In this revised and extended edition of Napoleon and the Operational Art of War, the leading scholars of Napoleonic military history provide the most authoritative analysis of Napoleon’s battlefield success and ultimate failure. Napoleon’s development and mastery of the operational art of warfare is revealed as each chapter analyzes one Napoleonic war or major campaign of a war. To achieve this, the essays conform to the common themes of Napoleon’s planning, his command and control, his execution of plans, and the response of his adversaries. Napoleon's sea power and the British response to the French challenge at sea is also investigated. Overall, this volume reflects the finest scholarship and cutting-edge research to be found in Napoleonic military history.
Contributors include Jonathan Abel, Robert M. Citino, Phillip R. Cuccia, Huw J. Davies, Mark T. Gerges; John H. Gill; Jordan R. Hayworth, Kenneth G. Johnson, Michael V. Leggiere, Kevin D. McCranie, Alexander Mikaberidze, Frederick C. Schneid, John Severn, Dennis Showalter, Geoffrey Wawro, and John F. Weinzierl.
Michael V. Leggiere, Ph.D. (Florida State University, 1997), is Professor of History and Deputy Director of the Military History Center at the University of North Texas. He is an award-winning author of five monographs on the history of the Napoleonic Wars.
All interested in the history of Napoleonic operational warfare, the rise and fall of Napoleon’s skill as a general, and naval French and British naval strategy in the Napoleonic era.