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Contributors include: Benita Heiskanen, Albion M. Butters, Pekka M. Kolehmainen, Laura Hernández-Ehrisman, Lotta Kähkönen, Mila Seppälä, and Juha A. Vuori.
Contributors include: Benita Heiskanen, Albion M. Butters, Pekka M. Kolehmainen, Laura Hernández-Ehrisman, Lotta Kähkönen, Mila Seppälä, and Juha A. Vuori.
Abstract
This contribution attempts to reduce the complexity of the manifold images of Europe’s position in the world with the help of the imagological method. It outlines an evolving and progressively more entangled dialectics as a successively shrinking ‘Europe’ was opposed, either in negative or positive terms, to a growing lineage of Others. The process takes us from a large and open-bordered Europe in Classical Antiquity to a concentrated and more self-enclosed Northern-Eurozone Europe in its recent polarisation between postcolonial/post-totalitarian guilt and resurgent populist xenophobia. Throughout this long and complex history, the classical notion of the House (oikos, domus) has continued to inform European self-images. For better or worse, Europe sees itself in terms of its fundamental domesticity.
Abstract
Lithuanians are a typical East European modern nation, created by the Lithuanian nationalist movement which emerged in the late nineteenth century. Modern Lithuanian identity is ethnolinguistic, resembling national identities of other Baltic countries. Its distinctive feature is the narrative appropriation of the history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which was a multi-ethnic, multi-confessional and multi-cultural empire which in 1569 merged with Poland in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Reminiscences of this great imperial past became an important source of inspiration for Lithuanian foreign policy after the accession of the country to the European Union in 2004. The makers of this policy conceived as Lithuania’s mission to ‘bring back’ to European civilization all former lands of ancient Lithuania. They used the Lithuanian presidency of the Council of the EU in 2013 to materialise these ideas, which became an important contribution to the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis. The contribution closes with the discussion of other impending crises related to the legacy of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.
Abstract
This contribution deals with the relationship between national historiographies and national stereotypes in twentieth-century Europe. It argues that this relationship was extraordinarily diverse and complex and produced a range of different scenarios. After briefly recalling the role and function of stereotypes and after providing the briefest of introductions to national history writing, it presents five brief case studies. They are, first, the contributions of British and German historians to national stereotyping during the First World War. Secondly, the contribution recalls the stereotyping that followed from the research of so-called Volksgeschichte in Germany during the interwar period. Thirdly, the need to nationalise territories in East-Central and Eastern Europe that had previously not belonged to the nation state gave rise to the formation of new national stereotypes after the end of the Second World War. Fourthly, the hypernationalism of the first half of the twentieth century threw a range of national historical master narratives into a severe crisis after 1945 and created the need to reframe those narratives in the post-Second World War world. The final case study deals with a similar need to recast national historical master narratives after the end of the Cold War from the 1990s onwards.
Abstract
In both Greece and Turkey anti-western discourse is widespread. On the one hand both societies perceive themselves as European, but at the same time they criticize the ‘West’ as religiously or culturally different from ‘us’, being prejudiced against ‘us’, siding with our rivals, as hypocritical, cruel or imperialist. These stereotypes have real or imaginary historical dimensions, but they also relate to recent political controversies. While the rationalisations of these images are not identical in the two countries, the contradictory end results are quite similar. While they criticize the West, neither the Greeks nor the Turks associate themselves with the ‘East’ or any ‘eastern’ country. When all these ambiguities are taken into consideration one may conclude that the anti-West/Europe discourse is used as a political means to voice complaints and demands: ‘You do not accept a cut on our debt’, or ‘You do not accept us in the EU’. These are accusations that show the ‘self’ as a victim. They also show a national identity in anguish: ‘We are being treated unjustly, humiliated, etc’. This discourse also operates indirectly as a means of comparison with the ‘developed Western’ countries, stating ones own moral and cultural superiority.
Abstract
The motivation behind this contribution is to explain how the concept of identity got from the emancipatory context of identity politics to the conservative revolutionary context of nationalistic, xenophobic, far-right movements of the Generation Identity. On one hand the notion of identity was mobilised to challenge the dominant oppressive power relations by the marginal social groups based mainly on distinctiveness of ethnicity, race, gender etc. On the other hand, recent crises in Europe brought to the fore the far-right youth movements that posed the defence of identity as their main motto. The aim of this contribution is to analyse cultural references within the discourses and performances of the pan-European identitarian movement in order to understand their mechanisms of instrumentalising national, ethnic, as well as local and European cultural characteristics and values. This case study is of relevance as it not only shows cultural representations behind specific social movements reacting to recent European crises, but also explains the processes by which they are being ‘europeanised’ into pan-European cultural and political discourses.