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Neuartige ethische Herausforderungen in Medizin, Biotechnologie, Technik, Umwelt u.a.m. werfen die Frage auf, wie im Kontext einer pluralen Gesellschaft empirisch fundiert und ethisch reflektiert verantwortliche Handlungsempfehlungen, normative Entscheidungen und gesetzliche Regelungen getroffen werden können. Ethik-Kommissionen lassen sich dabei als konkrete Orte angewandter Ethik in praktischer Perspektive verstehen. Doch wie wirken sich die Erfahrungen von Ethik-Kommissionen auf das Ethik-Treiben selbst und das Selbstverständnis als Ethiker aus? Der Band versammelt Beiträge von Ethikern, die vielfältige Erfahrungen in Ethik-Kommissionen gemacht haben.
Jochen Sautermeister war 2014-2017 Inhaber der Stiftungsprofessur für Moraltheologie unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Moralpsychologie an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München. Derzeit ist er Professor für Moraltheologie und Direktor des Moraltheologischen Seminars an der Universität Bonn und seit 2019 Dekan der Katholisch-Theologischen Fakultät.
Er ist Mitglied der Zentralen Ethik-Kommission für Stammzellenforschung am Robert-Koch-Institut, des Instituts für Wissenschaft und Ethik der Universität Bonn und des International Xenotransplantation Association Ethics Committee.
Neuartige ethische Herausforderungen in Medizin, Biotechnologie, Technik, Umwelt u.a.m. werfen die Frage auf, wie im Kontext einer pluralen Gesellschaft empirisch fundiert und ethisch reflektiert verantwortliche Handlungsempfehlungen, normative Entscheidungen und gesetzliche Regelungen getroffen werden können. Ethik-Kommissionen lassen sich dabei als konkrete Orte angewandter Ethik in praktischer Perspektive verstehen. Doch wie wirken sich die Erfahrungen von Ethik-Kommissionen auf das Ethik-Treiben selbst und das Selbstverständnis als Ethiker aus? Der Band versammelt Beiträge von Ethikern, die vielfältige Erfahrungen in Ethik-Kommissionen gemacht haben.
Jochen Sautermeister war 2014-2017 Inhaber der Stiftungsprofessur für Moraltheologie unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Moralpsychologie an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München. Derzeit ist er Professor für Moraltheologie und Direktor des Moraltheologischen Seminars an der Universität Bonn und seit 2019 Dekan der Katholisch-Theologischen Fakultät.
Er ist Mitglied der Zentralen Ethik-Kommission für Stammzellenforschung am Robert-Koch-Institut, des Instituts für Wissenschaft und Ethik der Universität Bonn und des International Xenotransplantation Association Ethics Committee.
Abstract
The Māturīdīs think that, without revealed law, human beings can grasp through speculative reasoning that some actions are good (ḥasan) and some are bad (qabīḥ). This article addresses the ontological aspect of such ethical rationalism. An analysis of the texts of legal theory shows that the sixth/twelfth-century Māturīdīs approached moral values in a non-realist way. Specifically, ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Samarqandī (d. 539/1144?), who identifies himself as a true successor of Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944), demonstrates that goodness (ḥusn) and badness (qubḥ) are neither real accidents nor divine command and prohibition; rather, “good” and “bad” just express one’s natural or rational approval and disapproval of objects and actions, and Prophetic law shapes some of the natural likes and dislikes. On this account, I conclude that al-Samarqandī’s view, shared by his contemporaneous fellow Māturīdīs such as Abū l-Thanāʾ al-Lāmishī (d. after 539/1144) and Najm al-Dīn al-Nasafī (d. 537/1142), challenges the current standard interpretations of the Māturīdī ethics as realism or divine command theory.
Abstract
In the Islamic moral discourse, the Muʿtazilī theologians are generally known to deem moral good (ḥusn) and bad (qubḥ) to be real and related to the action itself independently of the revelation. They also admit that the human intellect is capable of grasping moral principles. This position, however, was opposed by Ashʿarī theologians who consider good and bad to be recognizable only through revelation, as well as by philosophers who believe that ethical propositions carry a social normative function, and, hence, must be endorsed by a sufficient proportion of the population to be truly deemed ethical through praised opinions. According to Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna, d. 428/1037), the existence of a given proof is not a sufficient criterion for a moral proposition to be true.
After discussing these three views in the Islamic tradition, this paper looks at the impact of theological and philosophical views on legal hermeneutics (uṣūl al-fiqh), which has received little scholarly attention. The scope of my investigation is limited to Shīʿī uṣūl al-fiqh of the last century. More specifically, I shall focus on Ākhūnd al-Khurasānī (d. 1329/1911), a proponent of Muʿtazilī moral theory, as well as al-Muḥaqqiq al-Iṣfahānī (d. 1361/1942), a proponent of the philosophers’ position. In so doing, I argue that while some Shīʿī jurists have explicitly endorsed the theory of essential and rational goodness and badness, others defended Ibn Sīnā’s theory on moral propositions. Finally, I conclude that while Shīʿī jurists did not explicitly endorse the Ashʿarī position, one can observe some resonance with the epistemological claim of the Ashʿarī approach in their legal hermeneutics without necessarily endorsing the theory of divine and legislative goodness and badness. This leads me to underline the impact of both philosophical and theological doctrine on Islamic legal hermeneutics.
Abstract
Comparing ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s (d. 415/1025) ethical assessment of acts with their legal status, this paper draws attention to the complex manner in which he arrives at his definitions. The detailed analysis complicates the often presumed dichotomy between consequentialist and deontological approaches to ethics and between rationalist Muʿtazilism and theistic subjectivist Ashʿarism. It demonstrates that ʿAbd al-Jabbār employs both consequentialist and deontological perspectives. The paper argues that ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s definitions of “good,” “bad” and “obligatory” derive from taking God’s justice (ʿadl) as the standard by which he evaluates divine and human action, thus reversing analogizing from the seen to the unseen. Understanding an action as tipping the balance of justice in favor or against the agent explains ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s ethical and legal definitions of acts. It shows how an act of benefit for somebody else establishes a right for the agent and an obligation of restitution on the recipient.