Browse results

You are looking at 61 - 70 of 17,941 items for :

  • All content x
  • Primary Language: French x
Clear All

David Redmond

Aristotle identifies the eye as the organ of sight, the ear as the organ of hearing, and the nose as the organ of smell. However, rather than identify the flesh as the organ of touch and that particular bit of flesh, the tongue, as the organ of taste, Aristotle makes what he admits to be the surprising claim that the organ of both touch and taste is located further inward (near the heart). The flesh is merely the medium that comes between the sense organ and their respective sense objects. Focusing on the sense of touch in particular, I consider what reasons Aristotle offers in support of this claim. After carefully wading through De Anima 2.11, I argue that the only argument that Aristotle offers there relies on an assumption about the unity of the senses that provides as much support for alternative views about the organ and medium of touch as it does for the view that Aristotle endorses.

Felicità, piacere e politica nel tardo Platone

Alcune riflessioni di metodo e di contenuto a partire da un libro recente di Chad Jorgenson, The Embodied Soul in Plato’s Later Thought (cup 2018)

Filippo Forcignanò

Tiziano Dorandi and Francesco Verde

This contribution provides a new collection of the textual extant remains (reliquiae) of the Peripatetic philosopher Cratippus of Pergamon (I c. bc), and a full and detailed overview of the biographical and doctrinal features of this thinker.

Lara Trivellizzi

In this paper I aim to discuss a fragment of Aristotle’s De Philosophia (fr. 21 Ross = Cic. N.D. ii, 44). After defending Cicero’s reliability as a source for the present fragment, I will focus on its contents, with particular reference to the similarities and differences between fr. 21 Ross and De Caelo A-B: my aim in this comparison is to identify two different astronomical systems underlying, on the one hand, the account of fr. 21 Ross and, on the other hand, that given in the treatise. This shift of model is in my view the actual reason for the inconsistency between these accounts. Such an inconsistency might be explained in chronological terms: the last part of the paper, indeed, develops the hypothesis that De Philosophia Γ was written before 353–350bc, namely before Aristotle got acquainted with Eudoxus’ astronomical system.

Étienne Helmer

The presence of slavery in Plato’s political and ethical thought is marked by two contrary tendencies: one signals the conventional character of statutory slavery and tends to reduce the moral boundary between free people and servile people; the other one, going in the opposite direction, strongly reaffirms the functional frontier between these two categories, and makes it impassable. What does this double gesture of integration and exclusion of slavery mean with respect to Plato’s political thought? My claim, based on the analysis of a passage in Book vi of the Laws and some excerpts from the Statesman, is the following: for Plato, the statutory slavery fulfills the function of drawing the inner civic boundary on which the political field must be built if it is to have a true conceptual autonomy, by contrast with what contributes to its construction but without being fully political.

Vivianne de Castilho Moreira

This article is intended to examine the lines 1006a34-b9 of Metaphysics Γ 4, where Aristotle conjectures and discusses an objection to the very first step of his proof of the principle of the most universal science. As we shall see in detail, this objection consists in claiming that the meaning of a word is multiple, so that it is not possible for a word to have one single meaning, contrarily to what it seems to be required for one to say something. As we shall also see, some crucial aspects of aristotelian notion of meaning emerge in this context, among which those related to the unity proper to it.

Harold Tarrant

This paper takes issue with the thesis of Rashed and Auffret that the Critias that has come down to us is not a genuine dialogue of Plato. Authors do not consider the style of the Critias, which should be a factor in any complete study of authorship. It observes the widespread consensus that the style of the Timaeus and Critias are virtually inseparable. It surveys a wide range of stylistic studies that have tended to confirm this, before answering a possible objection that cites the similarity of style between the genuine Laws and Philip of Opus’ Epinomis. Since the main argument used by Rashed and Auffret relies on an inconsistency between Timaeus and Critias consideration is given to the types of inconsistency found within Platonic dialogues and sequences of dialogues, particularly the hiatus-avoiding dialogues including Timaeus itself and Laws. Finally, alternative explanations of the alleged inconsistency are offered.