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Abstract
Peak opium production was reached in 2017 when Afghanistan became the world-market leader in opium production in recent times. Historically only the British Empire had surpassed as China’s prime supplier prior to the mid-19th-century Opium Wars. Both situations belong to different historical periods. In colonial times the dominant superpower was engaged in major drug-dealings; nowadays a poor country such as Afghanistan has gained a dominant position in production but not in profit-making. Nearly half a century after Richard Nixon’s declaration of a ‘war on drugs’ Afghanistan and Myanmar are the prime suppliers of the world market. The spending of 611 billion US dollars on US-led military activities in Afghanistan since 9/11 has made Afghanistan the prime focus of actions to control the spread of drugs; more than two fifths of all United States’ spending for security issues was allocated in Afghanistan. Despite all these efforts Afghanistan has maintained its position as leading supplier of opiates to the end-user markets only after 9/11. Three questions are discussed in the article: How could Afghanistan emerge from oblivion to gain such a prime standing in cultivating and processing poppy (Papaver somniferum) and its derivates like morphine and heroin? How could illicit poppy cultivation become such a persistent and dominant cash crop in Afghanistan across all changes of governance and international relations? What factors allow expanding and sustaining the value chain of opiates from Asian to global markets?
Abstract
The Afghan poppy cultivation is presented here as a case in point to exemplify the linkages between external influences and local effects. World market and power relations have influenced cultivation patterns, processing, and trafficking. At the same time, poppy cultivation pinpoints an internal development which is strongly linked to deteriorating state control, warlordism, and regional power politics. Opium production has served as a major source of revenue for the upholding of disparate political structures which reflect the present political map of Afghanistan. Poppy cultivation in Afghanistan gained a substantial push during the last quarter century, from an annual production of 200 tons in 1979 to 4,200 tons in 2004, making use of former development efforts in creating irrigated oases in Helmand and Nangarhar. Prices rose after the Taliban’s 2001 ban on production, raising farmers’ incomes substantially and turning opium into an unrivalled cash crop. Fairly new production zones have been added in recent times; for example, Badakhshan – the stronghold of the Northern Alliance – has gained the third position with major increases in the last few years. Afghanistan’s poppy cultivation and opium production has to be interpreted in terms of globalization and fragmentation. Drug trafficking affects the neighboring states, namely, Iran, Tajikistan, and Pakistan, as they function as consumer markets as well as trade routes for contraband drugs heading towards the West. Consequently, the Afghan poppy cultivation is interpreted in a holistic manner.
Abstract
The establishment of a Russian village in Potsdam at the beginning of the 19th cen-tury is a peculiarity that can be perceived as a symbol of political vagaries and changeovers in the aftermath of Napoleon’s conquest of Prussia. Alexandrovka func-tioned as a showpiece for the Stein-Hardenberg reforms in terms of planed village and new agricultural policies. Property rights for land tillers, new cultivation tech-nologies and especially orchards played an important role. The surprising fact that this Russian village in Prussia has survived until today, has been due to the percep-tion of its historical value. Alexandrovka has been preserved as an attractive cultural heritage sight and included in Potsdam’s World Heritage Site since 1999. Alexan-drovka’s setting might be the only entirely preserved surviving example of a so-called Russian artificial village. Its role model was the now extinct Glasovo.