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Hendrik Lorenz and Benjamin Morison


Aristotle takes practical wisdom and arts or crafts to be forms of knowledge which, we argue, can usefully be thought of as ‘empiricist’. This empiricism has two key features: knowledge does not rest on grasping unobservable natures or essences; and knowledge does not rest on grasping logical relations that hold among propositions. Instead, knowledge rests on observation, memory, experience and everyday uses of reason. While Aristotle’s conception of theoretical knowledge does require grasping unobservable essences and logical relations that hold among suitable propositions, his conception of practical and productive knowledge avoids such requirements and is consistent with empiricism.

Emily Katz


There is little agreement about Aristotle’s philosophy of geometry, partly due to the textual evidence and partly part to disagreement over what constitutes a plausible view. I keep separate the questions ‘What is Aristotle’s philosophy of geometry?’ and ‘Is Aristotle right?’, and consider the textual evidence in the context of Greek geometrical practice, and show that, for Aristotle, plane geometry is about properties of certain sensible objects—specifically, dimensional continuity—and certain properties possessed by actual and potential compass-and-straightedge drawings qua quantitative and continuous. For their part, the objects of stereometry are potential sensible three-dimensional figures qua quantitative and continuous.

David Bronstein and Whitney Schwab


Plato in the Meno is standardly interpreted as committed to condition innatism: human beings are born with latent innate states of knowledge. Against this view, Gail Fine has argued for prenatalism: human souls possess knowledge in a disembodied state but lose it upon being embodied. We argue against both views and in favor of content innatism: human beings are born with innate cognitive contents that can be, but do not exist innately in the soul as, the contents of states of knowledge. Content innatism has strong textual support and constitutes a philosophically interesting theory.

Daniel Ferguson


The kind of self-knowledge at issue in the eye-soul analogy of the Alcibiades (132d5-133c7) is knowledge of one’s epistemic state, i.e. what one knows and does not know, rather than knowledge of what one is. My evidence for this is the connection between knowledge of one’s epistemic state and self-improvement, the equivalence of self-knowledge to moderation, and the fact that ‘looking’ into the soul of another is a metaphor for elenctic discussion. The final lines of the analogy (133c1-7) clarify that the part of the soul one ‘looks’ into and the part one learns about when learning about one’s epistemic state is divine.

Merrick Anderson


A growing number of scholars have seen that the Republic’s division of goods includes goods which possess value δι᾽ αὑτό in virtue of some of their causal effects. Building on this, I argue that goods, including justice, which are valuable διὰ τὰ γιγνόµενα ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ (and whose effects can contribute to the value a good has δι᾽ αὑτό) are so in virtue of a limited class of beneficial effects: those that depend on the recognition of other agents. This way of dividing goods explains why Socrates legitimately invokes some effects of justice in his demonstration that justice is valuable δι᾽ αὑτό.

Angeliki Nektaria Roumpou


This article reviews two new commentaries on Silius Italicus’ Punica published in 2017 by Oxford University Press: by Neil Bernstein on book 2 and by Joy Littlewood on book 10. Both volumes offer an introduction, translation and commentary as well as an analysis of important thematic points. This review considers each book’s main strengths, discusses their limitations, and demonstrates their immense contribution to Flavian scholarship. Moreover, it examines the place of these two particular books in current Silian studies, considering how they inscribe themselves into current trends.

Mark Humphries


The last half century has seen an explosion in the study of late antiquity, largely prompted by the influence of the works of Peter Brown. This new scholarship has characterised the period between the third and seventh centuries not as one of catastrophic collapse, but rather as one of dynamic and positive transformation. Where observers formerly had seen only a bleak picture of decline and fall, a new generation of scholars preferred to emphasise how the Roman Empire evolved into the new polities, societies, and cultures of the medieval West, Byzantium, and Islam. Yet research on the fortunes of cities in this period has provoked challenges to this increasingly accepted positive picture of late antiquity and has prompted historians to speak once more in terms that evoke Edward Gibbon’s History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. This study surveys the nature of the current debate, examining problems associated with the sources historians use to examine late-antique urbanism, as well as the discourses and methodological approaches they have constructed from them. It aims to set out the difficulties and opportunities presented by the study of cities in late antiquity, how understanding the processes affecting them has issued challenges to the scholarly orthodoxy on late antiquity, and how the evidence suggests that this transitional period witnessed real upheaval and dislocation alongside continuity and innovation in cities around the Mediterranean.

José Marcos Macedo and Daniel Kölligan


It is argued that Cretan µωλεῖν ‘contend, bring an action to court’ may be derived from PIE *melh3- ‘to go, walk’, attested also in Gk. prs. βλώσκω, aor. ἔµολον, reflecting the frequent usage of motion verbs in legal contexts meaning ‘file a lawsuit’. The derivational basis of µωλέω may have been a thematized root noun *mṓlh3-s ‘going (to court)’ or a vr̥ddhi-formation based on *µολός ‘going’.