Peter John Olivi on Perceptual Representation
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Abstract
This paper studies Olivi’s account of perceptual representation. It addresses two main questions: (1) how do perceptual representations originate? and (2) how do they represent their objects? Regarding (1), it is well known that Olivi emphasizes the activity of the soul in the production of perceptual representations. Yet it is sometimes argued that he overstresses the activity of the soul in a way that yields a philosophically problematic result. I argue that Olivi was well aware of the problem that could be raised for his theory and that he sought to cope with it. Regarding (2), Pasnau argues that for Olivi, causal relationships with external objects determine the content of perceptual representations. I argue that, rather, perceptual representations are about their objects because they are their similitudes. This makes him an internalist about representational content.
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Cf. G. O’Daly, ‘The response to skepticism and the mechanisms of cognition’, in The Cambridge Companion to Augustine, ed. E. Stump and N. Kretzmann (Cambridge, 2001), 159-170, 165.
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J.F. Silva and J. Toivanen, ‘The Active Nature of the Soul in Sense Perception: Robert Kilwardby and Peter Olivi’, Vivarium 48 (2010), 245-278, 276.
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Cf. Silva and Toivanen, ‘The Active Nature of the Soul’, 276.
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D. Perler, ‘Thought Experiments: the Methodological Function of Angels in late Medieval Epistemology’, in Angels in Medieval Philosophical Inquiry: their Function and Significance, ed. I. Iribarren and M. Lenz (Aldershot 2008), 143-154, 144.
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Cf. C. Panaccio, ‘Ockham’s Externalism’ in Intentionality, Cognition and Representation in the Middle Ages, ed. G. Klima (Bronx, forthcoming).
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E.g. P. King, ‘Rethinking Representation in the Middle Ages’ in Representation and Objects of Thought in Medieval Philosophy, ed. H. Lagerlund (Hampshire, 2007), 95-97 and Panaccio, ‘Ockham’s Externalism’. For a dissenting voice, see S. Brower-Toland, ‘Intuition, Externalism and Direct Reference in Ockham’, History of Philosophy Quarterly 24:4 (2007), 317-335.
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Cf. J. Lau, ‘Externalism about Mental Content’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E. Zalta (Fall 2010 Edition).
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F.-X. Putallaz, ‘Olivi’, in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, ed. J. Gracia and T. Noone (London, 2008), 521 and idem., Insolente Liberté. Controverses et condamnations au XIIIe siècle (Fribourg, 1996), 146.
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Cf. T. Suarez-Nani, ‘Un Modello Alternativo di Conoscenza? Francesco de Marchia e la spazializzazione del rapporto conoscitivo’, Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 53:1 (2006), 345-366, 363-364.
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Peter John Olivi on Perceptual Representation
In: VivariumSearch for other papers by Han Thomas Adriaenssen in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Abstract
This paper studies Olivi’s account of perceptual representation. It addresses two main questions: (1) how do perceptual representations originate? and (2) how do they represent their objects? Regarding (1), it is well known that Olivi emphasizes the activity of the soul in the production of perceptual representations. Yet it is sometimes argued that he overstresses the activity of the soul in a way that yields a philosophically problematic result. I argue that Olivi was well aware of the problem that could be raised for his theory and that he sought to cope with it. Regarding (2), Pasnau argues that for Olivi, causal relationships with external objects determine the content of perceptual representations. I argue that, rather, perceptual representations are about their objects because they are their similitudes. This makes him an internalist about representational content.
| All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 354 | 31 | 3 |
| Full Text Views | 105 | 2 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 70 | 5 | 0 |