Some medieval authors defend free choice by arguing that, even though human choices are indeed caused by the practical judgment about what is best to do here and now, one is nevertheless able to freely influence that practical judgment’s formation. This paper examines Peter Auriol’s account of free choice, which is a quite elaborate version of this approach and which brings its theoretical problems into focus. I will argue in favor of Auriol’s basic theory, but I will also propose an emendation to his theory in order to respond to some problems he leaves unresolved.
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All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
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Abstract Views | 308 | 49 | 5 |
Full Text Views | 249 | 2 | 0 |
PDF Views & Downloads | 61 | 7 | 0 |
Some medieval authors defend free choice by arguing that, even though human choices are indeed caused by the practical judgment about what is best to do here and now, one is nevertheless able to freely influence that practical judgment’s formation. This paper examines Peter Auriol’s account of free choice, which is a quite elaborate version of this approach and which brings its theoretical problems into focus. I will argue in favor of Auriol’s basic theory, but I will also propose an emendation to his theory in order to respond to some problems he leaves unresolved.
All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
---|---|---|---|
Abstract Views | 308 | 49 | 5 |
Full Text Views | 249 | 2 | 0 |
PDF Views & Downloads | 61 | 7 | 0 |