Recently, the behaviour of emerging powers in relation to R2P has been understood as that of norm-shapers: states that seek to adjust the norm so that it conforms to their particular understandings. In this behaviour, respect for sovereignty is seen as a central concern. In the English School of International Relations, identification with the institution of sovereignty reflects an approach called pluralism. China’s behaviour is consistent with a pluralist approach to international relations. This paper aims to examine the Chinese positions regarding R2P, in order to identify pluralist traits in them. The procedure was to raise, inductively, prescriptions made by China, associating them with theoretical categories. From an analysis of the Chinese positions, it can be demonstrated that China’s behaviour reveals a paradigmatic case of a pluralist norm-shaper. Qualitative Content Analysis techniques were used as a methodological approach, while MAXQDAplus software was applied as a tool to aid in the coding of declarations.
This article analyses the key aspects of the brics countries’ joint position on the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) concept, as well as the degree of their influence on transforming R2P into a global norm. The author’s aim was to answer the following questions: What interconnection is there between the brics and R2P discourses? How can brics stimulate an alternative interpretation of the R2P idea? In terms of cross-border partnerships, is R2P-based cooperation possible within the brics framework, and are states ready to expand it in the future? brics member states have demonstrated several common approaches to R2P, including their reliance on mechanisms strengthening the role of the state, their support for the UN position on peaceful conflict settlement, and preventive diplomacy.
This article explains why R2P failed to motivate action to protect vulnerable Syrians in the first two years of the crisis. We focus on the United States and argue that official discourse ‘localised’ the meaning R2P by grafting it on to preconceived ideas of America’s role in supporting democratic revolutions, which is how the situation was understood. American ‘exemplarism’ demanded the US support democracy by calling on Assad to go while not corrupting the ‘homegrown’ revolution through foreign intervention. The call for political and criminal accountability aligned exemplarist democracy promotion to R2P, but it did nothing to protect vulnerable populations from the conflict that ensued. This refraction of the norm complicated the United Nations sponsored peace process, which provided an alternative means of protecting the Syrian population. We address a gap in the literature by examining Western localisation and draw policy lessons, namely the importance of examining national predispositions when implementing R2P.
In this article, I argue that contemporary international law imposes an obligation upon the UN Security Council permanent members to refrain from using their veto repeatedly in ways that impede the Council from acting against violations of peremptory norms. This obligation not to veto emanates from the duty to cooperate to end violations of peremptory norms as enshrined in Article 41(1) of the International Law Commission Articles on State Responsibility. For this purpose, I demonstrate that the duty to cooperate itself possesses a peremptory character under the theory of ‘consequential jus cogens’, whereby effects of jus cogens norms are themselves peremptory. In doing so, this article contributes to the ongoing debates concerning the legal nature of the effects of jus cogens norms by showing that the theory of ‘consequential jus cogens’ is an application of the generally accepted maxim accessorium sequitur principale and thus forms part of positive international law.
Over the past fifteen years since the adoption of the Responsibility to Protect, all eyes have been on the UN Security Council and its ability to respond to situations at imminent risk of, or experiencing, atrocity crimes. To the contrary, little attention has been given to the Geneva-based Human Rights Council (hrc) and its procedures and mechanisms. This is interesting considering that the hrc has responded to emerging and protracted atrocity situations around the world, often at times when the Security Council remained silent. hrc response to atrocities in Myanmar, Venezuela, and elsewhere highlights the unique role it can play in implementing R2P and triggering follow-up action outside of Geneva; yet, much remains to be done to overcome both institutional and political challenges to fully utilise the hrc’s potential to uphold our individual and shared responsibility to protect.
In light of increased pressure on multilateral institutions, this article assesses the contribution of international organizations (IOs) to shaping international law. For that purpose, it analyses the recent work of the International Law Commission (ILC) regarding the role of IOs and its reception by States. The article argues that States do not perceive IOs as a relic of bygone times. Instead, the sceptical attitude of some States seems to be based primarily on a lack of conceptual clarity with regard to IO practice. Yet, a changing geopolitical landscape increases the pressure on lawyers to explain firstly, that the relevance of IO practice finds support in international law (and not only in favourable power relations), and secondly, that the law provides means to integrate a more plural international order within a common framework. On that basis, the article sketches possible approaches to four issues which were left open by the ILC.
Acknowledging that progress in gender mainstreaming was woefully deficient, the United Nations (UN) Department of Peacekeeping Operations organized a May 2000 Seminar in Windhoek on “Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations”, hosted by the Namibian Government, which produced two ground-breaking outcome documents that had an enormous impact on the adoption of landmark UN Security Council resolution 1325 on “Women and peace and security” five months later. Through the lens of the author’s first-hand account, the article unpacks and scrutinizes the ways in which the Seminar’s visionary Windhoek Declaration and the more operational Namibia Plan of Action came into being and had such a critical impact on that milestone resolution, and what specific factors ignited this exceptional outcome, including the role played by the host country. Through this prism, three key factors and the infectious effect of each are described, providing insights into the evolving Seminar dynamics and the interplay of inspiring speakers, Working Group deliberations, and strategic plenary sessions. The article also highlights, however, that the promises of the Windhoek Declaration, Namibia Plan of Action, and resolution 1325 have still not been fulfilled twenty years later, even though the hopes of conflict-affected women had been re-ignited in 2015 with Security Council resolution 2422’s sweeping calls for action and a stark Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 presenting robust recommendations for action to fill the many gaps. As the 20th anniversary of resolution 1325 approaches, a rallying cry of hope is directed to all those who believe in the need for women to be fully involved as equal partners in all peace and security processes that this struggle can still be accelerated to achieve the results envisaged if top UN leadership spearheads a bold time-bound initiative to steer the course forward. But will this rallying cry be embraced?
The analysis in this paper reveals that on the individual level, the institutional framework continues to exert a profound impact on social organizations’ forms and civic engagement in China. The CGSS2012-based analysis leads to the following findings. For a start, political party members and danwei employees demonstrate a higher degree of social organizational involvement and civic engagement. In the meanwhile, the party members’ role in promoting civic engagement is achieved to some extent through mediating effect of social organizations. Next, various types of social organizations have significantly increased civic engagement on a practical level. Finally, income plays a large role to increase the individuals’ organizational involvement, albeit with no obvious influence on civic engagement in practice. These findings are significant in the following ways. First, from an empirical perspective, the current institutional design for social organizations to participate in social governance has delivered the expected results. Second, it confirmed the existence of activists with distinct features in social life as well as the integration of multiple governing networks in social space at grassroots level. Third, in theory, this paper noted that apart from institutional environment of technical governance by bureaucratic government, institutional framework constitutes an important institutional foundation for the development of social organizations, giving rise to the need of further discussions about the interaction mechanism between political parties and society.
How to discriminate the two Chinese terms for “public benefit” (gong-yi) and “charity” (ci-shan) has been an oft-discussed topic on which academic circles are yet to reach consensus. This paper sorts out systematically the existing literature comparing and analyzing gong-yi (“public benefit”) and ci-shan (“charity”), reviews it in light of their origins, their roots in cultural and intellectual history, their meanings and their associations, and summarizes views the academic circles generally hold, hoping to provide reference for further academic discussions.