Comparing Fiscal Federalism investigates intergovernmental financial relations and the current
de jure and
de facto allocation of financial and fiscal powers in compound states from a comparative and interdisciplinary perspective. The volume combines theoretical approaches with case studies and involves scholars from various disciplines, in order to provide a comprehensive analysis of different approaches, developments and trends. This includes outlining fiscal federalism’s basic principles and overall frameworks, investigating current constitutional/legislative settings and how financial systems function, as well as zooming in on a selection of emerging issues in financial and fiscal relations. The single chapters are based on comparative investigations under the umbrella of a broad definition of fiscal federalism that includes all varieties of federal systems.
Concurrency of powers – the exercise of jurisdiction by federal governments and constituent units in the same policy areas – is a key, if not the central, mode of governance in most federal systems today. Moreover, the experience has been that federal governments dominate the concurrent space giving rise to contestation. This volume,
Concurrent Powers in Federal Systems: Meaning, Making and Managing, edited by Professor Nico Steytler, is the first to examine from a comparative perspective this crucial issue confronting both established and emerging federations. Case studies of 16 countries on five continents dissect the various manifestations of concurrency, analyse what drives this modern governance mode, and review management strategies that seek to guard against central dominance of concurrent areas.