Check on Foreign Debt Agreements in the Jordanian Legal System

in Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law Online
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The system of checks and balances, adopted by the Jordanian Constitution is highly weakened by the High Tribunal’s interpretation of Article 33 (addressing international relations) in Decision number 1/1962; especially regarding foreign debt agreements, where such agreements, entered into by the Executive Power, are, almost always, excluded from the approval of the National Assembly.

Unfortunately, the 2011 Constitutional Reform missed a golden opportunity to amend this Article; therefore, the alternative would be for the Constitutional Court, the successor of the High Tribunal, to present a different approach, especially since the authorities supporting the Tribunal’s decision can be revised to present a different interpretation that allows a better check over foreign debt, which has been rising recently to alarming levels.

The best candidate to initiate this change is the National Assembly, especially the Chamber of Deputies, either by submitting a request to the Court to this effect, or by carrying a legislative reform amending the Public Debt Management Law from the one side and, from the other side, drafting a law for the check over the Executive Power’s role in conducting external agreements in general, and foreign debt agreements, in particular; a law that balances the relations between the two Powers, regarding their financial functions, and enhances the democratization of the Jordanian System.

Check on Foreign Debt Agreements in the Jordanian Legal System

in Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law Online

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