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The paper presents a subjectivist interpretation of Protagoras’ man-measure fragment, by explaining some key terms (‘all things’, ‘measure’, ‘man’) and reconstructing his ontological, epistemological and anthropological views. The argument uses other fragments and testimonies of Protagoras as well as intertextual allusions to previous authors (especially Anaxagoras) and instances of reception of Protagoras by Plato, Aristotle and Isocrates which are particularly used here for the first time in order to interpret the man-measure fragment. It is argued that Protagoras denied metaphysical speculation and preferred human knowledge based on subjective perception and made plausible by intersubjective discourse.
The paper aims at examining some new testimonies on Aeschines of Sphettus that were not included in Gabriele Giannantoni’s Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae, and that refer to different aspects of the Socratic’s life and works. Some texts concern Aeschines’ biografy; namely, his relationship with Socrates (Suid. s.v. Σωκράτης), his patronymic and his poverty (Aristoph. Vesp. 1243–1247, 323–326, 459; Suid. s.v. σεσέλλισαι; Hesych. Miles. s.v. σεσέλλισαι). Other testimonies directly refer to Aeschines’ logoi Sokratikoi, with regard both to the style (Mich. Psellos Ἔπαινος τοῦ Ἰταλοῦ 19, 83; Hermog. De ideis I 409, 5) and to the content of specific dialogues, such as the Aspasia (Philod. Vit. X = PHerc. 1008, coll. xxi–xxii; Harpocrat. s.v. Ἀσπασία), the Miltiades (Stob. ii 34, 10) and the Alcibiades (Priscian. De constructione vii 187. 7–8).
Leaving aside Aristophanes, all the new fragments derive from late sources, and they can be ascribed to the Socratic with different degrees of certainty. Evidence for their attribution, indeed, is not always compelling. I will thus argue for the inclusion of some of these textes in a new collection of Aeschines’ fragments, by trying at the same time to define their place and their relevance within the complex of the sources on the Socratic.
This article reconstructs the work of John Moles, eminent classicist with a wide range of interests, as a historian of ancient philosophy. The article focuses on Moles’ studies of Dio Chrysostom, Cynicism, and Aristotle’s Poetics. In particular, the article presents Moles’ ever original interpretations, based on an exceptional knowledge of the ancient sources and modern scholarship. The article highlights the fundamental characteristics of Moles’ approach to the history of ancient philosophy, which is grounded in a firm historical basis and in detailed, acute, and always rigorously demonstrative analyses of texts. Moles’ contribution to the history of ancient philosophy is marked by strong ethical motivations and a commitment to trace in classical texts not just mere data, but rather values and ideas to be preserved and reflected upon.
Protagoras’ Grand Speech is traditionally considered to articulate a contractualist approach to political existence and morality. There is, however, a newly emerging line of interpretation among scholars, which explores a naturalist layer in Protagoras’ ethical and political thought. This article aims to make a contribution to this new way of reading Protagoras’ speech, by discussing one of its most elaborate versions.