USD $181.00
The Pragmatics of Propositional Attitude Reports
Series:
Author:
This volume, the fourth in the
Current Research in Semantics/Pragmatics Interface series, is a collection of nine papers dealing with the topic of reporting on beliefs and other attitudes, and in particular with the issue of the semantics-pragmatics boundary dispute which is the core topic of the current research in the field. Written by highly-regarded philosophers of language and linguists working on theoretical semantics and pragmatics, it brings together works in the mainstream tradition of logical form and the contextualism-anticontextualism debate and the research on the role of intentions, conventions, goals, plans and cultural stereotypes in attitude ascriptions. The editor's introductory chapter gives a valuable overview of the work, discussing the importance of all these aspects of propositional attitude research and stressing their compatibility and interdependence.
Introduction
Belief reports and pragmatic theory: the state-of-the-art, K.M. Jaszczolt
Propositional attitudes in direct-reference semantics, S. Schiffer
Interpreted logical forms, belief attribution, and the dynamic lexicon, P. Ludlow
Beyond sense and reference: an alternative response to the problem of opacity, L. Clapp
How do we know what Galileo said?, M.J. Cresswell
A puzzle about belief reports, K. Bach
Do belief reports report beliefs?, K. Bach
Attitude ascriptions, context and interpretive resemblance, A. Bezuidenhout
The default-based context-dependence of belief reports, K.M. Jaszczolt
The background of propositional attitudes and reports thereof, D. Woodruff Smith
Belief reports and pragmatic theory: the state-of-the-art, K.M. Jaszczolt
Propositional attitudes in direct-reference semantics, S. Schiffer
Interpreted logical forms, belief attribution, and the dynamic lexicon, P. Ludlow
Beyond sense and reference: an alternative response to the problem of opacity, L. Clapp
How do we know what Galileo said?, M.J. Cresswell
A puzzle about belief reports, K. Bach
Do belief reports report beliefs?, K. Bach
Attitude ascriptions, context and interpretive resemblance, A. Bezuidenhout
The default-based context-dependence of belief reports, K.M. Jaszczolt
The background of propositional attitudes and reports thereof, D. Woodruff Smith