Over the last few decades, the World Bank (‘WB’) has gained wide experience in post-conflict peacebuilding by experimenting new approaches to peace-and state-building in a wide range of difficult, fragile and conflict-affected countries such as Burundi, Liberia, and Nepal, all of which were undergoing significant political processes in the area of post-conflict reconstruction and democratic consolidation. The WB is the principal organization of the UN system providing low-interest loans for improvements in countries in difficulties. This paper explores the extent to which the WB can assert a role in the operational management of post-conflict reconstruction and argues that the WB’s increasing engagement with post-reconstruction issues is proper and permissible according both to its Establishing Agreement and its Relationship Agreement with the UN. But this is only provided it is balanced against a recognition of its intrinsic and operational limitations: namely and in particular the limitations that arise, respectively, from the UN Security Council’s competing competence in the same sector and the enduring existence of political prohibition clauses in the WB’s and IDA’s Establishing Agreements. If the WB’s post-conflict activities continue, it will turn out to be a player of great significance and actuality in developing and applying international post-conflict reconstruction norms and principles. Ultimately, given the inextricable link between development and conflict, the WB’s competence over post-conflict reconstruction issues is functional to its legitimacy. Support for the WB’s evolving role in post-conflict reconstruction scenarios will be highest if the WB enacts measures to promote its substantive and procedural legitimacy among member countries. This paper therefore collocates its analysis within the framework of democratic decision-making and argues for a clearer definition of responsibilities among the WB financial institutions and other organizations and organs belonging to the same UN family, such the UN Security Council, ECOSOC and the UN Peacebuilding Commission.
European Judicial Responses to Security Council Resolutions: A Consequentialist Assessment, Kushtrim Istrefi examines the multiple effects of European courts decisions as regards Security Council targeted sanctions and security detentions interfering with fundamental rights. He elaborates what type of judicial responses ensured real and practical respect for human rights for the petitioners, encouraged Security Council due process reform, clarified Security Council authorisations on security detentions, and tested the primacy and universal character of the UN Charter.
Making use of legal and non-legal instruments, Istrefi sheds some light upon what happened to, among others, petitioners, the SC due process reform agenda, and the UN Charter after such cases as
This submission challenges the presumption that uk nationals will lose eu citizenship following Brexit. Until now, the dominant narrative has been drawn from the law on treaties or international organizations, and this article adds the human rights perspective to Brexit. Firstly, eu citizenship can be assimilated to nationality. While eu citizenship is unique, the status protected under international law is a legal bond a person has with a political entity. This protection certainly covers nationality, and this paper argues it can be understood to also protect eu citizenship. Secondly, international law prohibits arbitrary withdrawal of this legal bond with a person. The uk does not have jurisdiction over eu citizenship, so it is doubtful the uk can terminate eu citizenship unilaterally. Even if the eu were to withdraw eu citizenship on its initiative, it would still constitute retroactive law, discrimination, and infringement of sovereignty. It is also disproportionate, because the loss of eu citizenship is not necessary for Brexit. When Greenland withdrew from the eu, its residents retained eu citizenship. For these reasons, the revocation of eu citizenship would be arbitrary. A distinction must be made between the membership of a state in the eu which can be terminated, and the direct legal bond formed between a person and the Union, which is far harder to revoke. On this basis, any uk national who has acquired eu citizenship prior to Brexit, should not be divested of it following Brexit.
This article complements the doctrine of termination of membership by arguing that at times international organizations (‘ios’) can still exert considerable normative effects on states that withdraw or express the intent to withdraw from them. We capture this continuing influence, which can collide with the exiting state’s intended goal of regaining control over specific issues, with a theoretical framework based on juridification as a socio-legal concept of systems theory in the international legal context. The aim is to explain the endogenous process of legal growth within the io via bureaucratisation and expert rule, which eventually affects the norms of the wider legal regime where the io operates. With three case studies of io exits, we illustrate the continuation of normative structures promoted directly or indirectly by the io, according to two legal techniques of juridification: third-party interpretation on the one hand, and the extended reach of norms and processes through the work of non-state actors on the other. Overall, widening the theoretical perspective on state exits under systems theory can lead to more complete judgements on the tensions between domestic and supranational systems in the expansion of global normative regimes.
Regional human rights bodies, such as the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, have constituent instruments which contain clauses allowing states to leave the institution. Given that regional human rights tribunals have the power to issue rulings against states, these clauses have been relatively underused. This paper argues that this is due to the socialisation of states within regional human rights regimes. Exit clauses are a reflection of underlying political forces behind a regional human rights bodies’ formation. They also play an important and under-examined role in state socialisation once a state is a member of a regional human rights body.
The question of how disputes arising from Brexit are to be resolved, and by which body, is one of the most sensitive issues in the negotiations on the uk’s withdrawal from the European Union and the envisaged future relationship between the uk and the eu. The legal issues related to withdrawal are further magnified in complexity due to the nature of the eu itself, which does not neatly fit into the category of a traditional international organization. The uk has repeatedly stated that it will not accept the continued role of the eu Court of Justice in the uk legal system after withdrawal. Any dispute settlement system must also respect the constitutional requirements of the eu legal order, most notably, by not infringing on the autonomy of eu law. This article discusses some of the various models from international dispute settlement that could be used to inspire a dispute settlement system in the Brexit context. It discusses dispute settlement in the withdrawal agreement and the role of the Court of Justice during and after a transition period. It then discusses the challenges of designing a dispute settlement system for the future relationship agreement. While aspects of these various models could be replicated, there is no dispute settlement system that is fully appropriate to deal with the various complexities and challenges of Brexit. The paper proposes the establishment of a standing international tribunal to resolve disputes arising from Brexit.
Among international criminal tribunals (‘icts’), the International Criminal Court (‘icc’) for the first time introduced victim participation and reparations for victims. Against potential African withdrawals from the icc Statute, this article seeks to demonstrate the need to retain membership of the icc under victim-oriented considerations. Despite its deficits and limitations, the icc is arguably an important judicial forum for victims of mass atrocities committed in Africa for three arguments. First, human rights are invoked as a standard to examine the legitimacy of the decisions of the icc, African Union (‘au’), and African states. Second, international and African regional human rights law on victim rights binds African states. Third, since au regional criminal justice initiatives present important deficits and limitations in terms of victim rights, they are unfit to replace the icc.