUEZ-PIÑERO ROYO, "Contrato internacional de trabajo y Convenio de Roma..:', op. cit., p. 1352. 40. With respect to employment contracts in general, see ibid, p. 1351. 1. 41. A professional player of the nationality of an EU Member State who is hired, or capable of being hired by a sporting body with headquarters in another EU Member State can exercise the free movement of workers, since he is a worker. Howeve5 following a classification ex lege fori, the same case is classified as a rendering of services - and the law applicable to the contract is established by articles 3 and 4 RC (uniform rules), and not by article 6 RC, a protective rule provided for individual employment contracts. 42. ECJ Judgment, 14 July 1976, Dona case 13/76, Rec. 1976, p. 1333 et seq. 43. ECJ Judgment, 15 December 1995, Bosman case C-415/93, Rec. 1995, p. 1/4921 et seq. 44. For example, ECJ Judgment of 12 December 1974, Walsave case 36/74, Rec. 1974, p. 1405 et seq; 23 February 1994, Schok case C-419/92, Rec. 1994, p. 1/505 et seq. 45. ECJ Judgment, 19 March 1963, Unger case 75/63, Rec. 1964, p. 347 et seq. 46. ECJ Judgment, 23 February 1982, Levin case 53/81, Rec. 1982, p. 1035 et seq. 47. See, above all, M. CASTELLANETA, "Libera circolazione del calciatori e disposizioni della FIGC", D.C.S.l., 1994-4, pp. 646-650. 48. The Court of Justice could not have been clearer when it pointed out that professional or semi- professional football players "who are nationals of a Member State benefit in all other Member States from the community provisions on the free movement of persons and services" (ECJ Judgment of 14 July 1976, Dons case, n. 13/76, Rec. 1976, p. 1340, point 12 of grounds).

49. See in this context M. THILL, "L'arret Bosman et ses implications pour la libre circulation des spottifs � I'int6rieur de 1'Union europeenne dans des contextes factuels diff6rents de ceux de I'affaire Bosman", R.M. U.E., 1996-1, p. 105. 50. This is upheld by the Commission in an unpublished opinion by its Legal Service of April 1996, which declared that the nationals ofthe following 13 countries would find themselves in this situation: the three European countries that are part of the European economic area, plus Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Turkey, Poland, Hungary, Slwakia, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Romania. Nationals of Switzerland, Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania would not benefit from this, neither would nationals of South American countries (Directorate General X, Information on the Bosman Case, unpublished text, 29 October 1996, pp. 3-6 and 12-13). In Spain, this interpretation has been corroborated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, following consultation with the Professional Football League. As a result, the Trgo club Celta has managed to register a national of the European economic area (Norway, to be precise) as a community player despite the controversy with the Professional Football Association (As, 26 August 1997, p. 19). See also, in the doctrine, L. NYSSEN and X. DENOEL, "La situation des ressortissants de pays tiers a la suite de I'arrit Bosman", R.M.U.E.. 1996-1, p. 119 et seq. In this connection, the sporting federations have ended up accepting the ruling of the Bosman judgment and have also acknowledged that players from the European economic area are not foreigners (Circular 592, 19 February 1996, of FIFA and Book 12 of the General Rules of the Spanish Royal Football Federation, following amendments of 20 March 1997). 51. Circulars 611, 27 March 1997, and 616, 30 May 1997, of FIFA �<�.'/�WMt/t/� coM�Mcm�&oo�tctMte�. 52. Nonetheless, the wages earned by professional players should not be confused with the compensation they must pay in the event that the labour relations are terminated voluntarily by the professional player.

53. The entry into force of the RC in Spain on 1 September 1993 not only entailed the virtual derogation of article 10.6 CC - conflict rule applicable to employment contracts - but also of article 1.4 of the Workers' Charter (E2) - a rule whereby the scope of Spanish labour legislation was extended to include cases in which services are rendered abroad by a Spanish worker hired in Spain by a Spanish undertaking -, a doubt raised by F. J. GARCIMARTIN ALFÉREZ ("Espaiia se adhiere al Convenio de Roma de 19 de junio de 1980 sobre ley aplicable a las obligaciones contractuales", R.E.D.L, vol. YJVI, 1994-1, pp. 446-450) and settled by J. CARRASCOSA GONZALEZ & M. C. RODRfGUEZ-P11�ER0 ROYO ("Contrato internacional de trabajo.:', op. cit., pp. 1344-1346). 54. Giulicmo/Lagarde report (OJ C 327, 11 December 1992, p. 25), considering the worker, like the consumer, to be the weaker party in the contractual relation. 55. In principle, the rest of the rules contained in article 6 RC are not relevant to employment contracts of professional players. Rule b) is not applicable since the professional player habitually carries out his work in the same country, and the rule about closer connections with another country is difficult to apply, as the work is habitually carried out in the country where the undertaking has its principal place ofbusiness is and of which it is a national.

56. R. M. MOURA RAMOS, "El contrato individual de trabajo", op. cit., p. 1896. 57. See section 1.2. 58. It is necessary to distinguish between rules on domestic public policy, rules that cannot be derogated from by contract and pertain to contractual law, and rules on international public policy (ordre public). For a distinction between internal and international public policy see, above all, 1. C. FERNANDEZ ROZAS & S. SANCHEZ LORENZO, Curso de Derecho internacional privado, Madrid, Civitas, 1996, pp. 381-382. 59. 1. F. MERINO MERCHAN expresses this in much harsher terms ("Valor jusidico de la clausula de rescision de Ronaldo. Conflicto juddico entre la normativa de la FIFA y el Derecho comunitario europeo", La Ley, 1997-4, p. 1311) stating that "The international sporting structures (FIFA, UEFA) are stuck in an

archaic and incomplete statutory position that upholds an autonomous, closed set of laws that are binding for all their members and isolated from the general system of sources of national and community law". 60. Indeed, Spanish law has chosen to grant the federations certain jurisdictional and sanctioning powers, see the Ley de! Deporte 10/1990. 61. The Spanish football league and the Champions League, for example. 62. For example, the rules on doping and the possibility that the federation's own agencies may establish an appropriate sanction. See, in this connection, in the international sphere J. A. R. NAFZINGER ("International Sports Law as a Process for Resolving Disputes", LC.L.Q., vol. 45, 1996, pp. 130-149), analysing several cases and reaching the conclusion that the courts would be well-advised to take sporting rules into consideration, and allow the decisions delivered by arbitration boards. 63. See K. van MIERT, "Sport et concurrence: developpements recents et action de la Commission", R.M. U.E., 1997-4, p. 7.

64. See A. BORRAS RODRIGUEZ, "Existe-t-il un droit international du sport", Nouveaux itineraires en Droit. Hommage a F. RIGAUX, Brussels, Bruylant, 1993, pp. 111-120. 65. Article 6 BC - on individual employment contracts- establishes the law that will govern the contract and this law is always the law of a country, which means that there is no place for contracts without law, or contracts subjected to a transnational or anational law As argued by A. KASSIS, Le nouveau droit europ6en..., op. cit., p. 373 et seq. 66. See A. BORRAS RODRIGUEZ, "Existe-t-il un droit international du sport", op. cit., pp. 1 l l-120. 67. The tension between federation rules and state law is clearly displayed in article 1.4 of the Statutes of the RF.E.F, approved by decision of the Consejo Superior de Deportes (Higher Council for Sports) on 19 February 1993, which establishes that the R.RE.E "accepts and undertakes to fulfil" the statutes of FIFA and UEFA, though it adds that "provided this is within the Spanish legal system". See the text in Aranzadi 1993, n. 772, amended in other parts by a Decision of 15 October 1993, Aranzadi 1993, n. 2961, and a Decision of 25 October I996, Aranzadi 1996, n. 2836.

68. Except for Portuguese law (in this connection, see, at http://www.iusportesleronicashim, p. 6, M. CARDENAL CARRO's review of J. LEAL AMADO's book, Contrato de trabalho desportivo). 69. For a specific analysis of this cause for termination, see E. BORRAJO DACRUZ "Extincion del contrato de trabajo deportivo por voluntad del futbolista profesional", in Homenaje a J. GARCtA ABELLAN, Murcia, Universidad de Murcia, 1994, pp. 27-39. Also, R. ROQUETA BUJ, El trabajo de los deportistas piofesionales, Valencia, Tirant lo Blanch, 1996, p. 305 et seq; M. CARDENAL CARRO, Deporte y Derecho Las relaciones laborales en el deporte profesional, Murcia, Universidad de Murcia, Eusko Jauriaritza y Bilbao Bizkaia Kutxa, 1996, p. 353. 70. Similarly, in article 9;j) of RD 318/1981, although with problems, since in practice it was difficult to use this cause for termination. 71. It is necessary to bear in mind that the different grounds for discharge from duty are included within the scope of lex contractus, in accordance with article 10.1, d) RC.

72. The comparison between the foreign law chosen and Spanish law should be restricted to the subject-matter under dispute. In this case, the unilateral termination of the contract by the worker. On this issue, see J. CARRASCOSA GONZALEZ, M. C. RODRtGUEZ-PINERO ROYO "Contrato intemacional de trabajo y ...", op. cit., pp. 1352-1353. 73. By contrast, the rules on health and safety of workers or those on dismissal are mandatory, see STS, 10 December 1990, fifth ground, 2 c.) See E. ZABALO ESCUDERO, El contrato de trabajo en el Derecho internacional privado espafiol, Barcelona, Bosch, 1983, pp. 179-195; in Portuguese doctrine, R M. MOURA RAMOS, Da lei aplicivel ao contrato de travalho internacional, Coimbra, Almedina, 1990, pp. 724-725, note 738, and pp. 783-792; in French doctrine, P. COURSIER, Le conflit de lois en matiire de contrat de travail, Paris, L.G.D.J., 1993, p. 129. 74. See R. M. MOURA RAMOS, Da lei aplicavel ao contrato de travalho internacional, op. cit., p. 790. 75. Indeed, the possibility of voluntary termination of contract by the worker is detived from the right of free choice of profession or trade, applying it to RD 1006/85, see E. BORRAJO DACRUZ "Extinci6n del contrato de trabajo deportivo por voluntad del futbolista profesional", op. cit., p. 29. Also, L. M. CAZORLA PRIE1'O, "La nulidad de las clausulas", El Mundo, 7 November 1997, p. 54. For a general approach, I. ALBIOL MONTESINOS, "Dimision del trabajador", in Comentarios a las Leyes laborales. El Estatuto de los trabajadores, book IX, vol. 1, Madrid, Edersa, 1983, p. 166 (even in temporary contracts, see. p. 171). See also A. MARTfN VALVERDE, "El ordenamiento laboral en la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional" R.P.S., n 137, 1983, p. 136. It is necessary to distinguish between freedom to work and right to work. From the latter emerges a limit to the discretion of the employer with regard to termination of the employment contract, see R. SASTRE IBARRECHE, El derecho al trabajo, Madrid, Trotta, 1996, p. 231 et seq. See also J. A. SAGARDOY BENGOECHEA & I. SAGARDOY DE SIM6N, "Articulo 35 CE" in O. ALZAGA VILLAAMIL (Dir.), Comentarios a la CE de 1978, Madrid, Civitas, 1996, pp. 594-595.

76. This is despite the penalties agreed on, because they would be very likely to be considered abusive by the judge of a Spanish labour court. Precisely the sum of money (consider the exaggeration - the termination clause in Francisco Lopez's contract with theEspanyol team amounts to 70,000 million pesetas - the situation has reached at hup.-IAvwwiusporteslopinionlclausula.htm, the source of which is the sporting daily Marca) established in these clauses invalidates the protective aim of RD 1006/85. See, in this context, E. BORRAJO DACRUZ "Extinci6n del contrato de trabajo deportivo..:', op. cit., p. 35; L.M. CAZORLA PRIETO, "La nulidad de las clausulas", El Mundo, 7 November 1997, p. 54. 77. See P. COURSIER, Le conflit de lois en matiere de contrat de travail, op. cit., p. 178 et seq. 78. The problem would then lie in the compensation fee for training, which, as pointed out by J.A. SAGARDOY BENGOECHEA & J. M. GUERRERO OSTOLAZA (El contrato de trabajo del deportista profesional, Madrid, Civitas, 1991, p. 6I), entails "an indirect form of maintaiuing the aforementioned right of retention". Insofar as community law is applicable, the question is settled by the ECB (see infia heading IV). 79. See J. F. MERINO MERCHAN, "Ronaldo pod6 fichar por el Inter o cualquier otro club de la Urri6n Europea", La Ley, 1997-4, pp. I160-1161. 1. 80. See infia section IV LB.

81. The rules on transfers (which are defined as the operation whereby an affiliated player obtains a change of encumbrance - contract - becoming bound to another club) required any player whose contract was expiring and who wanted to conclude another with a different club to pay a compensation for transfer, training and development. The nationality clauses were known as the 3 + 2 rule, according to which national associations were able to limit to three the number of foreign players that a national club could field for a first-division national championship match, plus two players who had played for a period of five years without interruption in the country of the national association in question, three in a junior category. This limitation was also applied to competition matches by teams organised by UEFA (that is, to European competitions). 82. Opinion of Advocate-General LENZ, 20 September 1995, Bosman case, C-415/93, Rec. 1995, p. 1/4930 et seq.

83. ECJ Judgment, 15 December 1995, Bosman case, C-415/93, Rec. 1995, p. 1/4921 et seq. 84. In addition to the authors specifically mentioned, see, among many others, G. AUNEAU, "Le mouvement sportif européen à l'épreuve du droit commuaautaire", R.T.D.E., 1996-1, pp. 101-119; A. BANEG1L ESPINOSA, "Derecho comunitario europeo y derecho del deporte: efecto directo y derecho de la competencia", La Ley. Union Europea, n. 3954, 17 January 1996, p. 1-8; A. KORMAN, "The Repercussions in England of the European Court of Justice Judgment in the Jean-Marc Bosman Case", Sports Law and Finance, November-December 1995, pp. 44-117; F VANDAMME, "La Communaute eurap6enne etle sportif professionnel", AMC.ME., n. 398, 1996, pp. 353-357. 85. So deep an impression did it make that on 29 March 1996, at the beginning of the Intergovernmental Conference in Turin, they even asked the heads of state and government to include a specific clause on sport in the Treaty on European Union, just as there is one on culture (Europe, no. 6680, 4/5 March 1996, p. 9). Although this proposal had some impact on the Italian and Belgian governments (see F. FERNANDEZ SALAS, "De la possibilit6 de renverser 1'arret Bosman par une modification du Trait6", RM. U.E., 1996-1, pp. 155-156) and on the community institutions (see European Parliament, "Resolucion sobre la Conferencia Intergubernamental de 1996 y la preparación de la Confetencia de Turin", 13 March 1996, G.J.C.E., 1996, B-111, p. 40), it was not included in the Amsterdam Treaty of 2 October 1997, which in a declaration on sport that was annexed to the Final Act (and as such is non- binding) merely acknowledges the social importance of sport and in particular its role in forging identity and reconciling peoples, and appeals to the European Union bodies to listen to sporting associations when important issues are at stake that interest sport, particularly amateur sport. Refusing to be deterred, FIFA began 1998 with an attitude of confrontation that does not presage anything positive. On the one hand, it has again requested that the EEC Treaty be amended to exclude football from the scope of community law, particular in social issues (Europe, 8 January 1998, p. 14). On the other hand, FIFA, at the request of Juventus of Turin, is demanding that Atletico de Madrid pay 4136 6 million lira (some 325 million pesetas) as a supplementary amount that it claimed was outstanding for the transfer of Vieri to the Spanish club after he signed up for 2600 million (El Pats, 14 January 1998, p. 46), even though this player is Italian.

86. See supra no. 7 for greater detail. 87. These fines would be based on the fact that such rules infringe competition rules, not the free movement of workers (Commission-Directorate General X-, Information on the Bosman Case, unpublished text, 29 October 1996, especially pp. 3-6). 88. See a general overview of the response of professional football to the Bosman judgment in 1. DIEZ-HOCHLEITNEF, and A. MARTtNEZ SANCHEZ, "La contribuci6n de la sentencia Bosman a la libre circulaci6n de trabajadores )y al deporte?", G.J.C.E., 1996, D-26, p. 280 et seq. 89. El Pais, 27 August 1997, p. 28. 90. In the recent strike the basketball players threatened to stage with respect to the 1998 King's Cup, the goal of reducing the excessive number of foreigners in this sport only affected nationals of third states, not EU nationals (El Mundo, sports section, 24 January 1988, p. 39). 91. The conflict stemmed from the different positions of the parties involved. The Spanish Handball Federation and the Association of Players considered that the Bosman judgment was not applicable because handball is not a professional sport, and EU players would thus continue to be regarded as foreigners for the

purposes of the agreement signed on 7 April 1995 between ASOBAL (Association of Clubs) and the Association of Handball Players, whereby the maximum number of players who cannot be fielded, that is, foreigners - whether EU or third-country nationals - who could take part in official handball competitions was limited to 3. ASOBAL was opposed to this, as were clubs with more foreign players than those permitted by these rules, even though several are nationals of other member states, such as the case of Caja Cantabria and Teucro. The dispute was settled following the decision of Social Affairs Court no. 2 in Santander on 14 October 1996 (asDlsson G.J.C.E., B-117, 1996, p. 55 et seq.; for a commentary, see A. MARTINEZ StLNCHEZ, "Asunto Olsson: una juez de Santander aplica la sentencia Bosman en favor de un jugador sueco de balonmano", G.J.C.E., 1996, B-117, p. 5 et seq.) and the approval by the government on 14 November 1997 of a Royal Decree including handball players in the Social Security system from 1 January 1998 (RD 1708/1997, B. O.E. 284, 27 November 1997, p. 34875 et seq.). 92. There are, by contrast, other provisions in Circular 616 that are not incompatible with community law, particularly those establishing a compensation fee for the training or development of footballers, although - in accordance with the Basman judgment - it expressly excludes from its scope those who are EU nationals.

93. In comparison, the Spanish Football Federation put forward a report by the Professor of Labour Law of the Universidad Complutense of Madrid, Juan Antonio Sagardoy, stating that Circular 616 does not affect article 48 of the EEC Treaty because refusal to transfer a footballer "does not prevent him playing or working; rather, it denies him a federation licence, a formalism similar, for example, to that required by a Spanish lawyer or doctor to exercise their profession in another EU country" (see summary at http://www.iusport.es/casos/ronaldo.htm, pp. 14-15). 94. The competition and employment commissioners, Karel Van Miert and Padraig Flynn have expressed similar opinions (letter of 2 July 1997, to the Secretary-General of FIFA, IP/97/615, 4 July 1997, at http://Europa.eu.intleulcommlspplrapirLhtm), explaining their preliminary position that Circular 616 may lead, "in the event of termination of a contract by a player who is the national of a member state, wishing to exercise his right of freedom of choice within the Community, to the denial of this right", and recommend that the Executive Committee of FIFA bear in mind that the aforementioned circular "constitutes an unjustified obstacle to the free movement of workers for it not to be sanctioned". 95. Indeed, the Commission would take a favourable view if FIFA were to amend circular 616 in line with RD 1006/85 (El FWs, 5 and 7 July 1997, p. 43 and 49 respectively).

96. Opinion of Advocate-General LENZ on the Bosman case, C-415/93, Rec. 1995, pp. 1/5026-5039. See also his article "La jurisprudencia del TJCE en materia deportiva", Boletin Europeo de la Universidad deLaRioja, 1997-1, supl., p. 2 et seq.). 97. Observations of the Commission in the MANCINI's hearing report to the Bosman judgment, multi-copy text, p. 20-21. The EU executive has subsequently endorsed its position in favour of applying article 85 in letters to FIFA and UEFA dated 19 January 1996 and 2 July 1997 (both at http://Eusopa.eu.intl eulcommlspplrapid.htm); in a document on the consequences of the Bosman judgment (Directorate General X, Information on the Bosman Case, unpublished text, 29 October 1996, particularly. pp. 3-6); in written replies to questions asked by Euro-MPs (for example, to question P-0647/96, OJ C 217, 26 July 1996, pp. 87-88); and in other cases (see, for example, the joint declaration by commissioners Van Miert and Flynn of 7 January 1998, Europe, 8 January 1998, p. 14), including doctrinal writings by its members (K. VAN MIERT, "L'arret Bosman: la suppression des frontieres sportives dans le marche unique europeen", R.M.U.E., 1996-1, p. 5 et seq.). 98. For example, J. VIALS ALONSO, "Las normas de la FIFA sobre traspasos de jugadores no comunitarios, )son compatibles con el Derecho comunitario de la competencia?", G.J.C.E., B-126, 1997, pp. 19-20; R. BLANPAIN and M. CANDELA SORIANO, M., El caso Bosman. )Elfin de la era de los tiaspasos?, Madrid, Civitas, 1997, pp. 31-33; G. CAMPOGRANDE, "Les r6gles de la concurrence et les entreprises sportives professionnelles apres I'arrEt Bosman", R.M.U.E., 1996-1, pp. 45-50;1-L. DUPONT, "Le droit communautaire et la situation du sportif professionnel avant 1'arret Bosman", R.M.U.E., 1996-1, pp. 73-74 and 77. 99. This is the case ofA. GIARDINI, "Libera circolazione dei calciatori nella CEE", D.C.S.L, 1988- 3, pp. 451-455; J. L. RUIZ-NAVARRO PINAR, "La libre circulaci6n de deportistas en la Comunidad Europea", Boletin de Derecho de las Comunidades Europeas, no. 22, 1989, pp. 179-182; S. WEATHERILL, "Discrimination on Grounds of Nationality in Sport", Y.E.L., vol. 9, 1989, pp. 68-80. 100. Observations of URBSFA and UEFA in the Bosman case, the MANCINI's hearing report to the Bosman judgment, multi-copy text, pp. 17-19. 101. Mainly A. BANEGIL ESPINOSA, "La aplicaci6n del Derecho comunitario europeo al deporte despues de la sentencia del Tribunal de Justicia de las CE sobre el caso Bosman", op. ciG, pp. 5-6; M. CARDENAL CARRO, Deporte y derecho..., op. cit., spec. p. 172 et seq.

102. It should be pointed out that the critics of the applicability of article 85 have generally merely denied each of these premises somewhat simplistically and in excessively categorical terms, so much so that they have scarcely contributed any arguments of substance to the debate in favour of their thesis (as compared to the opposite case, specifically cited below). 103. It is true that the ECJ has maintained that articles 85 and 86 the EEC Treaty are applicable, in principle, to all sectors of the economy, so that exclusion only operates when it is the object of a specific provision of the Treaty (for example, Judgment of 30 April 1986, the Asjes case, 209 213/84, Rec. 1986, p.

1425 et seg.). But in the approximately 500 decisions relating to competition law consulted, the question of whether gainful employment was included in the scope of article 85.1 of the EEC Treaty was not raised - formally, at least. And it could well have referred to this issue, at least in cases that generally require its scope. It is also significant that on the first occasion that the issue is raised directly the court should have preferred to opt for the comfortable attitude of not commenting, on the simplistic basis that nationality clauses and transfer rules for EU footballers were already prohibited under another precept (article 48 of the EEC). And it is symptomatic that the ECJ, which followed very closely LENZ's position on article 48 in its judgment, did not however make any comment about the application of competition rules, when its Advocate-General had done so in great detail. The above is reasonable grounds to consider that the precept in question is not applicable to the labour market or, at least, that the issue is not at all clear within the ECJ and, in view of the differing opinions of its members, it has preferred to remain silent about such a sensitive issue in order - as the doctrine has pointed out - that a time for thought will allow "on the one hand, the rippling effect of the Bosman judgment on the organisation of professional sport and, on the other, the result of the future negotiations between the Commission and UEFA on the systems for sharing out earnings" (P. DEMARET, "Introduction. Quelques observations sur la signification de I'arr6t Bosman", R.M. U.E., 1996-1, pp. 14-15). 104. For greater detail on these issues, see, in general, Ch. BELLAMY & G. CHILD, Derecho de la competencia en el mercado comein, Madrid, Civitas, 1992, p. 71-171; I. VAN BAEL & J.-F. BELLIS, Competition Law of the EEC, 2nd ed., Oxford, CCH Editions Limited, 1990, p. 20-46 and 59-66; Ch. GAVALDA & G. PARLEANI, Droit communautaire des affaires, 2nd ed., Paris, Litec, 1992, p. 417-539; M. WAELBROECK & A. FRIGNANI, Concurrence, vol. 4 of Commentaire J. MEGRET. Le droit de la CE, 2nd ed., Bruselas, Editions de l'Universite de Bruxelles, 1997, pp. 7-51 and 123-208; R. WHISH, Competition Law, 3rd ed., London, Butterworths, 1994, p. 186-242. 105. See, for example, ECJ Judgment of 11 January 1990, Sandoz case, n. C-277/87, Rec. 1990, p. 1/45 et seg.; CFI Judgment 11 July 1996, Metropole Television et al, n. T-528, 542, 543 y 546/93, Rec. 1996, p. 11/649 et seq; Decision of the Commission, 16 February 1994 ("Poutrelles"), OJL 116, 6 May 1994, p. 1.

106. For the opposite view, see the observations of the Belgian Royal Union, according to which "only the major clubs may be regarded as undertakings" and "sporting federations may not be regarded as associations of undertakings because the essential feature of their activity would not fall within the economic sphere" (the MANCINI's hearing report to the Bosman judgment, multi-copy text, p. 17). 107. Decision of the Commission, 27 October 1992 (on distribution of tickets), OJL 326, p. 31. 1. 108. OJC 217, 26 July 1996, p. 88. 109. CFI Judgment 9 November 1994, Scottish Football case T 46/92, Rec. 1994, p. 11/1039 et seq. 110. Commission, "La Communaute europeenne et le sport", Doc. SEC (91) 1438 end, 19 September 1991. Ill. The ECJ defines an undertaking as "every entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of the legal status of the entity and the way in which it is financed". (J. 17 February 1993, Poucet case, C-159 and 160/93, Rec. 1993, p. 1/637 et seq.). 112. Reply of the Commission to written question 2391/83, OJC 222, 23 August 1984, p. 21.

113. It should be recalled that this is the reasoning used by the Commission, LENZ and a substantial amount of doctrine to justify the existence of a restriction on competition (see supra). For the opposite reasoning see A. PAPPALARDO & N. PARISIS ("Le droit de la concurrence et le sport professionnel par 6quipe: quelques appreciations critiques sur la notion de march6 en cause, en marge de I'affaire Bosman", RM. U.E., 1996-1, pp. 62-63) state that it is by no means clear what the restrictions on compeitition are in the market of sources of supply. And other authors deny that the sporting regulations in question affect competition, because there is no competition between the clubs of different member states (for example, M. CARDENAL CARRO, "La libre circulaci6n de los futbolistas profesionales: diez consideraciones sobre la sentencia del caso Bosman', Aranzadi Social, vol. 205, 1996, pp. 2661-2663). 114. ECJ Judgment 25 October 1977, Metro case, 26/76, Rec. 1977, p. 1875 et seq. 115. For example, ECJ Judgment, 13 July 1966, Grundig case, 56 and 58/64, Rec. 1966, p. 496 et seq.; 28 February 1991, Delimitis case, C-234/89, Rec. 1991, p. 1/935 et seq. 116. Application of the notion of "sources of supply" by the EU institutions ex article 85 of the Treaty establishing the European Community is very ambiguous, since it is usually mixed up with other types of restrictions on competition and, in particular, the limitation or distribution of goods and services markets. Bearing in mind this warning, see for examination, I. VAN BAEL & J.-E BELLIS, Competition Law of the EEC, op. cit., pp. 173 et seq. and 812 et seq.; M. WAELBROECK & A. FRIGNANI, Concurrence, op. cit., p. 596 et seq. 117. For example, article 1, section 2, of Council Regulation (EC) 1310/97, of the Council amending Regulation (CEE) no. 4064/89, on the control of concentration operations between undertakings, OJL 180, 9 July 1997, p. 1; Commission notice on the definition of the market for the purpose of community competition law, OJC 372, 9 December 1997, pp. 5-6. 118. See any of the general monographs quoted previously. 119. CFI Judgment, 10 March 1992, Yetro case, T-68189, Rec. 1992, p. 11/1403 et seq.

120. Even so, LENZ did not expressly comment on the relevant market, neither did the doctrine supporting his opinion, and neither did the Commission. This is surprising, because in other cases he has been careful to specify that "it is necessary to establish the relevant market, which entails defining both the market of the product and the geographical market of reference" (point 13 of the notice on agreements of minor importance which do not fall within the meaning of article 85 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, OJ C 372, 9 December 1997, p. 13). Indeed, this attitude can only be understood bearing in mind that those who uphold the application of these rules have had to acknowledge that "there is a lack of a clear definition of the market in which the anti-competition effects would occur" (J. VtAS ALONSO, "Las normas de la FIFA sobre traspasos de jugadores no comunitarios...", op. cit., p. 19). 121. L. RITTER, W D. BRAUN & F. RAWLINSON (EEC Competition Rules. A Practitioner's Guide, Deventer, Kluwer, 1991, p. 32-33) cite, among other examples, plant growers and opera singers. 122. Supporting this viewpoint in the specific sphere of professional sport, J-P COT ("Jean-Marc Bosman: travailleur ou marchandise?", Gazette du Palais, 23 May 1996, p. 499) maintains textually that it should be deduced from the attitude of the ECJ in the Bosman case that it "has refused to consider professional players as goods". 123. To cite E. SAGARRA TRIAS ("La cessio obligatoria de jugadors ales seleccions nacionals", Mon Juridic, no. 133, May-June 1997, p. 53), "one of the most important innovations of the Bosman judgment is the statement that the legal relationship binding football players to their clubs is one of employment". 124. Even those who advocate the application of competition rules to professional sport cannot fail to recognise this fact (hence, point 263 of LENZ's general conclusions on the Bosman case). 125. For example, CFI Judgment of 21 February 1995, YSPOB case, T-29/92, Rec. 1995, p. 11/289 et seq. 126. Only in exceptional cases is the competition of certain goods and services restricted and the trade in completely different goods and services affected, since normally when the competition of one is restricted the trade in this good or service or another regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer is affected owing to their properties, price and the use to which they are destined (point 14 of the Commission notice on agreements of minor importance which do not fall within the meaning of article 85 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, OJC 372, 9 December 1997, p. 13). 127. For example, goods such as the right of ownership of sound supports (ECJ Judgment 8 June 1971, Deutsche Grammophon case 78/70, Rec. 1971, p. 487 et seq.) or services such as air transport (ECJ Judgment 30 April 1986, Asjes case 209- 213/84, Rec. 1986, p. 1425 et seq.).

128. See, for this position, R. ZACH, "Wettbewerbsrecht und Freizugigkeit fur Arbeitnehmer im Bereich des Sports nach dem Recht der EG", in W R SCHLUEP, Hommage a Arnold KOLLER, Beme, Stuttgart and Vienna, Stampfli,1993, pp. 852-853. 3. 129. Nonetheless, it has been argued to overcome this barrier that "once the players' contract has ended, they are not employees, but rather suppliers 'foumisseurs' of their own work" (D. O'KEEFFE and P. OSBORNE, "L'affaire Bosman: un arret important pour le bon fonctionnement du march6 unique europeen", RM. U.E., 1996-1, p. 43).

130. To an extent, the Court of Justice also maintains this in point 101 of the grounds, and it can likewise be deduced from LENZ's opinion on the Bosmmi case when, in point 263, he points out that the competition restricted by these rules is competition between clubs, irrespective of the fact that the rules in question restrict the player's freedom. 131. It has even been considered that "the position of players and the restriction on competition" between the clubs who carry out the sporting rules is "inseparable" (M. CARDENAL CARRO, "La libre circulaci6n de los futbolistas profesionales..:', op. cit., p. 2660).

132. To an extent, the economic relations that take place between clubs for the purpose of transfers are comparable to the economic compensation for services rendered deriving from the exercise of the freedom of movement of persons and services, and in this case the ECJ has maintained that this compensation does not constitute an autonomous movement of capital, governed as such by this freedom, but rather a transaction that underlies a provision in the sphere of the free movement of persons and services and, for this reason, pertains to that legal system (J. 31 January 1984, Luisi v Carbone, 286/82 and 26/83, Rec. 1984, p. 377 et seq.). 133. Particularly when the practice of the ECJ reveals that changing the direction of case law is no easy task, since it only occurs when there are substantial reasons, such as a settlement that was originally erroneous, or a correct one that has become antiquated. It is controversial if such conditions should apply to this case. 134. According to LENZ (points 57 and 260 of his opinion on the Bosman case), in the United Kingdom some 51 million pounds were spent during the 1992/1993 season on transfers; and about 96 million marks in Germany in the 1995/1996 season. While the Advocate-General considers that these data prove the importance of the transfer system in today's professional football and, therefore, the existence of a significant restriction on competition and significant effects on trade between Member States, these sums seem more characteristic of a de minimis agreement not prohibited by article 85.1 of the EEC Treaty, as he stresses that the Commission should have included as a criterion to delimit article 85 during the period of the Bosman case the fact that the total turnover of the participating companies did not exceed 300 million ecus (Communication, 23 December 1994, OJC 368, 23 December 1994). 135. For example, with respect to such an important market as Spain, the figures supplied by the media speak for themselves: in the 1996/1997 league 64 community players were registered in Spain in the first and second divisions. The figure rose to 80 in the current 1997/1998 league. In percentage terms, this means that community players accounted for 4.87% and 6.03% of total players in the aforementioned leagues (El Pais, 27 August 1997, p. 28). This is a year in which competition football has been called the league of the stars....

136. There is a lack of data on transfers for, for example, the four most expensive leagues, the Spanish, English, German and Italian; it would have to be established approximately how many community players could be affected; it would be necessary to examine the influence of broadcasting rights on player transfers, since players are becoming more and more expensive and, as a result, termination clauses and transfer fees are too in that they are an important element for establishing them; it would be appropriate to ascertain the volume of these broadcasting rights as a whole with a view to specifying the relevant market; it should be examined in detail whether, and, if so, to what extent, the structure of the football market is affected by them, leading to compartmentalisation. 137. As an exception, albeit partial, see the detailed study of "the symbiotic relationship" from the economic, programming viewpoint, etc., between professional sport and television, and its influence on competition law, by R. ALLENDESALAZAR CORCHO, "Derecho de la competencia, deporte profesional y television", G.J.C.E., 1995, D-23, p. 73 et seq.; and also an approach, more theoretic than practical, to the consequences of the abolishment of the transfer system and nationality clauses on clubs' revenues, the balance of competition, the financial situation of small clubs and players' salaries, by S. KÉSENNE, "L'affaire Bosman et f8conomie du sport professionnel par equipe", R.M. U.E., 1996-1, p. 79 et seq. 138. ECJ Judgment, I July 1985, Remia case, 42/84, Rec. 1985, p. 2545 et seq. 139. ECJ Judgment, 28 February 1991, Delimiris case, C-234/89, Rec. 1991, p. 1/935 et seq. 140. Such as CFI Judgment, 10 March 1992, Societd Italiana Yetro case T-77/89, Rec. 1992, p. II/ I403 et seq. 141. For example, CFI Judgment, 21 February 1995, VSPOB case, no. T-29/92, Rec. 1995, p. 11/289 et seq. 142. Trade refers to economic exchanges between member states as a whole, according to the ECJ (Judgment,14 July 1981, Zuchner case, 172/80, Rec. 1981, p. 2021 et seq.).

143. See the case law cited supra section 1.2. In this connection, UEFA (observations on the Bosman case, in MANCINI's hearing, multicopy text, p. I/18) observed that "transfers of players cannot be regarded as trade". Furthermore, regarding common trade policy, the ECJ has clarified that the notion of "trade" includes the exchange of goods and some - not all - services, without referring at all to workers (for example, Opinion 1/94, 15 November 1994, Rec. 1994, p. 115267 et seq.). 144. For the opposite opinion, see M. WAELBROECK &A. FRIGNANI (Concurrence, op. cit., p. 195, note 372) pointing out briefly and citing expressly LENZ's opinion on the Bosman case, that the term trade would include not only goods and services, but also "transfers of players between undertakings of different member states". 145. It is worth recalling that the ECJ and the Court of First Instance require proof that interstate trade is not affected solely in theory (for example, CFI Judgment 14 July 1994, Parker Ten case, T-77/92, Rec. 1994, p. W549 et seq.). 146. See the figures stated supra no. 37. 147. The Commission has stated in this regard that the contracts of professional players do not have a significant effect on trade between Member States (reply to written question 2391/83, OJC 222, 23 August 1984, p. 21). 148. The Belgian Royal Union points out in this connection that "the transfer system only concerns a minority of clubs and a small number of professional players", and would not "significantly affect trade between member states" (observations on the Bosman case, report for the hearing, p. 1/17).

149. By contrast, some authors advocate the application of article 86 EEC Treaty, such as D. O'KEEFFE & P. OSBORNE, "L'affaire Bosman: un arret important...", op. cit., pp. 41-43; and L. NYSSEN & X. DENOEL, "La situation des ressortissants de pays tiers...", op. cit., pp. 129-132. 150. In general, on the system of this article, see any of the monographs cited supra. 151. See especially points 3 to 5 of the Bosman judgment, specifying the legal status of international federations. 152. The Commission is studying the issue after receiving complaints from football manufacturers and the World Federation of Sporting Goods Industry in 1995, and had carried out a spot inspection on the headquarters of the English Football Federation (BIO/96/23, 22 January 1996, at http://Æuropa.eu.int/eu/comm/spplrapid.htm).

153. The European Parliament Committee on Culture, Yough, Education and the Media, Report on "The European Community and Sport", of 29 April 1994, Document PE 206.671/A/Fin. This controversy, which arose during the Barcelona Olympic Games, has reoccurred in relation to the exclusive system of the sale of tickets for the World Football Championship in France, held in June 1998, since the Commission is demanding that F1FA and the organising committee change the system to introduce greater competition (G.J.C.E., B-128, 1997, p. 54). 154. According to a press release from the Commission on 7 January 1998, (ElMundo, 8 January 1998, p. 39), proceedings have been opened against this system, on the consideration that this requirement is abusive, redundant and contrary to community legislation. 155. The case was recently raised before the Commission in view of UEFA's refusal to grant Wimbledon, a small English first division team, the right to move their headquarters to Dublin and nonetheless take part in the English League, because this measure goes against the exclusive jurisdiction granted to each national federation over their area of influence under sporting rules (El Pafs, 10 February 1998, p. 44). 156. M. CAMPOGRANDE, "Les regles de la concurrence et les entreprises sportives professionnelles apres I'arr6t Bosman", op. cit., p. 56. 157. Pending settlement of the Deliige case by the ECJ, see interesting arguments in favour of this application in N. PARISIS & M. FERNANDEZ SALAS, "Le sportif individuel au regard de I'arrit Bosman..:', op. cit., pp. 148-152.

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