The Bourgeois Charm of Karl Marx & the Ideological Irony of American Jurisprudence employs a well-known body of work, Marx’s, to explain the inevitable limits of scholarship, in hopes to encourage academic boldness, and diversity, especially within American jurisprudence.
While scholarly meaning-making has been addressed in specific academic areas, mostly linguistics and philosophy, it has never been addressed in a triangular relationship between the text (T1) and its instigator (S1), as well as its subsequent interpellator (S2). Furthermore, while addressed as a result of difference, it has never been addressed for today’s liberal theory, which includes liberal jurisprudence, through the mirror of Marxist difference.
Scholarship is the unique product of the instigator’s private and public subjectivity, as all theory is aimed to be communicated and used by the scholarly community and beyond. Understanding its public life, textual instigators (S1) aim to control its meaning employing various research methods to observe reality and then to convey their narrative, or “philosophy”. But meaning is not fixed; it is negotiated by S1 and those theories interpellate (S2), according to their own private and public subjectivity, which covers their ideology. Negotiated meaning is always a surprise to both S1 and S2, surprise which is both ironic and ideological. The book has ten chapters, an index and a list of references
Dana Neacsu, Ph.D. (2011), Rutgers University, is Librarian and Lecturer-in-Law at Columbia Law School (2000-), and Adjunct Professor at Barnard College (2003-). She has published monographs, and many articles on jurisprudence, including Introduction to US Law and Legal Research (Transnational, 2005), Introduction to U.S. Law, Policy and Research – An Environmental Perspective (Vandeplas Publishing, 2019) (with Peter Bower) as well as Sexual Orientation, Gender Identities, and the Law: A Research Bibliography, (2006-2016) (Hein, 2018) (co-editor-in-chief, with David Brian Holt).
Acknowledgments List of Illustrations Introduction
1Marx, Irony and Ideology – Negotiating Meaning
2Meaning as a Result of Textual Instigation and Interpellation
1Contextualizing Marx: Differentiating to Embrace or to Reject?
1Marx and Dewey
2Linguistic and Cultural Barriers to Marx’s Works
3Cultural Lifespan
4Marxian Ideology as Soviet, ergo, Undesired, Subjectivity
5Marx’s Un-American Attitude toward Religion
6Marx’s Human Progress and Self-Promotion
2Marxian or Marxism: Labels Differentiating Content or Fabricating Difference? 3Textual Differences and Marx’s Interdisciplinary Dialectics
1Dialectics and Ideology: Thinking, Researching and Incorporating Observations
2Marxian Interdisciplinary Dialectics
3Dialectics and Post-Marxian Scholarship
4Private Subjectivity, Alienation and Theory Production
1Alienation as Creative Reification
2Alienation and Ideological Resistance to Power Structures
3Karl Marx, the Alienated Alienating Intellectual
5Ideology as Public (Political) Subjectivity
1Ideology through the Ages
2Marxian and Marxist Views on Ideology
3Academic (Ideological) Purges?
4Marx and Ideological Identity
5Ideology and Ideological Propaganda
6Mass Media – Ideology Is the Message
6The Irony of Scholarship Production
1Encoded Irony in T₁
2Dormant Irony as T₁ Textual Omissions
3Textual Irony and Rorty’s Intellectual Ironist
7Ideological Irony – S₂ Actuating T₁’s Meaning
1Irony and Direct Scholastic Criticism
2Scholarship as (Ironic) Polite Criticis
8The Bearable Lightness of Jurisprudential Irony
1Jurisprudential Irony as Inescapable Trade-Off between Scholastic Ambition and Reality
2Jurisprudential Irony and the Socratic Method of Teaching Law
3Jurisprudential Irony – Byproduct of Legal Hegemony
4Encoded Jurisprudential Irony
5United States Supreme Court Justices as Embodied Irony: The Late Justice Scalia and Justice Gorsuch
9Ironical Ideology, Difference of Meaning and Philosophical Camaraderie
1Plato’s Concepts of Just and Justice
2Aristotle’s Dialectical Universals
3Thomas Hobbes’ and John Locke’s Ideological Differences and Different Epistemological Conclusions
4The Intersection between the Abstract and Concrete Facets of the Law According to Montesquieu, Kant and Rousseau
5Jeremy Bentham’s Common Sense and Grotius’ Technocratic Approach to Law
6American Jurisprudence and Marx: Strange Bedfellows … Not
10Irony, Jurisprudential Meaning-Making and Ideological Camaraderie
1Classical Liberalism
2Law as Science or the Rejection of Ideology
3Formalism and Realism: Two Sides of the Same Coin
4The Limits of Rawls and Dworkin: Justice and Historical Contingency
5Critical Legal Studies and Marx
6Feminism and Queer Theory
7Intersectionality – Bridging the Gap between Theory and Reality
Summary and Conclusion References Index
All interested in a critical view of scholarship, including American jurisprudence.