Some of my mental states are conscious and some of them are not. Sometimes I am so focused on the wine in front of me that I am unaware that I am thinking about it. But sometimes, of course, I take a reflexive step back and become aware of my thinking about the wine in front of me. What marks the difference between a conscious mental state and an unconscious one? In this article, the author focuses on Durand of St.-Pourçain’s rejection of the higher-order theory of state consciousness, according to which a mental act is conscious when there is another, suitably related, mental (reflex) act that exists at the same time with it. Durand rejects such higher-order theories on the grounds that they violate the thesis that a given mental power can have or elicit only one mental act at a given time. The author first goes over some of Durand’s general arguments for this thesis. He then turns to Durand’s application of the thesis to the issue of state consciousness and reflex acts. He closes by considering the objection that Durand’s same-order theory of state consciousness makes consciousness ubiquitous.
Purchase
Buy instant access (PDF download and unlimited online access):
Institutional Login
Log in with Open Athens, Shibboleth, or your institutional credentials
Personal login
Log in with your brill.com account
Adam Wodeham, Lectura secunda in librum primum Sententiarum. Prologus et distinctio prima, eds. R. Wood and G. Gál (St. Bonaventure, NY, 1990).
Durand of St.-Pourçain, In Petri Lombardi Sententias theologicas commentariorum libri IIII (Venice, 1571; repr. Ridgewood, NJ, 1964) (In Sent. C).
Durand of St.-Pourçain, Quaestiones de libero arbitrio, ed. P. T. Stella, “Le Quaestiones de libero arbitrio di Durando da S. Porciano.” Salesianum 24 (1962), 471–499.
Durand of St.-Pourçain, Scriptum super IV libros Sententiarum: distinctiones 1–5 libri secundi, ed. F. Retucci (Leuven, 2012) (= In Sent. A/B).
Durand of St.-Pourçain, Scriptum super IV libros Sententiarum: distinctiones 18–35 libri primi, eds. M. Perrone and F. Retucci (Leuven, 2019) (= In Sent. B).
Durand of St.-Pourçain, Scriptum super IV libros Sententiarum: distinctiones 22–38 libri secundi, eds. F. Retucci and M. Perrone (Leuven, 2013) (= In Sent. A/B).
Durand of St.-Pourçain, Scriptum super IV libros Sententiarum: prologus et distinctiones 1–3 libri primi, ed. G. Guldentops (Leuven, 2019) (= In Sent. B).
Francis of Marchia, Quodlibet cum quaestionibus selectis ex Commentario in librum Sententiarum, ed. N. Mariani (Grottaferrata, 1997).
Francis of Meyronnes, In quatuor libros Sententiarum (Venice, 1520).
Gregory of Rimini, Lectura super primum et secundum Sententiarum, 1: Super primum. Prologus et dist. 1–6, eds. W. Eckermann, M. Schulze, M. Santos-Noya, W. Simon and W. Urban (Berlin, 1981).
Guy Terrena, Quodlibet I, q. 14, ed. R. L. Friedman, “On the Trail of a Philosophical Debate: Durandus of St.-Pourçain vs. Thomas Wylton on Simultaneous Acts in the Intellect.” In Philosophical Debates at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century, eds. S. F. Brown, T. Dewender and T. Kobusch (Leiden, 2009), 458–461.
John Baconthorpe, In primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1–2, ed. T. Jeschke, Deus ut tentus vel visus: Die Debatte um die Seligkeit im reflexiven Akt (ca. 1293–1320) (Leiden, 2010), Appendix A, 591–611.
John Baconthorpe, Quaestiones in quattuor libros Sententiarum (Cremona, 1618).
John of Jandun, Super libros Aristotelis De anima subtilissimae quaestiones (Venice, 1552).
John of Pouilly, Quodlibet V, q. 7, ed. T. Jeschke, Deus ut tentus vel visus: Die Debatte um die Seligkeit im reflexiven Akt (ca. 1293–1320) (Leiden, 2010), Appendix E, 683–708.
Nicolaus Medensis (Durandellus), Evidentiae contra Durandum, ed. P. T. Stella (Tübingen, 2003).
Peter Auriol, In secundum librum Sententiarum (Rome, 1596).
Peter of Palude, In primum librum Sententiarum. Barcelona, Archivo Capitular de la Santa Iglesia Catedral, MS 35.
Peter of Palude, In primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 1 and q. 3, ed. T. Jeschke, Deus ut tentus vel visus: Die Debatte um die Seligkeit im reflexiven Akt (ca. 1293–1320) (Leiden, 2010), Appendix G, 725–759.
Peter of Palude, In quartum Sententiarum, d. 49, q. 4, ed. T. Jeschke, Deus ut tentus vel visus: Die Debatte um die Seligkeit im reflexiven Akt (ca. 1293–1320) (Leiden, 2010), Appendix H, 761–789.
Peter of Palude, Quodlibet. Toulouse, Bibliothèque municipale, MS 744, 75ra–118vb.
Prosper of Reggio Emilia, In primum librum Sententiarum. Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, MS Vat. lat. 1086.
Radulphus Brito, Quaestio Utrum actus rectus et reflexus sint unus actus. Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, MS Vat. lat. 1086, 205va–206rb.
Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones de quolibet, eds. Fratres Praedicatores. 2 vols. Opera omnia 25 (Rome, 1996).
Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum super primum librum Sententiarum, ed. R. P. Mandonnet (Paris, 1929).
Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles. Libri primus et secundus, eds. Fratres Praedicatores. Opera omnia 13 (Rome, 1918).
Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I, qq. 1–49, eds. Fratres Praedicatores. Opera omnia 4 (Rome, 1888).
Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I, qq. 50–119, eds. Fratres Praedicatores. Opera omnia 5 (Rome, 1889).
Thomas Wylton, Quaestio Quod in intellectu possunt esse plures intellectiones simul, ed. P. T. Stella, “Le Quaestiones de libero arbitrio di Durando da S. Porciano.” Salesianum 24 (1962), 506–517.
Walter Chatton, Reportatio et Lectura super Sententias: Collatio ad Librum Primum et Prologus, ed. J. C. Wey (Toronto, 1989).
William Crathorn, Quaestiones in primum librum Sententiarum, ed. F. Hoffman (Münster, 1988).
William of Ockham, Quaestiones in librum secundum Sententiarum (Reportatio), eds. G. Gál and R. Wood. Opera theologica 5 (St. Bonaventure, NY, 1981).
William of Ockham, Quodlibeta septem, ed. J. C. Wey. Opera theologica 9 (St. Bonaventure, NY, 1980).
Armstrong, D., and N. Malcolm. Consciousness and Causality (Oxford, 1984).
Ashworth, E. J. “Mental Language and the Unity of Propositions: A Semantic Problem Discussed by Early Sixteenth Century Logicians.” Franciscan Studies 41 (1981), 73–96.
Block, N. “On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness.” Behaviorial and Brain Sciences 18 (1995), 227–247.
Brentano, F. Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, trans. A. C. Rancurello, D. B. Terrell and L. L. McAlister (London, 1995).
Brower-Toland, S. “Medieval Approaches to Consciousness: Ockham and Chatton.” Philosophers’ Imprint 12.17 (2012), 1–29.
Brower-Toland, S. “Self-Knowledge, Self-Consciousness, and Reflexivity in Late Medieval Philosophy.” In Companion to Cognitive Theory in the Later Middle Ages, eds. R. L. Friedman and M. Pickavé (forthcoming).
Brower-Toland, S. “William Ockham on the Scope and Limits of Consciousness.” Vivarium 52 (2014), 197–219.
Caston, V. “Aristotle on Consciousness.” Mind 111.444 (2002), 751–815.
Dubouclez, O. “Plura simul intelligere. Éléments pour une histoire du débat médiéval et renaissant sur la simultanéité des actes de l’intellect.” Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales 81 (2014), 331–367.
Dumont, S. D. “New Questions by Thomas Wylton.” Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 9 (1998), 341–379.
Friedman, R. L. “Mental Propositions before Mental Language.” In Le langage mental du Moyen Âge à l’âge classique, ed. J. Biard (Leuven, 2009), 95–115.
Friedman, R. L. “On the Trail of a Philosophical Debate: Durandus of St.-Pourçain vs. Thomas Wylton on Simultaneous Acts in the Intellect.” In Philosophical Debates at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century, eds. S. F. Brown, T. Dewender and T. Kobusch (Leiden, 2009), 433–461.
Gallagher, S., and D. Zahavi. The Phenomenological Mind (New York, 2008).
Gamboa, L. D. “Can We Reflexively Access the Contents of Our Own Perceptions? Ockham on the Reflexive Cognition of the Contents of Intuitions.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 27 (2019), 921–940.
Gelber, H. G. “I Cannot Tell a Lie: Hugh of Lawton’s Critique of William of Ockham on Mental Language.” Franciscan Studies 44 (1984), 141–179.
Girard, C. “Some Medievals and Brentano on Reflexivity and the Structure of Mental Acts.” Topoi (forthcoming).
Hartman, P. J. “Durand of St.-Pourçain and Thomas Aquinas on Mental Representation.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 30 (2013), 19–34.
Hartman, P. J. “The Relation-Theory of Mental Acts: Durand of St.-Pourçain on the Ontological Status of Mental Acts.” In Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy 7, ed. R. Pasnau (Oxford, 2019), 186–211.
Jeschke, T. Deus ut tentus vel visus: Die Debatte um die Seligkeit im reflexiven Akt (ca. 1293–1320) (Leiden, 2010).
Knebel, S. K. “Durand, Quirós, Consciousness.” In Durand of Saint-Pourçain and His Sentences Commentary: Historical, Philosophical, and Theological Issues, eds. A. Speer, F. Retucci, T. Jeschke and G. Guldentops (Leuven, 2014), 344–384.
Koch, J. Durandus de S. Porciano O. P. Forschungen zum Streit um Thomas von Aquin zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts (Münster, 1927).
Kriegel, U. “The Same-Order Monitoring Theory of Consciousness.” In Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness, eds. U. Kriegel and K. Williford (Cambridge, MA, 2006), 143–170.
Pasnau, R. After Certainty: A History of Our Epistemic Ideals and Illusions (Oxford, 2017).
Pasnau, R. Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature: A Philosophical Study of Summa Theologiae 1a 75–89 (Cambridge, 2002).
Perler, D. “Are Reflexive Acts Possible? A Late Medieval Controversy.” In Miroir de l’amitié. Mélanges offerts à Joël Biard à l’occasion de ses 65 ans, ed. C. Grellard (Paris, 2017), 213–226.
Putallaz, F.-X. La connaissance de soi au XIIIe siècle. De Matthieu d’Aquasparta à Thierry de Freiberg (Paris, 1991).
Rode, C. Zugänge zum Selbst. Innere Erfahrung in Spätmittelalter und früher Neuzeit (Münster, 2015).
Rosenthal, D. “Varieties of Higher-Order Theory.” In Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology, ed. R. J. Gennaro (Amsterdam, 2004), 17–44.
Scarpelli Cory, T. Aquinas on Human Self-Knowledge (Cambridge, 2014).
Schierbaum, S. “Ockham on the Possibility of Self-Knowledge: Knowing Acts without Knowing Subjects.” Vivarium 52 (2014), 220–240.
Stella, P. T. “Le Quaestiones de libero arbitrio di Durando da S. Porciano.” Salesianum 24 (1962), 450–524.
Zupko, J. “Self-Knowledge and Self-Representation in Later Medieval Psychology.” In Mind, Cognition and Representation: The Tradition of Commentaries on Aristotle’s De Anima, eds. P. J. J. M. Bakker and J. M. M. H. Thijssen (Aldershot, 2007), 87–107.
All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
---|---|---|---|
Abstract Views | 332 | 56 | 7 |
Full Text Views | 28 | 3 | 0 |
PDF Views & Downloads | 82 | 11 | 1 |
Some of my mental states are conscious and some of them are not. Sometimes I am so focused on the wine in front of me that I am unaware that I am thinking about it. But sometimes, of course, I take a reflexive step back and become aware of my thinking about the wine in front of me. What marks the difference between a conscious mental state and an unconscious one? In this article, the author focuses on Durand of St.-Pourçain’s rejection of the higher-order theory of state consciousness, according to which a mental act is conscious when there is another, suitably related, mental (reflex) act that exists at the same time with it. Durand rejects such higher-order theories on the grounds that they violate the thesis that a given mental power can have or elicit only one mental act at a given time. The author first goes over some of Durand’s general arguments for this thesis. He then turns to Durand’s application of the thesis to the issue of state consciousness and reflex acts. He closes by considering the objection that Durand’s same-order theory of state consciousness makes consciousness ubiquitous.
All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
---|---|---|---|
Abstract Views | 332 | 56 | 7 |
Full Text Views | 28 | 3 | 0 |
PDF Views & Downloads | 82 | 11 | 1 |