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Safri also tries to show the indirect influence of Avicennism on logic in the Maghribī tradition in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. On the basis of his writings on logic and philosophical theology, al-Wallālī was considered a master of rational sciences by his contemporaries.
Safri also tries to show the indirect influence of Avicennism on logic in the Maghribī tradition in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. On the basis of his writings on logic and philosophical theology, al-Wallālī was considered a master of rational sciences by his contemporaries.
Meister Eckhart is undoubtedly one of the most fascinating medieval authors, who has appealed to a wide audience across the centuries. At the same time, the extraordinary universality and openness of his mystical-theological approach has repeatedly made him the object of all kinds of ideological projections and misinterpretations. The present volume examines the reception of Eckhart’s mysticism in the era of National Socialism. The main focus is put on the different and sometimes contradictory attempts to present Eckhart as the founder of “Germanic Christianity” or “German faith” and as a visceral opponent of both Judaism and the Catholic Church.
Meister Eckhart is undoubtedly one of the most fascinating medieval authors, who has appealed to a wide audience across the centuries. At the same time, the extraordinary universality and openness of his mystical-theological approach has repeatedly made him the object of all kinds of ideological projections and misinterpretations. The present volume examines the reception of Eckhart’s mysticism in the era of National Socialism. The main focus is put on the different and sometimes contradictory attempts to present Eckhart as the founder of “Germanic Christianity” or “German faith” and as a visceral opponent of both Judaism and the Catholic Church.
Abstract
The paper provides a reconstruction of proof by contradiction in Kant’s pure general logic. A seemingly less-explored point of view on this topic is how apagogical proof can account for the formal truth of a judgement. Integrating the argument held by Kjosavik (2019), I intend to highlight how one can use proof by contradiction, conceived as a modus tollens, to establish the logical actuality (logical or formal truth) of a cognition. Although one might agree on the capacity of the proof to prove formal falsity, the logical actuality of a judgement is assessable based on a logically grounded judgement and, as for transcendental logic, this cognitive operation has to presuppose the real possibility of an object.
Abstract
In this essay, I discuss three readings of Descartes’ Meditations. According to the first reading, “I exist” is for Descartes the foundation of our knowledge. This reading is dismissed on the grounds that, in his view, as long as God’s existence is not proven there is a good reason to doubt this proposition. Proponents of the second reading claim that there are two kinds of Cartesian knowledge: perfect and imperfect knowledge. The meditator has imperfect knowledge of “I exist” before God’s existence is proven. Subsequently, she acquires perfect knowledge of various metaphysical theorems. This reading is repudiated, too. I argue for a third reading, according to which “I think” – and not “I exist” – is the foundation of our knowledge.