Kretzmann and Spade were led by Richard Kilvington’s proposed revisions to the rules of obligations in his discussion of the 47th sophism in his Sophismata to claim that the purpose of obligational disputations was the same as that of counterfactual reasoning. Angel d’Ors challenged this interpretation, realising that the reason for Kilvington’s revision was precisely that he found the art of obligation unsuited to the kind of reasoning that lay at the heart of the sophismatic argument. In his criticism, Kilvington focused on a technique used by Walter Burley to force a respondent to grant an arbitrary falsehood and similar to Lewis and Langford’s famous defence of ex impossibili quodlibet. Kilvington observed that just as in obligational disputation one may be obliged to grant a false proposition and deny a true one, so in counterfactual reasoning one may be obliged to doubt a proposition whose truth or falsity one knows, on pain of contradiction.
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Eleonore Stump, ‘Obligations: From the Beginning to the Early Fourteenth Century’, in Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, ed. N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, and J. Pinborg (Cambridge, 1982), 315–34: 329. Cf. d’Ors, ‘Tu scis regem sedere’, 59 n. 26.
Stump, ‘Obligations’, 329; Kretzmann, The Sophismata of Richard Kilvington: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 330. Cf. d’Ors, ‘Tu scis regem sedere’, 65 n. 35.
See Kretzmann, The Sophismata of Richard Kilvington: Introduction, Translation and Commentary, 336.
See Christopher Martin, ‘William’s Machine’, Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986), 564–72.
Stephen Read, ‘Formal and Material Consequence, Disjunctive Syllogism and Gamma’, in Argumentationstheorie, ed. Jacobi, 233–59: 253.
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Kretzmann and Spade were led by Richard Kilvington’s proposed revisions to the rules of obligations in his discussion of the 47th sophism in his Sophismata to claim that the purpose of obligational disputations was the same as that of counterfactual reasoning. Angel d’Ors challenged this interpretation, realising that the reason for Kilvington’s revision was precisely that he found the art of obligation unsuited to the kind of reasoning that lay at the heart of the sophismatic argument. In his criticism, Kilvington focused on a technique used by Walter Burley to force a respondent to grant an arbitrary falsehood and similar to Lewis and Langford’s famous defence of ex impossibili quodlibet. Kilvington observed that just as in obligational disputation one may be obliged to grant a false proposition and deny a true one, so in counterfactual reasoning one may be obliged to doubt a proposition whose truth or falsity one knows, on pain of contradiction.
All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
---|---|---|---|
Abstract Views | 314 | 52 | 8 |
Full Text Views | 117 | 0 | 0 |
PDF Views & Downloads | 28 | 2 | 0 |