First-Person Thought

Action, Identification and Experience

The book offers new answers to two central questions that have been heavily debated, especially in recent years, in the debate on so-called de se skepticism: Is there something special about first-person thinking? And how does it relate to other forms of self-consciousness? The answer to the first question is a resounding "yes." This assertion is justified by the double-reflexive structure, motivational force, and specific concern that first-personal thinking involves. Regarding the second question, the book concludes that there are non-linguistic forms of self-consciousness. However, these should not be understood as representational contents or non-relational properties, but as mental relations that, without themselves being represented, can contribute to the phenomenal character of conscious states. In this respect, the book also provides a justification for the rarely considered impure intentionalism.

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Maik Niemeck lehrt und forscht zur Philosophie des Geistes (mit dem Schwerpunkt Theorien des Bewusstseins und Selbstbewusstseins) an der Philipps-Universität Marburg, an welcher er auch promoviert wurde. Zuvor war er Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am University College Freiburg und hat an den Universitäten Göttingen und Halle studiert. Forschungsaufenthalte haben ihn an das King's College London und die University of Notre Dame geführt.
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