Nach Titel durchsuchen

Serie:

Christian Klotz and Matteo Vincenzo d’Alfonso

Serie:

Jindřich Karásek

Abstract

The aim of the „Grundriss des Eigentümlichen der Wissenschaftslehre“ is to analyse the theoretical faculty. The starting point of this analysis is the proposition that the i posits itself as determinated by the Non-i. My thesis, which can be proven in Fichte´s text, is that it is the notion of the picture which serves as a point of orientation in the analysis of the cognitive faculty, as Kant calls it. The cognition of an object comes about as a dialectical relationship between the picturing i, the picture and the pictured object, which Fichte calls the real thing. I would like to investigate how much Fichte follows the Kantian analysis of the cognitive faculty on the one hand and how much he differs from it on the other hand. This investigation will take into account a question which is very important for every epistemology taking its starting point in subjectivity, namely the question of how the i can recognize that the objects of its cognition are real things and not the products of his phantasy. Fichte explicitly raises this very question. At the end of this paper, I attempt to show what kind of answer Fichte gives to this questionee.

Serie:

Christian Klotz

Abstract

Also in the latest versions of the Science of Knowledge Fichte considers explanation of the structure of consciousness a central task of philosophy. In his late explanation of consciousness, the concepts of life and image (or schema) play a central role – two concepts that in Fichte’s account are inseparable and mutually elucidate each other. By interpreting the 1810 Science of Knowledge and Fichte’s introductory lecture The facts of Consciousness from 1810/11, this article aims to show that the pair of concepts “life” and ‘image’ occur on two different theoretical levels in Fichte’s late philosophy: first, in the formulation of a view of consciousness that Fichte characterizes as ‘idealist’ and that he considers to be in continuity with Kant’s transcendental philosophy; and, second, in the exposition of the conception of consciousness as an image of a non-constructible absolute that goes beyond the idealist explanation without, however, denying its validity within its own sphere. The second step, which occupies the major part of the 1810 Science of Knowledge, can be understood as Fichte’s late reply to Jacobi’s critique of the Science of Knowledge as a ‘nihilism’. Its final step is the introduction of the concept of ‘sober- mindedness’, in the sense of a self-interpretation of moral consciousness which goes beyond any constructible content. The concluding part of the article interprets and discusses the conception of sober-mindedness as involving Fichte’s final reply to Jacobi’s criticism.

Serie:

Christian Klotz and Matteo Vincenzo d’Alfonso

Serie:

Manuel Jiménez-Redondo

Abstract

The late Fichte transforms transcendental philosophy into ontology, without transcendental philosophy ceasing to be transcendental philosophy. The center of his philosophy is no longer the transcendental self, but rather concepts like existence, light, image, from which the transcendental self can be derived. Against dogmatism, for which being is to be considered as an absolute fact, Fichte tries to show that being can be deduced and explained from the light, and that means: from transcendental freedom. Whatever exists is made from the substance of appearance, from the substance of visibility and light, from the material of the image. But the appearance, the image, the light, can only derive their creative power from the fact that they are (in absolute terms) the existence of the Absolute. And precisely at this point, under the idea that only the Absolute is, Fichte has repeatedly to cope with the question of the relation between the being-character of this substance and the being-character of the Absolute. Against his reiterated attempts to proceed this way, the difference between being and existence can not so easily be traced back to the concept of an absolute Being, in whose inner essence lies the fact that nothingness becomes itself an ‘apparent something’ (the world), against the background of which, and by which, the Absolute cannot be, and cannot be understood, except as absolute.

Serie:

Michael Gerten

Abstract

In Fichte research, there is no consensus on the interpretation of a topic of fundamental importance for Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre: the relationship of the absolute ‘in itself’ to its appearance. In addition to the difficulty of the matter in itself, the problems of understanding might also be related to the linguistic and terminological form of its presentation.

My paper starts with the hypothesis, that an adequate understanding is actually decisively dependent on the dissolution of the ambiguity of the terminus “being”, which also occupies a prominent position in Fichte’s prima philosophia. Taking a distinction from Rudolf Hermann Lotze, I consider in a type of thought experiment whether and how Fichte‘s concept of the absolute qua absolute being (“Sein”, as a counter-concept to appearance / image / existence of the absolute) can be explained or replaced by the term validity (“Geltung”). It is also necessary to consider to what extent the idea of validity is already contained in Fichte’s “Theory of Truth”.

Serie:

Christian Klotz and Matteo Vincenzo d’Alfonso

Serie:

Simon Schüz

Abstract

The goal of this paper is to interpret Fichte’s terminology of ‚light‘ and ‚imaging‘ in the WL-1804-ii as a rendition of transcendental principles. This analysis is intended as a contribution to the discussion concerning the theoretical status and methodology of the later doctrines of science. i begin with an exposition of four criteria for transcendentally constitutive principles: 1. presuppositional character, 2. constitutivity, 3. categorial difference between conditions and conditioned, 4. immanent justification. The systematic function of ‘light’ is exemplarily reconstructed according to these criteria. The focus of analysis lies on the fourth criterion, which is framed as the philosophical problem which Fichte’s conception of a ‘law of imaging’ in the 24th and 25th lectures answers to. The ‘law of imaging’ is reconstructed as a special form of performative self-validation which is intended to satisfy the criterion of immanent justification. A further upshot of this reading is a reappraisal of Fichte’s treatment of light’s perpetual ‘objectivization’.

Das carmen heroicum und der Krieg

Martin Opitz’ Ratispona in libertatem vindicata (1633)

Dirk Werle

Martin Opitz combines elements of the panegyric and the heroic epic in his Ratispona in libertatem vindicata, an epic poem published in 1633. By means of a narration that adapts and variates the genre tradition, he creates a future-oriented perspective of historical meaning and presents an interpretation of the historical events constituting the war that later came to be known as the Thirty Years War. In so doing, he emphatically raises the claim that the carmen heroicum’s interpretation of history is a proclamation of truth.

Aigi Heero

The present article analyzes the depiction of the Thirty Years War in the texts by the scholars of the Reval (today Tallinn) gymnasium and focusses on the occasional poems of professors (e.g. Timotheus Polus, Reiner Brockmann, David Cunitz) composed in the 1630s as well as on the autobiography of the cantor David Gallus (probably written in the early 1650s). As a result, it will be shown that in the poems the war is regarded as a topos and the concrete events of war are represented on an abstract level. The autobiography of Gallus, on the other hand, describes the war from the distant perspective of a survivor and reflects how the war was felt and experienced by a “private” person.