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In: Taxing Difference in Peru and New Spain (16th–19th Century)
In: Taxing Difference in Peru and New Spain (16th–19th Century)
Author:

Abstract

In 2019, the Mondragon worker cooperatives, which number around 100, employed over 81 000 workers. Based primarily on information from the Mondragon annual reports, this article traces Mondragon’s employment record from 1983–2019. In this period its Spanish employment growth outran that of Spain by a factor of 3.4, and that of the aggregated oecd countries by a factor of 6.3. On top of the Spanish employment, Mondragon cooperatives’ subsidiaries employed about 4300 workers abroad (7% of the total) in 2001, and about 14 500 (18% of the total) in 2019. The article expands on the reasons for this last type of employment. The article also explains why the proportion of cooperative owner-members in the total employment varies over time. Depending on the sector, in 2019 this proportion is 32–45%, and measured as a proportion of the employment in cooperatives 32–74%—the difference being engendered by non-cooperative subsidiaries. Many cooperatives regard these proportions as second-best practices in the search for a modus between competitive pressures and the maintenance of employment within cooperatives.

Open Access
In: Journal of Labor and Society
Author:

Abstract

The last fifteen years witnessed a remarkable revitalization in the field of Second International historiography. This renewed literature put forward different approaches and perspectives, as the interest for the history of social democracy draws on academic as well as political considerations. Whereas an important trend of this revitalization came from studies that focused on social and cultural aspects, this review explores two recent volumes published by North American authors that propose a different, and explicitly political, approach towards the history of social democracy in the years of the Second International.

Open Access
In: Journal of Labor and Society
Author:

Abstract

This paper is delivered from a conceptual theoretical review of grey literature: identifying key concepts and pragmatic policy interventions, which are required to address various aspects of the digital workforce. The main objective and purpose of this study is to analyze then articulate how technological panopticism, digital surveillance has changed the world of work. The study alerts us to the significant changes in work relations, which have been imposed by the digital age. At a nascent level society is asked to consider; how prepared are we to address the effects of technological panopticism on the mental (and physical) wellbeing of digital workers. On a nuanced basis the study fulfils another societal role: acting to introduce consideration of the digital surveillance aspects of how interaction with artificial intelligence and/or the internet of things could develop in the 2020s.

Open Access
In: Journal of Labor and Society
Volume Editors: and
Behind the controversies that have marked the history of the idea of Economic Constitution emerges the highly political issue of the room for manoeuvre left to public authorities in the economic sphere. The notion thus encapsulates a fundamental tension: between democracy and rule of law, which model of legal ordering of the economy should prevail?

From physiocrats to neo-liberals, from the Weimar Republic to European integration, from national constitutions to Global Governance, this collective book invites us to explore the genealogy of the controversial concept of Economic Constitution. The result of this interdisciplinary dialogue is a comprehensive reflection on the legal and political issues at stake in the current constitutionalization of the market order in Europe.

Contributors are: Philippe Steiner, Guillaume Grégoire, Hugues Rabault, Peter C. Caldwell, Thomas Biebricher, Werner Bonefeld, Serge Audier, Vincent Valentin, Pieter van Cleynenbreugel, Xavier Miny, Frédéric Marty, Claire Mongouachon, Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz, Francesco Martucci, Michael Wilkinson, Hjalte Lokdam, Susanna Maria Cafaro, Peter Lindseth, Cristina Fasone, Pierre Nihoul, François Colly, Peter-Christian Müller-Graff, Tony Prosser, Damien Piron, Mahmoud Mohamed Salah, Stephen Gill, Thibault Biscahie, Sebastien Adalid, and Christian Joerges.

Derrière les controverses qui jalonnent l’histoire de l’idée de Constitution économique émerge la question éminemment politique de la marge de manœuvre laissée aux autorités publiques dans la sphère économique. La notion cristallise ainsi une tension fondamentale : entre démocratie et État de droit, quel doit être modèle d’organisation et d’ordonnancement juridique de l’économie?

Des physiocrates aux néolibéraux, de la République de Weimar à l’intégration européenne, des constitutions nationales à la Global Governance, cet ouvrage collectif nous invite dès lors à explorer la généalogie du concept polémique de Constitution économique. Les auteurs ouvrent alors, à travers un dialogue interdisciplinaire constant, une réflexion globale autour des enjeux juridiques et politiques du processus actuel de constitutionnalisation de l’ordre de marché en Europe.

Abstract

The term ‘economic constitution’ brings into contact two systems, modern democratic constitutionalism and the market economy. The constitution describes the processes of self-government, implying a polity’s freedom to shape itself – including its own economy. The market economy presumes a self-regulating system based on rules inherent to the market – which seems to preclude political interventions. A constitution that defers to a certain economic system relinquishes its political sovereignty; an economy that is open to the particular demands of a political system relinquishes its self-regulatory character. The term ‘economic constitution’ brings that contradiction into focus. The essay first reflects on Physiocracy as an example of an attempt to impose market rules from above, which ran aground on the real practices of society in the 18th century. Next, it examines the radicalism of the Weimar Constitution, which, for many Social Democrats, opened up the possibility of social and economic transformation from the ground up, and faced a reaction from both statists and economic liberals. Both cases raised the problem of how to articulate social-economic rules and political empowerment, especially within federations: the dilemma of the European Union as a system of economic rules and ‘constitutional’ structure.

Open Access
In: The Idea of Economic Constitution in Europe
Author:

Résumé

La Constitution belge et l’économie semblent être des corps étrangers l’un à l’autre. Sous l’angle des normes matérielles, le déficit constitutionnel est comblé en droit interne par le législateur spécial et la Cour constitutionnelle et en droit de l’Union par la primauté des normes de droit primaire et de droit dérivé. Le concept dominant est celui de la liberté économique qui peut être aménagée par les autorités étatiques sur le plan normatif ou via le capitalisme public. Ces deux interventions requièrent une habilitation législative qui est d’interprétation restrictive et qui doit respecter le principe d’égalité et de non-discrimination. Sous l’angle des normes organiques, deux questions plus particulières nous paraissent devoir être abordées en l’absence ici aussi de normes constitutionnelles. Comment les autorités indépendantes qui assurent la régulation économique trouvent-elles leur place dans l’ordre juridique belge alors qu’elles sont dotées du pouvoir réglementaire ? La Constitution permet-elle ou interdit-elle aux pouvoirs publics de prendre en charge des activités économiques et d’instituer à cet effet des services publics économiques et, à défaut, l’aspect structurel du capitalisme public trouve-t-il alors ses limites dans le droit de l’Union européenne ?

Open Access
In: The Idea of Economic Constitution in Europe

Résumé

La ‘Constitution économique’ est une illusion, qu’il convient de désacraliser pour redonner toute son importance au pouvoir politique. L’échec ordolibéral initial d’une ‘constitution économique’ n’a pas empêché l’avènement d’une ‘Constitution économique néolibérale’. Le contenu de cette dernière est principalement constitutionnel : transformer l’État pour le soumettre au marché et ainsi permettre l’avènement d’une ‘méta-politique’, d’une idéologie dominante imposée juridiquement par le droit. Pour désacraliser cette ‘Constitution économique’, il convient de rappeler son rejet initial par la doctrine juridique, lors du colloque de Liège de 1970. Si la ‘Constitution économique néolibérale’ s’est imposée, c’est par une mutation des modalités de prise de décision politique. Celle-ci a été contrainte par des sources juridiques supra-législatives, internationales comme nationales, qui s’inspirent du dogme néolibéral et/ou reprennent les techniques du marché. Ce dernier devient l’un des gardiens – aux côtés des autorités indépendantes – des règles juridiques, et donc de l’idéologie, néolibérales. Pour autant, l’idée de supériorité du marché n’a pas résisté aux différentes crises que connaît le néolibéralisme. Elle tend cependant à être remplacée par l’idée de ‘Constitution écologique’, dont les ressorts autoritaires restent les mêmes que celle de ‘Constitution économique’.

Open Access
In: The Idea of Economic Constitution in Europe
Author:

Abstract

The contribution explores contemporary arguments about the scope of mass democracy in economic liberalism and expounds their origins in the liberal-conservative critique of the Weimar democratic welfare state, focusing on Carl Schmitt’s endorsement of the strong state as the prerequisite of sound economy. Like the founding ordoliberal thinkers, he characterized the Weimar welfare state as a weak state that had given in to the demands of recalcitrant social interests. He recognizes free economy as a genuine and indispensable political task and argues that the state can therefore not be an outgrowth of majoritarian democracy. Authoritarian liberalism is an argument about the indispensability of the liberal state as the independent power and authoritative guardian of the free economy. It recognizes the separation between state and society as fundamental to the constitution of a free economy and in this relationship, it identifies the state as the institution of institutions. It lays down the rules of conduct in a free economy and enforces the rules decides upon. Schmitt’s authoritarian critique of the mass-democratic legislative state and his endorsement of the executive state of the rights of property illuminates the political character of contemporary authoritarian liberalism and offers a cogent account of what is at stake.

Open Access
In: The Idea of Economic Constitution in Europe