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We describe the earliest occurrences of the Liar Paradox in the Arabic tradition. The early Mutakallimūn claim the Liar Sentence is both true and false; they also associate the Liar with problems concerning plural subjects, which is somewhat puzzling. Abharī (1200-1265) ascribes an unsatisfiable truth condition to the Liar Sentence—as he puts it, its being true is the conjunction of its being true and false—and so concludes that the sentence is not true. Tūsī (1201-1274) argues that self-referential sen-tences, like the Liar, are not truth-apt, and defends this claim by appealing to a correspondence theory of truth. Translations of the texts are provided as an appendix.
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All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
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Abstract Views | 178 | 50 | 14 |
Full Text Views | 272 | 257 | 0 |
PDF Views & Downloads | 364 | 332 | 0 |
We describe the earliest occurrences of the Liar Paradox in the Arabic tradition. The early Mutakallimūn claim the Liar Sentence is both true and false; they also associate the Liar with problems concerning plural subjects, which is somewhat puzzling. Abharī (1200-1265) ascribes an unsatisfiable truth condition to the Liar Sentence—as he puts it, its being true is the conjunction of its being true and false—and so concludes that the sentence is not true. Tūsī (1201-1274) argues that self-referential sen-tences, like the Liar, are not truth-apt, and defends this claim by appealing to a correspondence theory of truth. Translations of the texts are provided as an appendix.
All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
---|---|---|---|
Abstract Views | 178 | 50 | 14 |
Full Text Views | 272 | 257 | 0 |
PDF Views & Downloads | 364 | 332 | 0 |