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This paper deals with the place Diogenus of Babylon grants music within the realm of ethical education and training, as reported in Philodemus of Gadara’s (partisan) testimony in his De Musica, wherein it is stated that music encourages men to cultivate virtue and strengthen it. By exploring the controversy between Epicureanism and Stoicism, this paper aims to understand how, according to Stoic thought, cognitive sense-perception (ἐπɩστημoνKὴ σἲσθησɩᴤ) could have an ethical outcome, the sensory experience thus proving its expertise within the field of ethics, and succeeding in changing man's varying states of pleasure and pain. In fact, music like poetry turns out to be the resounding image of rationality that holds direct sway over the rational soul.


In this paper, I examine Plato’s onto-cosmological conception in the Timaeus, trying to find out how many principles or set of principles are established in Timaeus’ description of the constitution of kosmos. The intelligible model, the sensible copy, the receptacle and the demiurge: these are the different kinds of the things that are and the agents of their relations. But it is not clear at all if this perspective can be represented as a form of monism, dualism or anything else.


"Plato on Truth-Value and Truth-Aptness" examines Plato’s conception of truth-value and truth-aptness. The examination focuses on Philebus 36c3-50e4 where Socrates argues that pleasures can be true and false and more precisely that there are various kinds of true and false pleasures. The Philebus passage is the only one in Plato’s corpus where various kinds of truth, falsity, and truth-aptness are examined in close proximity and in relation to one another. Hence it is an especially valuable and, with respect to the topics treated in this paper, neglected site. Socrates distinguishes four kinds of true and false pleasure, which I examine sequentially. In doing so, I argue that Plato distinguishes two kinds of representational truth-value and truth-aptness, propositional and non-propositional respectively, and two kinds of ontic truth-value and truth-aptness, absolute and gradable respectively. On the basis of a key passage at Philebus 42c5-7 the discussion concludes, suggestively but aporetically, with a consideration of how these various kinds of truth-value and truth-aptness are related to one another.

Editors Méthexis


This paper explores the deep dualism, metaphysical and epistemological, between Forms and particulars in Plato’s work. It both argues that the dualism exists and offers a hypothesis, concerning Plato’s view of the criteria for thinking of an object, to explain it. The paper concludes that while these criteria are indeed stringent, they nonetheless allow the possibility that we can still think of, and know, individuals.


The paper compares Heraclitus’ and Democritus’ opinions on the notion of wakefulness. Its aim is threefold. First of all, it aims to demonstrate that the fragments of both philosophers distinguish between two kinds of wakefulness: physical wakefulness, i.e. the bodily state which all men are in when they are not asleep, and "intellectual" waking, conceived as a form of superior rational consciousness which human bings do not normally possess. The second aim of the paper is to prove that Heraclitus and Democritus share the idea that "intellectual" wakefulness has notable existential and ethical implications. For example, it divides humanity into two classes: the class of wise men, who have the right understanding of reality, and that of fools, who live their entire lives like dull sleepwalkers. The third and final aim consists instead in illutraing the main differences between the two Presocratic philosophers, as well as highlighting some important connections between the doctrine of waking and their ontology, epistemology and political thought.


What arguments does Plato offer to explain the pre-eminence he confers to the idea of the Good in Republic, 6? Considering in detail the short but key section of the Republic (504b-506d) that precedes the analogy between the Good and the Sun, this paper argues that it is what Plato claims to be the universal recognition that the Good exists independently of any opinion that makes it so important for human thought. Nothing less than the concept that can make everything else intelligible, as the sun makes everything in the sensible world visible.