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René Descartes is neither a Conceptualist nor a Platonist when it comes to the ontological status of the eternal truths and essences of mathematics but articulates a view derived from Proclus. There are several advantages to interpreting Descartes’ texts in light of Proclus’ view of universals and philosophy of mathematics. Key passages that, on standard readings, are in conflict are reconciled if we read Descartes as appropriating Proclus’ threefold distinction among universals. Specifically, passages that appear to commit Descartes to a Platonist view of mathematical objects and the truths that follow from them are no longer in tension with the Conceptualist view of universals implied by his treatment of the eternal truths in the Principles of Philosophy. This interpretation also fits the historical evidence and explains why Descartes ends up with seemingly inconsistent commitments to divine simplicity and God’s efficient creation of truths that are not merely conceptually distinct from the divine essence.
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As T.J. Cronin, “Eternal Truths in the Thought of Descartes and of His Adversary,” Journal of the History of Ideas 21 (1960), 553-559, points out, the italicized part of the quote from Descartes’ letter resembles the way Suarez phrases the problem in the ninth of his Metaphysical Disputations, section 2, no. 4. Cronin concludes from this that Descartes had this work in front of him and directly opposed Suarez’s doctrine of the eternal truths. However, note that Descartes here, in all likelihood, merely repeats Mersenne’s wording, so this does not imply Descartes had first-hand knowledge of Suarez’s text. N.J. Wells, “Descartes and the Scholastics Briefly Revisited,” New Scholasticism 35 (1961), 177-190, qualifies this hypothesis, identifying certain Thomists whom Suarez discusses in his convoluted treatment of the issue as Descartes’ true opponents. In light of this, various scholars subsequently read Descartes as taking a stand on the various sub-issues that form part of Scholastic debates regarding the eternal truths. However, Descartes’ general lack of familiarity with and interest in subtle Scholastic theological and metaphysical doctrines prior to 1640 makes it highly unlikely that Descartes was positioning himself within a Scholastic debate. I argue for this more fully in Descartes on Forms and Mechanisms and elaborate in Section 3.
R. De Rosa, “Rethinking the Ontology of Cartesian Essences,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19 (2011), 605-622, at 606 and 609.
De Rosa, “Rethinking the Ontology of Cartesian Essences,” 611-612.
De Rosa, “Rethinking the Ontology of Cartesian Essences,” 612.
This view is defended by Schmaltz, “Platonism and Descartes’ View,” and by M. Rozemond, “Descartes’s Ontology of the Eternal Truths,” in Early Modern Metaphysics: Essays in Honor of Vere Chappell, ed. P. Hoffman, D. Owen, and G. Yaffe (Peterborough, Ontario, 2008), 41-63. Schmaltz (170) even characterizes Descartes as taking a “middle way between Platonic realism and the conceptualism of Gassendi and Locke.”
Rozemond, “Descartes’s Ontology of the Eternal Truths,” 58; Schmaltz, “Platonism and Descartes’ View,” 165.
De Rosa, “Rethinking the Ontology of Cartesian Essences,” 615-616.
De Rosa, “Rethinking the Ontology of Cartesian Essences,” 616-618. De Rosa also argues that Descartes’ doctrine of divine simplicity implies that the being of essences in God’s mind is not ontologically prior to their being in human minds, for God simultaneously enacts whatever he wills. But surely God could have created the eternal mathematical truths and essences without creating human minds for them to inhere in? And does this not indicate their ontologically prior existence in God?
Descartes, 30 September 1640, Philosophical Writings, vol. 3, ed. Cottingham, Stoothoff, Murdoch, and Kenny, 153-154; at iii, 185.
Descartes, 11 November 1640, in Philosophical Writings, vol. 3, ed. Cottingham, Stoothoff, Murdoch, and Kenny, 156; at iii, 232.
G.M. Walski, “The Opponent and Motivation Behind Descartes’s Eternal Truths Doctrine,” in Il Seicento e Descartes, ed. A. Del Prete (Florence, 2004), 43-60. Walski’s hypothesis is confirmed by the fact that, in subsequent replies to Mersenne, Descartes appears to be quoting his words back to him; see, e.g., the letter of 27 May 1630. Marion, Sur la théologie blanche de Descartes, 202, qualifies that Mersenne is the anecdotal interlocutor, but Kepler the theoretical interlocutor (i.e., the proponent of a theory to which Descartes responds).
Descartes, 28 June 1643, Philosophical Writings, vol. 3, ed. Cottingham, Stoothoff, Murdoch, and Kenny, 227.
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René Descartes is neither a Conceptualist nor a Platonist when it comes to the ontological status of the eternal truths and essences of mathematics but articulates a view derived from Proclus. There are several advantages to interpreting Descartes’ texts in light of Proclus’ view of universals and philosophy of mathematics. Key passages that, on standard readings, are in conflict are reconciled if we read Descartes as appropriating Proclus’ threefold distinction among universals. Specifically, passages that appear to commit Descartes to a Platonist view of mathematical objects and the truths that follow from them are no longer in tension with the Conceptualist view of universals implied by his treatment of the eternal truths in the Principles of Philosophy. This interpretation also fits the historical evidence and explains why Descartes ends up with seemingly inconsistent commitments to divine simplicity and God’s efficient creation of truths that are not merely conceptually distinct from the divine essence.
All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
---|---|---|---|
Abstract Views | 506 | 89 | 4 |
Full Text Views | 285 | 40 | 0 |
PDF Views & Downloads | 136 | 76 | 0 |