To implement the spirit of previous talks between Chinese and US leaders and relevant government agencies on economic and trade issues and to resolve Sino-US trade frictions, China has made some adjustments in its foreign trade strategy over the past year. These adjustments are not only to demonstrate its sincerity in negotiating and in responding to US demands, but also to meet China’s own development needs, in line with its own strategic interests. This article takes China’s own strategic interests as a starting point for discussing the necessity of adjusting China’s foreign economic and trade strategies with respect to foreign trade, industrial development, and intellectual property, as well as further adjustment measures that should be taken.
After the 2008 financial crisis, discussions at home and abroad on the existing international order, which is based on the United States and the West, and on its future have increased significantly, but most of the relevant research results lack both a workable framework for the assessment of the international order and an empirical analysis of historical changes in the international order. By constructing a relatively complete framework for defining and assessing the international order and examining major changes of international order since 1800, we can provide a list of possible Chinese options, i.e., China is still to be a “builder of world peace, contributor to global development, and defender of the international order.” As long as it is determined that no country can truly block China’s economic growth from the outside, and that China’s economic growth depends more on domestic reform and opening up, what China needs to do is to keep calm, govern itself well while persisting in reform and opening up, and do its utmost to work with other countries and non-state actors to steadily improve the international order for the benefit of the world.
The next 15 years will be a time for China to transform its comparative advantages, a critical period for China’s rise as a major emerging country, and a period of major adjustments in the international landscape. A new round of technological revolution, changes in global economic governance, the game of major countries, and other important factors will profoundly change the future international economic landscape. In the future, the international economic landscape will show trends reflecting the following “ten major changes”: (1) the global economy will enter a period of low-speed growth; (2) the global economic landscape will become more conspicuously multi-polar; (3) changes in production methods driven by the new technological revolution will reshape the global industrial division of labor; (4) the structures and patterns of international trade will change, with digitalization and servicification prominent, and rules will increasingly emphasize high-level facilitation and liberalization; (5) the global cross-border investment will increase amid fluctuations and new trends will emerge in the formulation of cross-border investment rules; (6) the aging of the world’s population will accelerate, and the scale of middle-income groups in developing countries will surpass their counterparts in developed countries; (7) green development will become an important orientation as countries formulate development strategies; (8) global energy structures and patterns will change profoundly; (9) overall global food security will improve; (10) international financial centers will become more diversified. These major changes in the external environment will bring unprecedented new opportunities for and challenges to China’s development. It will be necessary to grasp these new trends of change in the international economic landscape, in order to make use of the advantages and avoid harm during the new round of opening up.
This article, for the first time, uses the input-output tables of 30 provinces in China from 2002, 2007, and 2010 to examine the impact of participation in global value chains (GVCs) and national value chains (NVCs) on the regional-industrial dimension of China’s economic growth. The results of our research show that participation in GVCs and NVCs can significantly promote China’s economic growth, and that there is a complementary relationship between the two. At the same time, the effects of this participation on China’s economic growth are temporally and spatially heterogeneous, and that the role of GVCs in promoting economic growth has weakened significantly after the outbreak of the global financial crisis; participation in GVCs and NVCs and the interactive effects of both also have a significantly greater impact on economic growth in coastal areas than in inland areas. In addition, the interactive relationship between different participation methods in NVCs and in GVCs in terms of promoting economic growth is asymmetrical, with NVC downstream participation being the main method for achieving effective interaction between GVCs and NVCs.
Although globalization was, in theory, believed to bolster the world economy and benefit all nations, past globalization waves, corresponding to various stages of the Industrial Revolution, had in fact excluded developing nations from participating in and benefiting from them, until the most recent wave of globalization beginning in the 1990s. Failure to understand the fundamental difference between this latter stage and the previous waves of globalization continue to interfere with our percep-tion of the problems facing the world. Using the framework of growth theory, this paper investigates the characteristics of the present wave of globalization since the 1990s. Major findings are twofold. First, international trade returned to its classic pattern, as theorized by Ricardo, Heckscher, Ohlin, and Samuelson, and developed and developing countries alike benefited from it, although in developed countries, the dividends failed to trickle down to ordinary workers due to the lack of any redis-tribution policy. Second, as a result of mutual gains, economic convergence occurred for the first time in history. By implementing its reform and opening-up policy, Chi-na created the institutional conditions necessary for its own growth and catching-up. A series of economic reforms contributed to the improvement of incentives and the reallocation of resources, thus increasing potential growth capacity. Meanwhile, opening up to the outside world in general and joining the WTO in particular have helped China realize its comparative advantage and gain the globalization dividend. The implications of this study can therefore be summarized: (1) domestic reform is a necessary condition for a country to participate in and benefit from globalization; (2) globalization ought to be open and inclusive so as to benefit all nations; and (3) a domestic redistribution policy is necessary if the dividend is to be shared among all groups.
Identity politics is a new thing. Its newness is not to be limited to interpretation in the philosophical and sociological sense, but also needs to be understood within a specific historical process. The historical relevance of identity politics lies in its being connected with the evolutionary process of the world order. It originated in Third World liberation movements against white colonialists, and after the end of the Cold War, it entered into the capitalist system in the guise of cultural pluralism, transforming from revolutionary politics into performance politics. Universalism and cultural pluralism dissolved the hegemonic position of white culture and eventually triggered its resistance. It stimulated the emergence of white identity politics, and it became a new force against globalization.
This paper analyzes the serious but not fatal risks of the recent development of artificial intelligence (AI), as well as the potentially fatal dangers of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) with self-consciousness and autonomy in the future. The author also discusses the safety conditions for AI, arguing that a self-destruct procedure should be implanted within super AI in order to ensure the ontological security of humankind.
China has a pivotal position in global supply chains. Since the Covid-19 pandemic broke out, comments about “decoupling” and “relocation of manufacturing abroad” have continued unabated. The author believes that the reshuffling of global industrial chains will lead to a reshuffling of global industrial chains, not to decoupling from China, as a few Westerners hope, and that they will rather develop toward becoming more vertically integrated, more diversified, and more resilient, under the influence of market laws.
In response to concerns about the relocation of industrial chains as a result of the pandemic, the author points out that industry during the next phase will be paying more attention to digital infrastructure, namely cloud services, the Internet of Things, remote services, and so on. Right now, China’s building of digital infrastructure, such as 5G data centers and the Internet of Things, is accelerating, so China’s future commercial infrastructure should be strengthened rather than weakened.
This time, global industrial restructuring will certainly not consist of simple relocation, but will be a structural reconfiguration based on the developing needs of advanced productive forces, as well as the production relations formed around the world in terms of infrastructure building and the business environment, and on the basis of this, through innovation, there will emerge an industrial structure in which production chain clusters are vertically integrated.
When confronting the restructuring of future industrial chains, China should have five major countermeasures: (1) improve the layout of industrial chains and mend their shortcomings; (2) start the domestic economic cycle and encourage export-oriented enterprises to shift to domestic sales; (3) encourage traditional industries to digitize, restructure, and use new technology to develop their domestic markets; (4) attach importance to the market value of cyberspace and give full play to the role of cross-border e-commerce; (5) strive to expand the total value of import trade and achieve a balance of imports and exports.
This paper expounds eight views on economic and financial issues. First, US escala-tion of trade friction cannot solve any problem. Second, the United States has bene-fited substantially from its trade deficit with China. Third, allegations of “Chinese Theft of US Technology” reflect the logic of power politics. Fourth, further deepen-ing the reform on the Renminbi exchange rate formation mechanism. Fifth, China does not have “State Monopoly Capitalism”. Sixth, the goal to improve corporate governance structure will remain unchanged. Seventh, being persistent about opening the financial sector to the outside world. Last, China’s development should also be based on handling its own affairs well.