The author argues that medieval solutions to the limit decision problem imply four-dimensionalism, i.e., the view according to which substances that persist through time are extended through time as well as through space and have different temporal parts at different times.
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R. Cross, “Four-Dimensionalism and Identity Across Time: Henry of Ghent vs. Bonaventure,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 27 (1999), 393-414.
See in particular Cross, “Four-Dimensionalism and Identity Across Time,” and A. Wood, “Mind the Gap? The Principle of Non-Repeatability and Aquinas’ Account of the Resurrection,” Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy 3 (2015), 99-127. On the other hand, a more careful attitude would suggest more investigation on the distinction between permanent and successive things before subscribing to these parallelisms and identifications. Such an investigation is still lacking in the literature, however, and goes beyond the scope of this paper.
De Libera, “La problématique de l’instant du changement,” 66. See also Kretzmann, “Incipit/Desinit”; Strobach, The Moment of Change, part i, ch. 3.
See de Libera, “La problématique de l’instant du changement,” 66.
C. Gilmore, “Where in the Relativistic World Are We?” Philosophical Perspectives 20 (2006), 199-236; C. Gilmore, “Persistence and Location in Relativistic Spacetime,” Philosophy Compass 3 (2008), 1224-1254.
See M. Leonard, “Locating Gunky Water and Wine,” Ratio 27 (2014), 306-315.
T. Bittner and M. Donnelly, “A Classification of Spatio-Temporal Entities Based on Their Location in Space-Time,” in International Workshop on Semantic-based Geographical Information Systems, ed. E. Zimanyi (Dordrecht, 2006), 1626-1635; T. Sattig, The Language and Reality of Time (Oxford, 2006); Gilmore, “Where in the Relativistic World Are We?”
A. Giordani and D. Costa, “From Times to Worlds and Back Again: A Transcendentist Theory of Persistence,” Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (2013), 210-220; D. Costa, “The Transcendentist Theory of Persistence,” The Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming); P. Simons, Parts. A Study in Ontology (Oxford, 1987); P. Simons, “Where Is It At? Modes of Occupation and Kinds of Occupant,” in Mereology and Location, ed. S. Kleinschmidt (Oxford, 2014), 59-68; and B. van Fraassen, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Time and Space (New York, 1970), where similar views, if not the same, are sympathetically discussed.
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The author argues that medieval solutions to the limit decision problem imply four-dimensionalism, i.e., the view according to which substances that persist through time are extended through time as well as through space and have different temporal parts at different times.
All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
---|---|---|---|
Abstract Views | 388 | 42 | 5 |
Full Text Views | 188 | 0 | 0 |
PDF Views & Downloads | 38 | 2 | 0 |