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Volume Two: Uses of History in Constitutional Adjudication
Constitutions are a product of history, but what is the role of history in interpreting and applying constitutional provisions? This volume addresses that question from a comparative perspective, examining different uses of history by courts in determining constitutional meaning. The book shows that there is considerable debate around the role of history in constitutional adjudication. Are, for example, historical public debates over the adoption of a constitution relevant to reading its provisions today? If a constitution represents a break from a prior repressive regime, should courts construe the constitution’s provisions in light of that background? Are former constitutions relevant to interpreting a new constitution? Through an assessment of current practices the volume offers some lessons for the future practices of courts as they adjudicate constitutional cases.

Contributors are: Mark D. Rosen, Jorge M. Farinacci-Fernós, Justin Collings, Jean-Christophe Bédard-Rubin, Cem Tecimer, Ángel Aday Jiménez Alemán, Ana Beatriz Robalinho, Keigo Obayashi, Zoltán Szente, Shih-An Wang, and Diego Werneck Arguelhes.
Rule of Law Guardian for the Public Health Derogation
Author: Kate Shaw
In an era of Covid 19, the book The Court of Justice of the European Union explores the extent to which the CJEU can realise a powerful role as guardian of the EU’s rule of law in a public health emergency. Drawing on an extensive literature review, it The Court of Justice of the European Unionargues the CJEU can realise such a role by anchoring a structured rule of law review in its reasoning when considering the exercise by the Member States of the public health derogation. Both the legal reasoning of the CJEU during the Covid 19 public health emergency and its aftermath, as well as the related challenges to the EU’s rule of law, are legally and politically of intense interest to legal academics, legal practitioners, policy makers and students.
Globalisation, migration, and (de-)secularisation have fundamentally transformed the concepts of religion, state, and law during the last decades. The main goal of this interdisciplinary approach is to clarify the multifaceted theoretical and practical challenges of religious diversity and socio-political pluralism in Europe.

In twenty-two chapters, the contributions to this volume revisit basic concepts, structures and institutional settings such as sovereignty, the dogma of the separation of state, church and/or religion; human and minority rights; gender and religion; varieties of fundamentalisms, interreligious dialogue and peacebuilding and, not least, religious education.
The compatibility of ISDS in Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) with the autonomy of EU law
The EU’s participation in international dispute resolution mechanisms presents particular problems owing to its multilevel governance and its autonomy from international and national law. The inclusion of foreign direct investment in the Common Commercial policy in the Treaty of Lisbon, expanded those to investment arbitrations under Member States’ BITs, as the Court of Justice ruled in Achmea. EU Law and International Investment Arbitration, examines the impact of that inclusion beyond Achmea, from the perspectives of international and EU law, to the remaining extra-EU BITs of the Member States and the Energy Charter Treaty.
Volume Editors: Guillaume Grégoire and Xavier Miny
Behind the controversies that have marked the history of the idea of Economic Constitution emerges the highly political issue of the room for manoeuvre left to public authorities in the economic sphere. The notion thus encapsulates a fundamental tension: between democracy and rule of law, which model of legal ordering of the economy should prevail?

From physiocrats to neo-liberals, from the Weimar Republic to European integration, from national constitutions to Global Governance, this collective book invites us to explore the genealogy of the controversial concept of Economic Constitution. The result of this interdisciplinary dialogue is a comprehensive reflection on the legal and political issues at stake in the current constitutionalization of the market order in Europe.

Contributors are: Philippe Steiner, Guillaume Grégoire, Hugues Rabault, Peter C. Caldwell, Thomas Biebricher, Werner Bonefeld, Serge Audier, Vincent Valentin, Pieter van Cleynenbreugel, Xavier Miny, Frédéric Marty, Claire Mongouachon, Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz, Francesco Martucci, Michael Wilkinson, Hjalte Lokdam, Susanna Maria Cafaro, Peter Lindseth, Cristina Fasone, Pierre Nihoul, François Colly, Peter-Christian Müller-Graff, Tony Prosser, Damien Piron, Mahmoud Mohamed Salah, Stephen Gill, Thibault Biscahie, Sebastien Adalid, and Christian Joerges.

Derrière les controverses qui jalonnent l’histoire de l’idée de Constitution économique émerge la question éminemment politique de la marge de manœuvre laissée aux autorités publiques dans la sphère économique. La notion cristallise ainsi une tension fondamentale : entre démocratie et État de droit, quel doit être modèle d’organisation et d’ordonnancement juridique de l’économie?

Des physiocrates aux néolibéraux, de la République de Weimar à l’intégration européenne, des constitutions nationales à la Global Governance, cet ouvrage collectif nous invite dès lors à explorer la généalogie du concept polémique de Constitution économique. Les auteurs ouvrent alors, à travers un dialogue interdisciplinaire constant, une réflexion globale autour des enjeux juridiques et politiques du processus actuel de constitutionnalisation de l’ordre de marché en Europe.

Abstract

The term ‘economic constitution’ brings into contact two systems, modern democratic constitutionalism and the market economy. The constitution describes the processes of self-government, implying a polity’s freedom to shape itself – including its own economy. The market economy presumes a self-regulating system based on rules inherent to the market – which seems to preclude political interventions. A constitution that defers to a certain economic system relinquishes its political sovereignty; an economy that is open to the particular demands of a political system relinquishes its self-regulatory character. The term ‘economic constitution’ brings that contradiction into focus. The essay first reflects on Physiocracy as an example of an attempt to impose market rules from above, which ran aground on the real practices of society in the 18th century. Next, it examines the radicalism of the Weimar Constitution, which, for many Social Democrats, opened up the possibility of social and economic transformation from the ground up, and faced a reaction from both statists and economic liberals. Both cases raised the problem of how to articulate social-economic rules and political empowerment, especially within federations: the dilemma of the European Union as a system of economic rules and ‘constitutional’ structure.

Open Access
In: The Idea of Economic Constitution in Europe
Author: Pierre Nihoul

Résumé

La Constitution belge et l’économie semblent être des corps étrangers l’un à l’autre. Sous l’angle des normes matérielles, le déficit constitutionnel est comblé en droit interne par le législateur spécial et la Cour constitutionnelle et en droit de l’Union par la primauté des normes de droit primaire et de droit dérivé. Le concept dominant est celui de la liberté économique qui peut être aménagée par les autorités étatiques sur le plan normatif ou via le capitalisme public. Ces deux interventions requièrent une habilitation législative qui est d’interprétation restrictive et qui doit respecter le principe d’égalité et de non-discrimination. Sous l’angle des normes organiques, deux questions plus particulières nous paraissent devoir être abordées en l’absence ici aussi de normes constitutionnelles. Comment les autorités indépendantes qui assurent la régulation économique trouvent-elles leur place dans l’ordre juridique belge alors qu’elles sont dotées du pouvoir réglementaire ? La Constitution permet-elle ou interdit-elle aux pouvoirs publics de prendre en charge des activités économiques et d’instituer à cet effet des services publics économiques et, à défaut, l’aspect structurel du capitalisme public trouve-t-il alors ses limites dans le droit de l’Union européenne ?

Open Access
In: The Idea of Economic Constitution in Europe

Résumé

La ‘Constitution économique’ est une illusion, qu’il convient de désacraliser pour redonner toute son importance au pouvoir politique. L’échec ordolibéral initial d’une ‘constitution économique’ n’a pas empêché l’avènement d’une ‘Constitution économique néolibérale’. Le contenu de cette dernière est principalement constitutionnel : transformer l’État pour le soumettre au marché et ainsi permettre l’avènement d’une ‘méta-politique’, d’une idéologie dominante imposée juridiquement par le droit. Pour désacraliser cette ‘Constitution économique’, il convient de rappeler son rejet initial par la doctrine juridique, lors du colloque de Liège de 1970. Si la ‘Constitution économique néolibérale’ s’est imposée, c’est par une mutation des modalités de prise de décision politique. Celle-ci a été contrainte par des sources juridiques supra-législatives, internationales comme nationales, qui s’inspirent du dogme néolibéral et/ou reprennent les techniques du marché. Ce dernier devient l’un des gardiens – aux côtés des autorités indépendantes – des règles juridiques, et donc de l’idéologie, néolibérales. Pour autant, l’idée de supériorité du marché n’a pas résisté aux différentes crises que connaît le néolibéralisme. Elle tend cependant à être remplacée par l’idée de ‘Constitution écologique’, dont les ressorts autoritaires restent les mêmes que celle de ‘Constitution économique’.

Open Access
In: The Idea of Economic Constitution in Europe
Author: Werner Bonefeld

Abstract

The contribution explores contemporary arguments about the scope of mass democracy in economic liberalism and expounds their origins in the liberal-conservative critique of the Weimar democratic welfare state, focusing on Carl Schmitt’s endorsement of the strong state as the prerequisite of sound economy. Like the founding ordoliberal thinkers, he characterized the Weimar welfare state as a weak state that had given in to the demands of recalcitrant social interests. He recognizes free economy as a genuine and indispensable political task and argues that the state can therefore not be an outgrowth of majoritarian democracy. Authoritarian liberalism is an argument about the indispensability of the liberal state as the independent power and authoritative guardian of the free economy. It recognizes the separation between state and society as fundamental to the constitution of a free economy and in this relationship, it identifies the state as the institution of institutions. It lays down the rules of conduct in a free economy and enforces the rules decides upon. Schmitt’s authoritarian critique of the mass-democratic legislative state and his endorsement of the executive state of the rights of property illuminates the political character of contemporary authoritarian liberalism and offers a cogent account of what is at stake.

Open Access
In: The Idea of Economic Constitution in Europe

Abstract

This contribution seeks to trace the significance of the concept of an economic institution in the neoliberal tradition. Three different phases from the inception of liberal discourse to contemporary times are distinguished. During the first phase the concept of an economic constitution is developed, particularly by ordoliberal thinkers, and is taken up in other currents of neoliberal thought, including the Chicago School. The second phase witnesses a decline of thinking in terms of economic constitution as ordoliberalism loses its influence within neoliberal discourse and Chicago thinkers discard the concept. A final phase is characterized by a rapprochement between Constitutional Political Economy as represented by James Buchanan and contemporary Freiburg School thought epitomized, first and foremost, by Viktor Vanberg, who concur in the continued significance of economic constitutionalism.

Open Access
In: The Idea of Economic Constitution in Europe