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Abstract
Naturalism is the dominant characteristic of W. V. Quine’s philosophy. The current study presents a more comprehensive and sympathetic clarification of Quine’s naturalized epistemology (NE hereafter), and vindicates its main positions by critically responding to the three objections to Quine’s NE: it is the replacement of traditional epistemology (TE hereafter), it is viciously circular, and it is devoid of normative dimension, and to Williamson’s three charges to naturalism (mainly Quine’s brand), finally concludes that the three objections and Williamson’s three charges to Quine’s NE are mainly perhaps caused by misreading or misinterpretation, so all of them failed, and that there are still illuminating, reasonable, and valuable insights in Quine’s NE, which are worthy of further development.
Abstract
Comparative philosophy is gaining traction in professional academic philosophy, with specialist journals, organizations, books, and public campaigns. These inroads have been made in canonical areas of philosophy, including epistemology, metaphysics, logic, and value theory. Yet comparative philosophy still plays little role in practical applied ethics, an interdisciplinary research area in which work with practice and policy implications are dominated by the anglophone world. In this article, I explain why comparative work might be especially difficult in this type of applied ethics, and I suggest how comparative philosophers might overcome these challenges to connect their theoretical work with contemporary practical issues.
Abstract
The launching of philosophical pursuits undertaken in an East-West trajectory at the first East-West Philosophers’ Conference in 1939 represents a turning point in philosophy. However, as groundbreaking as this approach was, it left out all philosophical cultures that did not fit the initial framework. Islamic philosophy, being viewed as neither Western nor Eastern (Asian), was thus marginalized from the start. I introduce “Bricolage” – a method emphasizing curiosity, humility, and playfulness – as a more nuanced way of engaging with diverse philosophical traditions. “Bricoleurs” are interculturalists who remain open to the use of different methodologies: they are “flâneurs” walking through diverse philosophical landscapes for sheer intellectual pleasure.
Abstract
I use the concept of epistemic injustice to think through the practice and methodology of comparative, or “fusion,” philosophy. I make two related claims: 1) the philosophical ethnocentrism displayed by academic departments in the U.S. is a case of epistemic injustice, primarily willful ignorance, that ought to be rectified; 2) the corrective to this problem, namely, fusion philosophy, is itself epistemically problematic in its tendency toward ontological expansiveness, that is, an unjustified claim to all traditions as one’s own. In the end, I hope to show how a robust practice of self-reflexivity can counter this potentially colonizing tendency of fusion philosophizing.
Abstract
This paper is motivated by a question of naturalized epistemology of W. V. Quine and the question is how a naturalistic account gives rise to theoretical understanding with its realistic ontology. I concentrate on the possibility of the principle of reification by way of interpretation and the point is how we interpret interpretation in a naturalistic account. First, we must distinguish between Quine and Carnap based upon the distinction of interpretation versus reduction. Second, we should take seriously the function of observation and the consequent interpretation with regard to reality and ontological understanding. This article also exams the positions of Descartes, Kant and recent philosophers Gadamer and Davidson. In doing so, some test cases of interpretation analyze in particular the case of “anomalous monism”. Finally, this paper makes effort to focus on quantum mechanics as an object of naturalistic interpretation, although it is itself a naturalistic interpretation of classical physics and relativity based upon observation of new features of reality. In conclusion, the Yijing philosophy of change is cited as a possible, useful and meaningful interpretation of quantum mechanics just as quantum mechanics could be a useful and meaningful interpretation of the Yijing’s onto-cosmology (which theory I had established two decades ago).
Abstract
In her chapter “Models of knowledge in the Zhuangzi: Knowing with chisels and sticks,” Karyn L. Lai ponders Confucius’s conversation with the cicada catcher in the Zhuangzi. Lai asks, “What does the cicada catcher know that Confucius doesn’t?” The knowledge that Confucius and his disciples seek may be precisely what they can never have. I explore the epistemological rift between ways of knowing by applying Karen Amimoto Ingersoll’s distinction between “seascape epistemology” (based on Native Hawaiian, Kānaka Maoli, ways of knowing) and Western epistemology (framed as girding neocolonialist expansion on the Hawaiian Islands).