The Ethiopian Federal Democratic Republic (EFDR) Constitution is promulgated in 1994. Under Article (45) of the EFDR the country is restructured from presidential to parliamentary system of government. Since then, the country has been ravaged by the gross violation of the liberty of citizens and the crisis of national unity and consensus among the diversified ethnic groups. The impact of the parliamentary system in aggravating those critical challenges and the comparative advantage of presidantialism is the most ignored political research topic. In this Article, I investigated that the blurry separation of powers of the parliamentary structure of the country has created fusion of powers which has undermined the system of checks and balances. Thus, the executive organ of the government has enabled to concentrate unchecked and unaccountable power which has manifested in the gross violation of the liberty of citizens. Likewise, Article (73) of EFDR has declared that the prime minister and council of ministers of the country to be appointed by the legislators. This has deprived their boarder popular base and authenticity; and equivocally undermined their potency and decisiveness in addressing the existing crisis of national unity and consensus. Comparatively, the presidential structure of government is defined by the firm separation of powers and genuine system of checks and balances. The direct popular election of the president enables the president and council of ministers to secure broader popular base and authenticity. Thus, it is advantageous over parliamentarian structure in terms of protecting the liberty of citizens and addressing the crisis of national unity and consensus in Ethiopia.
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The Ethiopian Federal Democratic Republic (EFDR) Constitution is promulgated in 1994. Under Article (45) of the EFDR the country is restructured from presidential to parliamentary system of government. Since then, the country has been ravaged by the gross violation of the liberty of citizens and the crisis of national unity and consensus among the diversified ethnic groups. The impact of the parliamentary system in aggravating those critical challenges and the comparative advantage of presidantialism is the most ignored political research topic. In this Article, I investigated that the blurry separation of powers of the parliamentary structure of the country has created fusion of powers which has undermined the system of checks and balances. Thus, the executive organ of the government has enabled to concentrate unchecked and unaccountable power which has manifested in the gross violation of the liberty of citizens. Likewise, Article (73) of EFDR has declared that the prime minister and council of ministers of the country to be appointed by the legislators. This has deprived their boarder popular base and authenticity; and equivocally undermined their potency and decisiveness in addressing the existing crisis of national unity and consensus. Comparatively, the presidential structure of government is defined by the firm separation of powers and genuine system of checks and balances. The direct popular election of the president enables the president and council of ministers to secure broader popular base and authenticity. Thus, it is advantageous over parliamentarian structure in terms of protecting the liberty of citizens and addressing the crisis of national unity and consensus in Ethiopia.
All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
---|---|---|---|
Abstract Views | 1109 | 122 | 9 |
Full Text Views | 31 | 6 | 0 |
PDF Views & Downloads | 48 | 12 | 0 |