This paper shows that Georg Groddeck and Carl Gustav Jung shared a common cultural background, in which Carl Gustav Carus’s theory of the psyche was preeminent. Accordingly, they emphasized symbolization and unconscious creativity. These aspects affected their clinical work, aimed at pioneering therapies: Jung with schizophrenics, Groddeck treating physical diseases. They overcame the limits of the psychoanalysis of their time and, going beyond neurosis, discovered the pre-Oedipal period and the fundamental role of mother-child relationship. While Freud’s technique was based on a one-person paradigm, both Jung and Groddeck considered analytic therapy as a dialectical process, ushering in a two-person paradigm. Therefore, they did not use the couch; a setting that is assessed in the light of recent research on mirror neurons. It is also highlighted that the analytic groups influenced by Groddeck and Jung have developed similar ideas in both theory and technique; a fact that may induce further studies on the history of depth psychology.
My article re-reads John Milton’s Paradise Lost through a feminist post-Jungian perspective; the study will observe the implications of contemporary Jungian critical approaches toward Milton’s portrayal of Eve, who helps Adam find ‘a paradise within …, happier far’ (PL 12. 587). I will first highlight the negative portrayal of an evil, intellectually inferior Eve in Paradise Lost, and ultimately re-reading the poem—and the role of Eve in it—from the perspective of a feminist Jung. The initial reading of Paradise Lost, in which Eve was regarded as inferior and complementary to Adam, reflects Jung’s criticized notion that the anima’s role is to complement a man’s psychology. This, however, can be read differently through a post-Jungian feminist perspective. From this new viewpoint, Eve can be regarded as Adam’s equal, rather than an inferior company, and a catalyst in their ‘coniunctio’, in which they both individuate (rather than Eve, the anima be subservient to Adam’s individuation) in Paradise Lost. Despite the vast differences between John Milton’s and Carl Jung’s cultural and historical backgrounds, this novel reading of Paradise Lost in context of revisions to Jung’s anima theory and theory of individuation offers a more positive view on the poet’s depiction of Eve in keeping with more recent developments in Milton scholarship, which have drawn attention to the way the text questions conventions of gender hierarchy and patriarchy.
Flags are conceptual representations that can prime nationalism and allegiance to one’s group. Investigating children’s understanding of conflict-related ethno-national flags in divided societies sheds light on the development of national categories. We explored the development of children’s awareness of, and preferences for, ethno-national flags in Northern Ireland, Kosovo, and the Republic of North Macedonia. Children displayed early categorization of, and ingroup preferences for, ethno-national flags. By middle-childhood, children’s conflict-related social categories shaped systematic predictions about other’s group-based preferences for flags. Children of minority-status groups demonstrated more accurate flag categorization and were more likely to accurately infer others’ flag preferences. While most Balkan children preferred divided versus integrated ethno-national symbols, children in the Albanian majority group in Kosovo demonstrated preferences for the new supra-ethnic national flag. We discuss the implications of children’s ethno-national flag categories on developing conceptualizations of nationality and the potential for shared national symbols to promote peace.
Numerous scholars from different fields ranging from history, political science, ethnic and cultural studies, sociology, and anthropology have discussed ethnic and racial identity issues in the People’s Republic of China. Most have noted that there are competing narratives regarding the conceptions of race and ethnicity. Much of the scholarship has been based on social constructivist orientations. This essay is directed towards a merger between social constructivist and cognitive science approaches on essentialism that may open the doors for further research and investigation of this important topic.
What is the relationship between war propaganda and nationalism, and what are the effects of each on support for, or participation in, violent acts? This is an important question for international criminal law and ongoing speech crime trials, where prosecutors and judges continue to assert that there is a clear causal link between war propaganda, nationalism, and mass violence. Although most legal judgments hinge on the criminal intent of propagandists, the question of whether and to what extent propaganda and nationalism interact to cause support for violence or participation remains unanswered. Our goal here is to contribute to research on propaganda and nationalism by bridging international criminal law and the behavioral and brain sciences. We develop an experiment conducted with Serbian participants that examines the effects of propaganda as identified in the latest international speech crime trial as causing mass violence, and thereby test hypotheses of expert witness Anthony Oberschall’s theory of mass manipulation. Using principal components analysis and Bayesian regression, we examine the effects of propaganda exposure and prior levels of nationalism as well as other demographics on support for violence, ingroup empathy, and outgroup empathy. Results show that while exposure to war propaganda does not increase justifications of violence, specific types of war propaganda increase ingroup empathy and decrease outgroup empathy. Further, although nationalism by itself is not significant for justifying violence, the interaction of increased nationalism and exposure to violent media is significant for altering group empathies. The implications of these findings are discussed with respect to international criminal law and the cognitive science of nationalism.
The Cognitive Science of Nationalistic Behavior (CSNB), presented in this paper, integrates the political sciences of nationalities as invented communities with an evolutionary cognitive analysis of social forms as products of the human mind. The framework is modeled after the Cognitive Science of Religion, where decades of cross-disciplinary work has generated standards, predictions, and data about the role of individual cognitive tendencies in shaping societies. We study the nationalistic calendar as a cultural attractor and draw on cue-based behavioral motivation and differential autobiographical memory systems to explain its appeal to the human mind. Calendrical elements are analyzed in the context of essentialist thought patterns and action representation systems. We conclude with the implications of calendrical thinking on the control of elites who aim to forge and reinforce national identities. This paper lays the groundwork for applying a similar approach to the study of other nationalistic elements.
The problem of other minds has been discussed in the Buddhist epistemological tradition, three arguments by Vasubandhu, Dharmakīrti, and Ratnakīrti having received the most attention from modern scholars. However, there is another significant resource for considering the problem, viz Dharmapāla’s distinct analyses of a bodhisattva’s and of a buddha’s cognitions of other minds. Through examining his commentary on the Viṃśikā called Cheng wei shi bao sheng lun 成唯識寶生論 and the Cheng wei shi lun 成唯識論 together with the Wei shi ershi lun shuji 唯識二十論述記 by Kuiji (窺基, 632–682), I argue first for the specificity of Dharmapāla’s basic tenet that accepts other minds and negates external objects, pointing out how it differs from Dharmakīrti’s and Ratnakīrti’s arguments on the same topic. Based on this analysis, especi,ally focusing on Dharmapāla’s argument concerning a buddha’s cognition of another’s mind, I also propose to read Dharmapāla’s argument as a variant of the so-called transparency thesis, which claims that one’s mental states are transparent not only to oneself but also to the Buddha, or more correctly, one’s mind is more transparent to the Buddha than to oneself.