The Games of the New Emerging Forces and Indonesia’s Systemic Challenge under Sukarno
Indonesian President Sukarno established the Games of the New Emerging Forces (ganefo) not only as an alternative to the Olympic Games in the 1960s, but also as part of a systemic challenge to the international status quo. They occurred twice, once in Indonesia in 1963 and again (as “Asian ganefo”) in Cambodia in 1966. The ganefo drew on Asian left-nationalism and neutralism and foreshadowed a possible alternative United Nations that Sukarno planned to call the Conference of the New Emerging Forces (conefo), with membership from the People’s Republic of China and other Asian states. This research note explores the link between sports, Indonesian nationalism and neutralism, ideas of Indonesian martial masculinity, and global politics during the 1960s in East Asia. Contrary to the ideal of the International Olympic Committee (ioc) to keep sports and politics separate, it suggests that both the ioc and Sukarno’s Indonesia mixed sports and politics, but in very different ways.
The Battle of Okinawa, Media Coverage, and Truman’s Reevaluation of Strategy in the Pacific
Nicholas Evan Sarantakes
The Battle of Okinawa was the last major ground battle of World War ii. The Tenth u.s. Army that invaded this small piece of Japan was a unique force composed of units from the u.s. Army and others from the u.s. Marine Corps. Much historical literature has focused on the different approaches to ground combat of the two armed services, but they also employed very different policies towards support of the news media. The u.s. Marines were much more supportive than the u.s. Army. The two different policies and styles of news coverage that reporters employed led to coverage favoring the u.s. Marines. Reporting suggested that u.s. Marine procedures were less costly in lives and created enormous concern in the United States about casualty rates, motivating President Harry S. Truman to hold an Oval Office meeting to re-think strategy in the Pacific theater. It would be wrong, though, to argue that the media altered the course of the war. Truman asked hard probing questions about the direction of the war, but General of the Army George C. Marshall acted to ensure that the United States stayed on its current strategic path.
Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism in Chinese Art Collecting and Scholarship Between the United States and Europe, 1900–1920
K. Ian Shin
Interest in Chinese art has swelled in the United States in recent years. In 2015, the collection of the late dealer-collector Robert Hatfield Ellsworth fetched no less than $134 million at auction (much of it from Mainland Chinese buyers), while the Metropolitan Museum of Art drew over 800,000 visitors to its galleries for the blockbuster show “China: Through the Looking Glass”—the fifth most-visited exhibition in the museum’s 130-year history. The roots of this interest in Chinese art reach back to the first two decades of the 20th Century and are grounded in the geopolitical questions of those years. Drawing from records of major collectors and museums in New York and Washington, D.C., this article argues that the United States became a major international center for collecting and studying Chinese art through cosmopolitan collaboration with European partners and, paradoxically, out of a nationalist sentiment justifying hegemony over a foreign culture derived from an ideology of American exceptionalism in the Pacific. This article frames the development of Chinese art as a contested process of knowledge production between the United States, Europe, and China that places the history of collecting in productive conversation with the history of Sino-American relations and imperialism.