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In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
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Abstract

In Kantian philosophy, the term “condition of possibility” is central, but carries the following ambiguity. According to one reading, “condition of possibility” merely means “necessary condition”. However, it is demonstrated that a deeper interpretation of the term “possibility” proves to be more fruitful. This reading allows us to reconstruct an important background assumption of Kant: Every condition of the possibility of experience holds necessarily, provided that experience is possible. Or more generally: All conditions of the possibility hold necessarily as long as the conditioned is actually possible.

This conclusion is understood through the axiomatic system S5. Therefore I argue by referencing the schematism chapter that Kant’s notion of modal terms can be formalized through S5.

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
Author:

Abstract

In On the Trinity 15.12.21, Augustine appears to endorse the KK principle (that if one knows that φ , then one knows that one knows that φ ) in the course of giving an argument – the Multiplicity Argument – against the Academic skeptics. Gareth Matthews has disputed Augustine’s endorsement of the KK principle and presented a different reading of the Multiplicity Argument. In this note, I show that Matthews’s construal of the Multiplicity Argument is both interpretively and technically defective and defend the attribution of some form of the KK principle to Augustine.

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
Author:

Abstract

Aristotle argues that time depends on soul to count it, but adds that motion, which makes time what it is, may be independent of soul. The claim that time depends on soul or mind implies that there is at least one measurable property of natural beings that exists because of the mind’s activity. This paper argues that for Aristotle time depends partly on soul, but more importantly on motion, which defines a continuum. This argument offers a robust metaphysics of time. In contrast to modern philosophy of physics, for Aristotle the continuum of motion is prior in being to time, while time is a hybrid of the real continuum of motion and the activity of mind.

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis