In their article on ‘Investigating historical abuses’ Yannick Balk, Georg Frerks and Beatrice de Graaf (2022) present an applied history of intercountry adoption to the Netherlands over the past 70 years and conclude that a moratorium on intercountry adoption is necessary because of the many adoption abuses. In this paper we comment on their aims, methods, results, and conclusions. Applied historical analysis without considering the numerous empirical studies on the effects of (de-)institutionalization is problematic if the application is to impact policy. Furthermore, using inaccessible archival material and opaque triangulation hinders replication. An estimate of the overall frequency of adoption abuses is absent. Any adoption abuse is a serious violation of children’s rights and needs to be addressed. However, we argue that their findings do not necessitate the recommendation to (temporarily) stop intercountry adoption at the expense of children in institutions for whom intercountry adoption would be the last resort.
We appreciate the attention paid by professors van IJzendoorn and Bakermans-Kranenburg (hereafter IJ/B) to our work and the report by the Committee Investigation Intercountry Adoption (hereafter CIIA). We are grateful to the Journal of Applied History (JOAH) for the possibility to respond, since we do not agree to all IJ/B’s observations and criticisms.
IJ/B’s comments hinge to a large degree on the undesirability of institutional care and how that compares with intercountry adoption as a last resort. We have not addressed or researched this in our work, as we
Recent years have seen the rapid descent of relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (prc). Hopes for cooperation in places of common concern like climate change gave way to strains in almost all areas. In place of “engagement,” the administration of Donald J. Trump adopted a tougher approach of “strategic competition” that its successor so far has continued. This article explores the relationship between the demise of engagement and opinions coming from the American China expert community. Specifically, it questions the impact on engagement of five secular dynamics that these China authorities have experienced—generational turnover; the field’s vast expansion and diversification; increased disciplinary specialization; the enhanced prominence of the generalist in national security discussions in place of China specialists; and changes in the media leading to more skeptical journalistic voices on U.S.-prc relations. Without over-emphasizing either the influence of the expert community on U.S. decision-making, or underplaying the more repressive and authoritarian actions of the Chinese Communist Party, this article suggests that the China expert community has been more of a factor in the end of engagement than current accounts of academics and commentators acknowledge.
During 2021, the International Security Studies Forum (issf) posted a series of articles on H-Diplo, the Diplomatic and International History discussion network, in which leading scholars of U.S. foreign relations assess the legacy of President Donald J. Trump’s policies in world affairs. As the editors explain, these essays examine and evaluate “the effects of the Trump presidency, from a range of different perspectives, and in light of the events of the Trump years, . . . on the United States’ standing in the world.”1 Many articles address the impact of Trump’s policies on specific regions and
For a generation before the 2008 global financial crisis, Sino-U.S. relations were premised on a modus vivendi of détente. While neither of the two great powers ever was willing to sacrifice its own geopolitical interests, the larger framework guiding the relationship was one of pragmatic cooperation and issue management. That shared understanding has helped keep Asia generally stable since 1979, the last time the region experienced an interstate war. But by 2016, President Barack Obama’s final year in office, the Pentagon had begun prioritizing great power war as the next big paradigm. Washington’s think tank industry had churned out piles
The War in Vietnam ended in 1975. In 1978, the United States and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (srv) were on the verge of restoring full diplomatic relations when National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski scuttled the effort, fearing that this would complicate his attempts to establish full diplomatic relations with the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). The United States restored diplomatic relations with the srv only in 1995.
The war itself has produced an enormous literature, but only now are scholars giving serious attention to the history of the reconciliation process. Two recent books pave the
Kimberly D. McKee’s Disrupting Kinship: Transnational Politics of Korean Adoption in the United States is an interdisciplinary project that uniquely frames seemingly separate issues—such as U.S. domestic child welfare policy and American militarism in South Korea—into a distinct portrait of the transnational adoption industrial complex (taic). In conversation with previous critical adoption and intersectional feminist literatures, McKee advances the taic as analytic lens for investigation into the historically situated, macro- and micro-levels of adoption (such as family formation and citizenship). Significantly, McKee insists on centering and nuancing the voices of adoptees throughout her elaboration
Weipin Tsai is Senior Lecturer in Modern Chinese history at Royal Holloway, University of London. Her research focuses on the history of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service, the Chinese Post Office, and Chinese private letter hongs in the 19th Century. Harvard University Press will publish her forthcoming monograph titled The Making of China’s Post Office: Sovereignty, Modernization, and the Connection of a Nation.
Seungmi Laura Cho is a doctoral candidate in social welfare at the Sandra Rosenbaum School of Social Work, University of Wisconsin-Madison. Cho also has her bachelor’s and master’s degree in social work from
The People’s Republic of China has confronted the United States with diplomatic challenges ever since Washington recognized Beijing in January 1979. Basic to this engagement was and continues to be economics, and particularly trade, which elicited American responses ranging from enmity, fear, and uncertainty to cooperation, amity, and hope. Scholarship has not focused enough attention on the ideals and values that undergirded commercial relations as the principal American approach to China. Beginning with President Richard M. Nixon’s opening to Beijing and ending with President Donald J. Trump’s trade war (with touchstones in the Nixon, George H. W. Bush, William J. Clinton, Barack Obama, and Trump years), this article analyzes how a bilateral trading relationship that so transformed the world evolved from recognition to rivalry. The answer to the wax and wane lies in the near-century long practice of American free-trade internationalism that followed the principles of the “capitalist peace” paradigm, long embraced by the United States as a pillar of its foreign policy.