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Abstract
This investigation examines the question of whether the similar theories of the origins of monarchy encountered in certain early Greek and Indian literary sources should be taken as evidence of cross-cultural diffusion of political ideas. The paper argues against the alternative explanation, according to which the similarity in form in the Greek and Indian versions of the kingship theory is rooted in similar social processes, by exposing how the earliest extant Greek version of the theory seems to build on a prototype most closely mirrored in one early Indian source.
Abstract
We reply to the objections raised in Polis 40 (2023) by Ryan Balot and Manuel Knoll to our original paper ‘Recognition and Redistribution in Aristotle’s Account of Stasis’, published in Polis 39 (2022). We argue that Knoll is correct in arguing that Aristotle distinguishes between democratic views of distributive justice and his own, but wrong to argue that this wholly resolves a tension in Aristotle’s exposition between views of democratic justice as, in one sense, based on equality ‘according to worth’ and in another based on arithmetic equality. Balot, we contend, misconstrues our original argument when he represents us as claiming that, according to Aristotle, the injustice which leads agents to engage in stasis exists entirely in their own minds. We did not and do not hold that view and therefore (pace Balot) are in no way committed to any of its alleged implications. Balot’s misunderstanding on that point entails a wholesale misrepresentation of our original argument.
Abstract
This paper argues that the discussion in which Aristotle engages in Metaphysics ΖΗ has the same starting-point as natural science: the principles of changing substances. These inquiries are nonetheless distinct because natural science uses these principles in its detailed investigations into natural substances, whereas ΖΗ reflect on the principles themselves. ΖΗ are an integral part of Aristotle’s inquiry into the principles of all substances, changing and unchanging: they are not merely preliminary to an inquiry into the latter kind. They are also an integral part of Aristotle’s ‘first philosophy’, alongside theology’s study of the nature and activity of unchanging substances.
Abstract
At the beginning of Book 9 of the Politeia (571cd), Platon suggests that all people bear in themselves unlawful desires like the desire to have sex with their own mother or with any other human, god, or beast, the desire to murder anyone, or the desire to eat anything. Modern scholars take it for granted that by the desire to eat anything, Platon means cannibalism. This view is based on the fact that Platon discusses unlawful desires in connection with the tyrannical man and that the tyrant is, elsewhere in the Politeia, twice connected with anthropophagy (at 8.565d–566a and 10.619c). This paper challenges this communis opinio and argues that we have no reason to assume that at Politeia 9.571d Platon claims that every one of us has the hidden desire to consume human flesh. Also, the alleged cannibalism of the Platonic tyrant is questioned. A close reading of the passages 8.565d–566a and 10.619c reveals that in the depiction of the tyrant Platon makes use of mythological motifs and literary topoi but never literally claims that the tyrant has cannibalistic desires.
Abstract
In the proposed law-code in De legibus there is a law that votes are to be known by the best citizens (the optimates) but free to the common people (the plebs) (3.10). This law, Cicero claims, grants ‘the appearance of liberty’ (libertatis species), preserves the authority (auctoritas) of the optimates, and promotes harmony between the classes (3.39). The law and the precise meaning of libertatis species remain opaque even with the lengthy commentary (3.33–39), and much scholarly debate and discussion has arisen as a result – most of it very critical of Cicero’s proposal and the arguments supporting it. This paper offers a fresh analysis of the voting law that is more charitable to Cicero. It unpacks the full details of the voting system that is developed in De legibus and sheds new light on developments in Cicero’s thinking about the best state.
Abstract
The meaning of the word tyrannos in Greek tragedy is much debated. Some have assumed that the word is always a neutral term signifying ‘ruler’ alone. Others argue for competing ideologies regarding tyranny: the result of an evolution in thinking on autocracy. This article challenges both of these assumptions. The negative meaning of tyrannos is always latent in tragedy, even where the word is used objectively and not as a term of abuse. Tyrannos does not simply indicate a powerful individual but implies absolute power, fortune and wealth. This absolute power leads to ruin and tyrannical vice. Tyrannos signifies not a bad or illegitimate ruler, but rather one with the potential to develop such characteristics. It is the tyrant who evolves, whereas Greek conceptions of tyranny remain largely unchanged from at least the time of Aeschylus to that of Aristotle.
Abstract
In the present paper, I argue that in order to be in a position to understand what the World Soul thinks about, we need first to answer the question of whether the universe perceives and if so, of what it perceives. I shall first (section ) lay out the main reasons for suspecting that the universe has perception and some possible objections against this view. I will then (section ) make a case for my claim that the universe has perception on the basis of my ‘minimalist’ account of perception, which identifies four necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for having an instance of aisthēsis: 1) a body; 2) a soul; 3) affections which cause motion/change in the body and in the soul; 4) the cause of these affections. I will show that the universe composed of a World Body and a World Soul meets all four conditions. On the basis of this, I will claim that one can ascribe (self-) perception to the universe. Finally (section ), I will suggest that the universe perceives the polyhedra of its own body.
Abstract
In this paper, I argue that Bryson’s Oikonomikos is a fascinating example of the oikonomia genre in several different respects. Although the problematic transmission of this Neopythagorean text makes studying it a challenge, such effort is well-rewarded with an elaborate argument which paints the human bodily constitution, the central bodily functions and oikonomic activities as intrinsically linked. Focusing on Bryson’s argument which roots oikonomic behaviour in human biology, I explore the underlying conceptualisation of human nature and contextualise it within relevant philosophical and scientific traditions.