The former Queen of Science seems to be lacking both a specific subject and a particular method. Thus the need arises for intra- and metaphilosophical orientation – especially since the way philosophy sees itself stems from various influential schools and traditions whose mutual exchange is not as lively as one might have hoped.
This volume of original essays brings together some of the protagonists of different metaphilosophical debates that have so far been led fairly independently of each other. The authors discuss the question of both the possibility and the scope of philosophical knowledge under a variety of aspects, particularly: (1) a priori knowledge and the role of intuitions, (2) transcendental arguments, (3) analytic philosophy and its methods as well as (4) phenomenology and analytic philosophy.
Preface Alvin I. GOLDMAN: Philosophical Intuitions: Their Target, Their Source, and Their Epistemic Status Hilary KORNBLITH: Naturalism and Intuitions Ernest SOSA: Intuitions: Their Nature and Epistemic Efficacy Thomas GRUNDMANN: The Nature of Rational Intuitions and a Fresh Look at the Explanationist Objection Timothy WILLIAMSON: Philosophical Knowledge and Knowledge of Counterfactuals Quassim CASSAM: The Possibility of Knowledge Robert STERN: Transcendental Arguments: A Plea for Modesty Alex BURRI: A Priori Existence Elke BRENDEL: Self-Referential Arguments in Philosophy Michael ESFELD: Metaphysics of Science between Metaphysics and Science Hans-Johann GLOCK: Could Anything Be Wrong with Analytic Philosophy? Frank JACKSON: On not Forgetting the Epistemology of Names Marcus WILLASCHEK: Contextualism about Knowledge and Justification by Default Dagfinn FØLLESDAL: Existence, Inexpressibility and Philosophical Knowledge Christian BEYER: Contextualism and the Background of (Philosophical) Justification