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Abstract
At Phaedo 74b–c an important argument is given for the non–identity of perceptible equals and equality. The argument is usually understood as an application of Leibniz’s Law in which the predicate appears unequal is affirmed of perceptible equals but not equality. But this reading requires explaining why the plural locution the equals themselves is initially used for equality, and why the additional predicate appears as inequality is denied of it. In this paper, an account of the equality premise is given which allows for an initial grasp of equality as a plurality (suitably expressed by a plural locution), and introduces a generic predicate for appearance, appears its opposite (rightly denied of equality). The former ensures that the question of non–identity is not begged, while the latter secures a role for every element in the premise. So understood, the argument is both more robust and carefully formulated than is usually thought.
Abstract
In On the Trinity 15.12.21, Augustine appears to endorse the KK principle (that if one knows that
Abstract
Aristotle argues that time depends on soul to count it, but adds that motion, which makes time what it is, may be independent of soul. The claim that time depends on soul or mind implies that there is at least one measurable property of natural beings that exists because of the mind’s activity. This paper argues that for Aristotle time depends partly on soul, but more importantly on motion, which defines a continuum. This argument offers a robust metaphysics of time. In contrast to modern philosophy of physics, for Aristotle the continuum of motion is prior in being to time, while time is a hybrid of the real continuum of motion and the activity of mind.