As George Karamanolis writes, “This period of competing interpretations of Plato is often called ‘Middle Platonism’. The term may convey the sense of transition from the Academic phase of a single interpretation to the pluralism of the imperial centuries. Yet for the same reason it is misleading, as it suggests a doctrinal or ideological unity which, as I argued, is hardly present.” Plato and Aristotle in Agreement? Platonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to Porphyry (Oxford, 2006) p. 27.

As George Karamanolis writes, “This period of competing interpretations of Plato is often called ‘Middle Platonism’. The term may convey the sense of transition from the Academic phase of a single interpretation to the pluralism of the imperial centuries. Yet for the same reason it is misleading, as it suggests a doctrinal or ideological unity which, as I argued, is hardly present.” Plato and Aristotle in Agreement? Platonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to Porphyry (Oxford, 2006) p. 27.)| false
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This point is made by Mortley, Connaissance pp. 167-70 and S. Lilla, Clement of Alexandria: A Study of Christian Platonism and Gnosticism (Oxford, 1971) p. 55. My aim here is to substantiate this observation by illustrating how Stoicism and Platonism, through the framework provided by Philo, can be brought into agreement with one another with respect to the issue of what it is to follow or assimilate to God.

This point is made by Mortley, Connaissance pp. 167-70 and S. Lilla, Clement of Alexandria: A Study of Christian Platonism and Gnosticism (Oxford, 1971) p. 55. My aim here is to substantiate this observation by illustrating how Stoicism and Platonism, through the framework provided by Philo, can be brought into agreement with one another with respect to the issue of what it is to follow or assimilate to God.)| false
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J. Armstrong, ‘After the Ascent: Plato on Assimilating to God,’ Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 26 (2004) pp. 171-83 at p. 173

J. Armstrong, ‘After the Ascent: Plato on Assimilating to God,’ Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 26 (2004) pp. 171-83 at p. 173)| false
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S.G. Pembroke, ‘Oikeiosis’ pp. 114-49 in A.A. Long ed. Problems in Stoicism, (London, 1971); G. Striker, ‘The Role of Oikeiosis in Stoic Ethics,’ Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 1 (1983) pp. 145-67; T. Engberg-Pedersen, ‘Discovering the Good,’ 145-84 in M. Schofield and G. Striker eds. The Norms of Nature: Studies in Hellenistic Ethics (Cambridge, 1986); B. Inwood, ‘Hierocles: Theory and Argument in the Second Century A.D.,’ Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 2 (1984) pp. 151-83; K. Vogt, Law, Reason, and the Cosmic City: Political Philosophy in the Early Stoa (Oxford, 2008) pp. 89-110.

S.G. Pembroke, ‘Oikeiosis’ pp. 114-49 in A.A. Long ed. Problems in Stoicism, (London, 1971); G. Striker, ‘The Role of Oikeiosis in Stoic Ethics,’ Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 1 (1983) pp. 145-67; T. Engberg-Pedersen, ‘Discovering the Good,’ 145-84 in M. Schofield and G. Striker eds. The Norms of Nature: Studies in Hellenistic Ethics (Cambridge, 1986); B. Inwood, ‘Hierocles: Theory and Argument in the Second Century A.D.,’ Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 2 (1984) pp. 151-83; K. Vogt, Law, Reason, and the Cosmic City: Political Philosophy in the Early Stoa (Oxford, 2008) pp. 89-110.)| false
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Vogt, Law, Reason, and the Cosmic City p. 129. Kerford discusses the wise man’s knowledge as the ability to act rightly in any given situation, rather than as a sort of divine omniscience of actual content, in G.B. Kerford, ‘What Does the Wise Man Know?’ pp. 125-137 in John Rist ed. The Stoics (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1978).

Vogt, Law, Reason, and the Cosmic City p. 129. Kerford discusses the wise man’s knowledge as the ability to act rightly in any given situation, rather than as a sort of divine omniscience of actual content, in G.B. Kerford, ‘What Does the Wise Man Know?’ pp. 125-137 in John Rist ed. The Stoics (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1978).)| false
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C. Levy, ‘Philo’s Ethics,’ pp. 146-71 at pp. 146-54 in A. Kamesar ed. Cambridge Companion to Philo (Cambridge, 2009).

C. Levy, ‘Philo’s Ethics,’ pp. 146-71 at pp. 146-54 in A. Kamesar ed. Cambridge Companion to Philo (Cambridge, 2009).)| false
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Wyrwa, Die christliche Platonaneigung pp. 30-2.

Wyrwa, Die christliche Platonaneigung pp. 30-2.)| false
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Wyrwa, Die christliche Platonaneigung pp. 39-41.

Wyrwa, Die christliche Platonaneigung pp. 39-41.)| false
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See Boys-Stones, Post-Hellenistic Philosophy p. 140 n. 50 and pp. 188-94.

See Boys-Stones, Post-Hellenistic Philosophy p. 140 n. 50 and pp. 188-94.)| false
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Van den Hoek, Clement of Alexandria pp. 67-8.

Van den Hoek, Clement of Alexandria pp. 67-8.)| false
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Van den Hoek, Clement of Alexandria p. 58.

Van den Hoek, Clement of Alexandria p. 58.)| false
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Wyrwa, Die christliche Platonaneigung p. 113.

Wyrwa, Die christliche Platonaneigung p. 113.)| false
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J. Lössl, “Origenes und die Begriffe ‘Naturgesetz’ und ‘Gewissen’ nach Röm 2, 14-16” pp. 77-100 in A. Fürst ed. Origenes und sein Erbe in Orient und Okzident (Münster, 2011).

J. Lössl, “Origenes und die Begriffe ‘Naturgesetz’ und ‘Gewissen’ nach Röm 2, 14-16” pp. 77-100 in A. Fürst ed. Origenes und sein Erbe in Orient und Okzident (Münster, 2011).)| false
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For discussion see van den Hoek, Clement of Alexandria p. 59, W. Richardson, ‘The Philonic Patriarchs as Nomos Empsychos,’ Studia Patristica 1 (1957) pp. 512-25 and idem., ‘Nomos Empsychos: Marcion, Clement of Alexandria and St. Luke’s Gospel,’ Studia Patristica 4 (1962) pp. 188-96. The later in particular discusses Clement’s debt to like as the living law, a move which here allows him to connect the Logos of God not only to Moses, but also to the common law of Stoicism. For a more recent discussion see F. Jourdan, “Le Logos de Clément sourmis à la question,” Revue des études augustiniennes 56 (2010), pp. 135-172.

For discussion see van den Hoek, Clement of Alexandria p. 59, W. Richardson, ‘The Philonic Patriarchs as Nomos Empsychos,’ Studia Patristica 1 (1957) pp. 512-25 and idem., ‘Nomos Empsychos: Marcion, Clement of Alexandria and St. Luke’s Gospel,’ Studia Patristica 4 (1962) pp. 188-96. The later in particular discusses Clement’s debt to like as the living law, a move which here allows him to connect the Logos of God not only to Moses, but also to the common law of Stoicism. For a more recent discussion see F. Jourdan, “Le Logos de Clément sourmis à la question,” Revue des études augustiniennes 56 (2010), pp. 135-172.)| false
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See D. Runia, “Why does Clement of Alexandria Call Philo ‘The Pythagorean?’ ” Vigiliae Christianae 49 (1995) 1-22 for discussion.

See D. Runia, “Why does Clement of Alexandria Call Philo ‘The Pythagorean?’ ” Vigiliae Christianae 49 (1995) 1-22 for discussion.)| false
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Lilla, Clement of Alexandria pp. 106-7.

Lilla, Clement of Alexandria pp. 106-7.)| false
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