Does Duns Scotus identify the natural will with the affectio commodi? This identification has become the standard view. In this paper, I will challenge this view through an analysis of some key texts. The main thesis of the paper is that Scotus allows for two scenarios related to the will’s dual affections. The first is the real situation of the created will: the will is a free potency and possesses two affections. The second is a hypothetical case; Scotus suggests the fictive case of a will that only possesses the affectio commodi. Accordingly, it can be concluded that: (i) when considering the will in its real condition, both affections belong to the will’s free appetite; (ii) in the hypothetical case the natural will, the intellectual appetite and the affectio commodi are all identified; (iii) in the real condition of the will, the natural will is a passive inclination to receive perfection.
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Cf. J. E. Hare, ‘Scotus on Morality and Nature’, Medieval Philosophy and Theology 9 (2000), 15-38; and God and Morality: A Philosophical History (Malden Mass 2007), 91-97.
Cf. J. Boler, ‘Transcending the Natural: Duns Scotus on the Two Affections of the Will’, American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 67 (1993), 109-126.
Cf. Christophe Cervellon, ‘L’affection de justice chez Duns Scot. Justice et luxure dans le péché de l’ange’, in Duns Scot à Paris. Actes du Colloque de Paris, 2-4 septembre 2002, eds. O. Boulnois et al. (Turnhout 2004), 425-468; and S. Lee, ‘Scotus on the Will: the Rational Power and the Dual Affections’, Vivarium 38 (1998), 40-54.
Cf. Boler, “Transcending the Natural: Duns Scotus on the Two Affections of the Will”, 109-112, and “An Image for the Unity of Will in Duns Scotus”, Journal of the History of Philosophy 32 (1994), 23-44.
Cf. Peter King, ‘Mediaeval thought experiments’, in Thought experiments in science and philosophy, eds. T. Horowitz–G. J. Massey (Pittsburgh 1991), 49-56; and Knuuttila–Kukkonen, ‘Thought experiments and indirect proofs in Averroes, Aquinas, and Buridan’, 95-99.
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Does Duns Scotus identify the natural will with the affectio commodi? This identification has become the standard view. In this paper, I will challenge this view through an analysis of some key texts. The main thesis of the paper is that Scotus allows for two scenarios related to the will’s dual affections. The first is the real situation of the created will: the will is a free potency and possesses two affections. The second is a hypothetical case; Scotus suggests the fictive case of a will that only possesses the affectio commodi. Accordingly, it can be concluded that: (i) when considering the will in its real condition, both affections belong to the will’s free appetite; (ii) in the hypothetical case the natural will, the intellectual appetite and the affectio commodi are all identified; (iii) in the real condition of the will, the natural will is a passive inclination to receive perfection.
All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
---|---|---|---|
Abstract Views | 516 | 59 | 4 |
Full Text Views | 127 | 4 | 0 |
PDF Views & Downloads | 66 | 12 | 0 |