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Why is choral dance (χορεία) so prominent in Plato’s Laws? In answer to this question, this book offers an in-depth analysis of the dialogue’s moral psychology, arguing that dance is not only an educational instrument but also, in terms of the physical expression of ordered pleasure, a symbolic image of the principal goal of moral education: moderation (σωφροσύνη). Thus, choral dance becomes a powerful construct to illustrate Plato’s main philosophical concerns. Other key features of the book include an innovative account of the dialogue’s complex composition, new interpretations of the puppet image and the tragedy claim, and the first chapter-length investigation of the moral funtion of shame.
Why is choral dance (χορεία) so prominent in Plato’s Laws? In answer to this question, this book offers an in-depth analysis of the dialogue’s moral psychology, arguing that dance is not only an educational instrument but also, in terms of the physical expression of ordered pleasure, a symbolic image of the principal goal of moral education: moderation (σωφροσύνη). Thus, choral dance becomes a powerful construct to illustrate Plato’s main philosophical concerns. Other key features of the book include an innovative account of the dialogue’s complex composition, new interpretations of the puppet image and the tragedy claim, and the first chapter-length investigation of the moral funtion of shame.
This book offers thirteen essays that examine women and the female in Neoplatonism from a variety of perspectives, paying particular attention to the interactions between the metaphysics, psychology, and ethics.
This book offers thirteen essays that examine women and the female in Neoplatonism from a variety of perspectives, paying particular attention to the interactions between the metaphysics, psychology, and ethics.
Abstract
The paper provides a reconstruction of proof by contradiction in Kant’s pure general logic. A seemingly less-explored point of view on this topic is how apagogical proof can account for the formal truth of a judgement. Integrating the argument held by Kjosavik (2019), I intend to highlight how one can use proof by contradiction, conceived as a modus tollens, to establish the logical actuality (logical or formal truth) of a cognition. Although one might agree on the capacity of the proof to prove formal falsity, the logical actuality of a judgement is assessable based on a logically grounded judgement and, as for transcendental logic, this cognitive operation has to presuppose the real possibility of an object.
Abstract
In this essay, I discuss three readings of Descartes’ Meditations. According to the first reading, “I exist” is for Descartes the foundation of our knowledge. This reading is dismissed on the grounds that, in his view, as long as God’s existence is not proven there is a good reason to doubt this proposition. Proponents of the second reading claim that there are two kinds of Cartesian knowledge: perfect and imperfect knowledge. The meditator has imperfect knowledge of “I exist” before God’s existence is proven. Subsequently, she acquires perfect knowledge of various metaphysical theorems. This reading is repudiated, too. I argue for a third reading, according to which “I think” – and not “I exist” – is the foundation of our knowledge.
Several illuminating connections are drawn between Rawls’s political liberalism and Plato’s contrasting appeal to the “noble lie” in politics, between Rawls’s overall method of reflective equilibrium and Aristotle’s dialectic, between Rawls’s opposition to merit in the distribution of wealth and Augustine’s similar anti-Pelagian stance, and between Rawls’s view of a just society as a common good of common goods and the natural law dimension of Aquinas’s philosophy. In general, the distance between Rawlsian abstraction and his historical embeddedness is lessened considerably.
Several illuminating connections are drawn between Rawls’s political liberalism and Plato’s contrasting appeal to the “noble lie” in politics, between Rawls’s overall method of reflective equilibrium and Aristotle’s dialectic, between Rawls’s opposition to merit in the distribution of wealth and Augustine’s similar anti-Pelagian stance, and between Rawls’s view of a just society as a common good of common goods and the natural law dimension of Aquinas’s philosophy. In general, the distance between Rawlsian abstraction and his historical embeddedness is lessened considerably.