Browse results

While realism has enjoyed renewed vigor in contemporary philosophy, Est-ce réel ? Phénoménologies de l’imaginaire challenges the relevance of the concept of reality from a phenomenological perspective. The volume brings together an exciting and provocative range of contemporary research on these issues, moving beyond the classical opposition between the real and the imaginary. Est-ce réel? gathers original contributions from a selected group of specialists, including internationally acclaimed scholars as well as emerging researchers. The collection demonstrates a vast new territory unfolding in contemporary philosophy, from ontological reflections on the imaginary to the analysis of the fundamental aesthetic, ethical, socio-political, and therapeutic implications that follow from them.

With texts by G. Chernavin, A. Coignard, A. Dufourcq, I. Fazakas, A. Gléonec, A. Hervy, U. Idziak-Smoczyńska, A. Koubova, C. Lapierre, Y. Murakami, F. Pignarre, D. Popa, E. de Saint Aubert, J. Sallis, A. Schnell, R. Steinmetz et J.J. Wunenburger.
Kazimierz Twardowski (1866-1938) is the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School with its strong tradition in logic and its scientific approach to philosophy. Twardowski’s unique way of doing philosophy, his method, is of central importance for understanding his impact as a teacher. This method can be understood as a philosophical grammar, which is also how Leibniz conceived his universal language of thought.
Analytic philosophy in the twentieth century can be characterized by its opposition to psychologism, on the one hand, and its opposition to metaphysics, on the other. This is changing now, as questions within the philosophy of mind and metaphysics are raised by analytic philosophers today.
Maria van der Schaar shows in her book that we can improve our analytic methods by making use of Twardowski’s philosophical grammar. Twardowski’s positive attitude to psychology and metaphysics may also help us to develop an analytic metaphysics and to get a better understanding of the relation between psychology and philosophy.
Volume Editors: Denis Fisette and Riccardo Martinelli
The purpose of this book is to highlight Carl Stumpf’s contributions to philosophy and to assess some of the aspects of his work. This book is divided into four sections, and also includes a general introduction on Stumpf’s philosophy. The first section examines the historical sources of his philosophy, the second examines some of the central themes of his work and the third examines his relationship to other philosophers. The fourth section consists of notes taken by Husserl during Stumpf’s lectures on metaphysics in Halle, Stumpf’s introduction to the edition of his correspondence with Brentano, which he prepared in 1929, and some important letters pertaining to this correspondence. This book also provides a comprehensive bibliography of the works of Stumpf.

New investigations on the content, impact, and criticism of Aristotelianism in Antiquity, the Late Middle Ages, and modern ethics show that Aristotelianism is not an obsolete monolithic doctrine but a living and evolving tradition within philosophy. Modern philosophy and science are sometimes understood as anti-Aristotelian, and Early Modern philosophers often conceived their philosophical project as opposing medieval Aristotelianism. New Perspectives on Aristotelianism and Its Critics brings to light the inner complexity of these simplified oppositions by analysing Aristotle’s philosophy, the Aristotelian tradition, and criticism towards it within three topics – knowledge, rights, and the good life – in ancient, medieval, and modern philosophy. It explores the resources of Aristotle’s philosophy for breaking through some central impasses and simplified dichotomies of the philosophy of our time.

Contributors are: John Drummond, Sabine Föllinger, Hallvard Fossheim, Sara Heinämaa, Roberto Lambertini, Virpi Mäkinen, Fred D. Miller, Diana Quarantotto, and Miira Tuominen
The volume contains almost thirty papers by Kazimierz Twardowski (1866-1938), the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School. The papers are published in English for the first time. They stem from the Lvov period, which is often contrasted with the earlier Vienna period of Twardowski’s scientific activity. Contrary to received opinion, the editors argue that the Lvov period is just as important as the Vienna period. Indeed, the scope of Twardowski’s investigations was much broader and more profound in later years. The papers concern fundamental problems of philosophy: the methods of philosophizing, the boundary of psychology and semiotics, the conceptual apparatus of metaphysics, ethical skepticism, the question of free will and ethical obligation, the aesthetics of music and so on. The systematic considerations are complemented by concise but excellent sketches of the philosophical views of Socrates, Aquinas, Leibniz, Spencer, Nietzsche, and Bergson.
Minding Time: A Philosophical and Theoretical Approach to the Psychology of Time offers a theoretical account of the most fundamental kinds of time representation, drawing on philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, and biology. Recent experimental findings on creatures from bees to scrub-jays to human beings have demonstrated the complex – and astoundingly reliable – functioning of biological clocks. These clocks, Carlos Montemayor argues, make possible representations of duration that are then anchored to representations of simultaneity, and they do so independently of conscious information or representations of the self. Montemayor offers an innovative philosophical explanation of how representations of duration and simultaneity relate to the consciously experienced present moment.

No theory has integrated the research on representations of simultaneity and duration. Minding Time: A Philosophical and Theoretical Approach to the Psychology of Time provides such a theory, showing that the metric constraints on time measurements are not dependent on phenomenal consciousness.
Freedom as Overcoming the Fear of Death
Author: Paul Cobben
In The Paradigm of Recognition. Freedom as Overcoming the Fear of Death Paul Cobben defends the position that Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit contains all the building blocks to elaborate a paradigm of recognition which fundamentally criticizes the contemporary versions of Habermas, Rawls and Honneth. In his concept of recognition, the fear of death is the central category to understand the mediation between freedom and nature. Cobben not only systematically reconstructs how this view results from Hegel’s criticism of Hume and Kant, but also shows how Hegel’s three-part division of social freedom is based on this mediation. Therefore, Honneth wrongly thinks that his three forms of social freedom (related to love, respect and solidarity) correspond to Hegel’s three-part division.