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Edited by Frauke Albersmeier, David Hommen and Christoph Kann

Ever since the rise of the so-called analytic school in 20th century philosophy, philosophical analysis has often been considered to be synonymous with conceptual analysis. However, criticism has also been levelled at the conceptual analysis procedures, which undermined confidence in the merits of conceptual analysis. As far as the clarification of concepts is concerned, explication is therefore sometimes proposed as an alternative means.
Combining historical and systematic perspectives, this volume collects new work on analytical and explicatory methods within 20th century philosophy. The contributions explore how clarificatory and reformatory methods of engaging with concepts have been construed and utilized by such different authors as Aristotle, Russell, Wittgenstein, Carnap or Mackie, marking out underappreciated congruencies and reevaluating historical disputes. They explore the role of analysis in metaphysics as well as metaethics and examine how methodological accounts relate to underlying ideas about concepts.

Michael Quante

Personhood and personality are essential features of human persons. Following the debate concerning ‘personal identity’ the metaphysical and the practical dimension of our personal lifeform are made explicit.
The search for criteria for personal identity on the one hand and for person-making characteristics on the other hand are at the center of the philosophy of person. In this book the various dimensions of the personal lifeform of human beings which have been debated in analytical philosophy are examined. Thereby a new systematic conception is unfolded in which the metaphysical and the practical aspects of our personal lifeform are made explicit as a complex unity.

Panentheism and Panpsychism

Philosophy of Religion Meets Philosophy of Mind

Edited by Godehard Brüntrup, Benedikt Paul Göcke and Ludwig Jaskolla

Panpsychism has become a highly attractive position in the philosophy of mind. On panpsychism, both the physi-
cal and the mental are inseparable and fundamental features of reality. Panentheism has also become immensely popular in the philosophy of religion.
Panentheism strives for a higher reconciliation of an atheistic pantheism, on which the universe itself is causa sui, and the ontological dualism of necessarily existing, eternal creator and contingent, finite creation. Historically and systematically, panpsychism and panentheism often went together as essential parts of an all-embracing metaphysical theory of Being. The present collection of essays analyses the relation between panpsychism and panentheism and provides critical reflections on the significance of panpsychistic and panentheistic thinking for recent debates in philosophy and theology.

Edited by Christian Erbacher

Every student of the twentieth century has heard both of the great Viennese economist Friedrich von Hayek and of the equally great philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein. But what isn’t well known is that the two were distant cousins and that, shortly after Wittgenstein’s death in 1951, Hayek set out to write a biography of his cousin. The project was derailed by Wittgenstein family members, who felt it was to soon to publish such a work. But Hayek’s draft acquired an underground readership, and Wittgenstein’s biographers have used it extensively.
Here finally, is the text of that work itself. Hayek’s account has the great merit of being close to its subject; the draft, moreover sheds light, not only on Wittgenstein but on Hayek as well. Allan Janik’s elegant afterword makes these links clear. Anyone interested in Wittgenstein or, for that matter, in the thought and culture of the earlier twentieth century, will want to read Christian Erbacher’s excellent edition of Hayek’s draft biography. – Marjorie Perloff

Georg Meggle

In Facetten des Sozialen ergänzt Meggle seine systematischen Arbeiten über kommunikatives Handeln und sprachliche Bedeutung und konzentriert sich auf einige konkrete Aspekte einer allgemeineren Theorie der Sozialität.
Außer den sogenannten Kollektiven Identitäten (Teil A) – einem derzeit breit diskutierten sozialpolitischen Thema – stehen in diesem Band die folgenden drei Aspekte des Sozialen im Zentrum: Gemeinsames Wissen (Teil B), Offenheiten – in Opposition zu Täuschungen – (Teil C) und Reflexivitäten (Teil D). Sind das wirklich drei verschiedene Aspekte? Oder handelt es sich letztlich nur um einen einzigen in gelegentlich verschiedenen Gewändern (Bezeichnungen)? Nicht einmal diese Frage ist bisher entschieden.

Omissions and their moral relevance

Assessing causal and moral responsibility for the things we fail to do

Pascale Willemsen

This book empirically investigates the social practice of ascribing moral responsibility to others for the things they failed to do, and it discusses the philosophical relevance of this practice.

In our everyday life, we often blame others for things they failed to do. For instance, we might blame our neighbour for not watering our plants during our vacation. Interestingly, the attribution of blame is typically accompanied by the attribution of causal responsibility. We do not only blame our neighbour for not watering our plants, but we do so because we believe that not watering the plants caused them to dry up and die. In this book, I investigate how we make moral and causal judgments about omissions. I discuss different philosophical perspectives on this matter, and I outline to what extent the actual social practice is in line with philosophical theories.

Michael Quante

Hegel’s philosophy of mind is a systematically current conception due to its consistent anti-scientism and its multifaceted rejection of all forms of philosophical scepticism and its being a conception that has many references to pragmatism.

In its detailed examination of Hegelian texts this book offers various systematic references to current philosophy of mind. From the starting point of a basis of action theory the specific moves of Hegel’s concept of mind are developed: The antidualistic synthesis of corporality and spirituality and the genuine sociability of the human mind create the framework in which Hegel develops a modern conception of concrete freedom.
The primary goal of this book is to turn Hegel’s philosophy of mind into fertile terrain for the addressing of central problems of the present by bringing his systematic views into a dialogue with philosophical positions which have proponents today.

“Quante’s Hegel deserves to play a significant role in discussions of the most important contemporary issue in philosophy: the nature and importance of human freedom.” (Robert Pippin)

Martin Pleitz

The Liar paradox arises when we consider a sentence that says of itself that it is not true. If such self-referential sentences exist – and examples like »This sentence is not true« certainly suggest this –, then our logic and standard notion of truth allow to infer a contradiction: The Liar sentence is true and not true. What has gone wrong? Must we revise our notion of truth and our logic? Or can we dispel the common conviction that there are such self-referential sentences? The present study explores the second path. After comparing the Liar reasoning in formal and informal logic and showing that there are no Gödelian Liar sentences, the study moves on from the semantics of self-reference to the metaphysics of expressions and proposes a novel solution to the Liar paradox: Meaningful expressions are distinct from their syntactic bases and exist only relative to contexts. Detailed semantico-metaphysical arguments show that in this dynamic setting, an object can be referred to only after it has started to exist. Hence the circular reference needed in the Liar paradox cannot occur, after all. As this solution is contextualist, it evades the expressibility problems of other proposals.

Michael Quante

Leading one’s life as a person is an essential feature of our human existence which is constitutively characterized by finiteness, sociality and vulnerability. Within the framework of a pragmatistic anthropology central features of our being persons (i.e. personal identity, self-consciousness, freedom, autonomy and responsibility) are made explicit in this study. The such unfolded conception is anthropological in the sense of being restricted to the human life-form. The explication is pragmatistic in a double sense: Firstly, action is taken as a complex and not reducible basic feature; secondly, the study is committed to the pragmatistic model of justification. Leading one’s life as a human person, this is the study’s central thesis, is realized in constellations of recognition (intersubjective or institutionally framed). These can be made explicit as basic grammar of our evaluative Praxis within an ascriptivist framework.

Michael Quante