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Duns Scotus on the Natural Will1

In: Vivarium
Author:
Cruz González-Ayesta University of Navarra

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Abstract

Does Duns Scotus identify the natural will with the affectio commodi? This identification has become the standard view. In this paper, I will challenge this view through an analysis of some key texts. The main thesis of the paper is that Scotus allows for two scenarios related to the will’s dual affections. The first is the real situation of the created will: the will is a free potency and possesses two affections. The second is a hypothetical case; Scotus suggests the fictive case of a will that only possesses the affectio commodi. Accordingly, it can be concluded that: (i) when considering the will in its real condition, both affections belong to the will’s free appetite; (ii) in the hypothetical case the natural will, the intellectual appetite and the affectio commodi are all identified; (iii) in the real condition of the will, the natural will is a passive inclination to receive perfection.

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