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Hegel hatte den Gegenstand der Psychologie als „subjektiven Geist“ und den Gegenstand der Geisteswissenschaften als „objektiven Geist“ bezeichnet. Dieser Unterscheidung entsprechend ist das übergreifende Thema von Band V die begriffliche Analyse des Psychisch-Geistigen in Gestalt einer speziellen Wissenschaftstheorie der Psychologie (§25) und einer allgemeinen Wissenschaftstheorie der Geisteswissenschaften (§26). Das für die Psychologie spezifische wissenschaftstheoretische Problem ist die Frage: „Wie ist eine objektive empirische Wissenschaft vom Subjektiven möglich?“ Um hierauf eine Antwort geben zu können, werden grundlegende Termini der Allgemeinen Psychologie, wie Lernen, Wahrnehmung, Intelligenz und Emotion, rekonstruiert – auch im Hinblick auf die derzeit neuesten Entwicklungen der KI-Forschung. Naturwissenschaften stützen technische Praxen, während Geisteswissenschaften die soziopolitische Praxis der Konfliktbewältigung sowie die kulturreflexive Selbstvergewisserung des Menschen theoretisch fundieren. Diese Unterscheidung ist Ausgangspunkt für eine allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie der Geisteswissenschaften. Zu den hier behandelten Fragen gehören unter anderem: „Was ist eine Erklärung historischen Geschehens?“, „Wie lässt sich Literaturkritik wissenschaftlich betreiben?“ und „Was ist Kunst?“.

Abstract

This paper attempts to develop a phenomenological account of community which would not be pervaded by Eurocentric assumptions. Such Eurocentrism is what Husserl’s phenomenological framework has been accused of. I first reconstruct Husserl’s phenomenology of community in his late transcendental phenomenology by examining the Vienna Lecture. I show that Husserl’s Eurocentrism is encapsulated in his account of corporeity, which simultaneously recognizes the importance of corporeity and its necessary overcoming in theoria, which originates in the European philosopher. I then argue that Merleau-Ponty, through his rigorously embodied phenomenology, can offer a non-Eurocentric phenomenology of community. Elaborating on the Husserlian insight of corporeity, notably the perceptual experience and the écart at stake in the encounter with other bodies, allows Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of the flesh to recast community from and with the body as an open, situated, and non-archeo-teleological structure, allowing phenomenology to reimagine inter-cultural encounters away from tropes of European exemplarity.

Open Access
In: Research in Phenomenology

Abstract

Merleau-Ponty suggests in his Nature lectures that myth provides the best way into thinking the relation of strange kinship between humanity and animality. He goes on to refigure Husserl’s paradigm of the two hands touching to extend beyond merely human-to-human relations, invoking in the process the myth of Narcissus. By carefully examining Merleau-Ponty’s late refiguration of that paradigm, alongside the revised conception of narcissism that it helps him to develop, we find that while human-animal empathy is made possible by a ground of intercorporeal kinship, human-animal estrangement makes possible the emergence of an ethical relation to other animals, contingent upon the sublimation of animal desire. Holding human-animal kinship and estrangement in tension reveals a nascent ideal present implicitly in the early stages of childhood development: a vision of the possibility of interspecies harmony, rooted in the bodily reciprocity that drives the process of self-maturation.

In: Research in Phenomenology
In: Research in Phenomenology

Abstract

In the unpublished seminars given in the United States and France between 1989–1991, Manger l’autre: Politiques de l’Amitié and Rhétoriques du Cannibalisme, Derrida analyzes the rhetorical function that the act of eating has in the Western tradition’s philosophical texts. In this paper I analyze the reading Derrida makes in those seminars of Saint Augustine’s Confessions, in order to show that they are entangled with a critique of political sovereignty. For Derrida, Augustine has a cogito of his own, which is a cogito du manger l’autre. Augustine’s formulation is “I think, eat and drink” (ego cogito, manduco et bibo), and Derrida understands it as a way of constituting both the self of the ego and the self of the community. The first form of Christian community configured through the intake of food is the fraternity of milk: infants that suck the same milk from the breast of their nurse or mother. The second configuration of the community is, of course, the sacrament of Eucharist, in which the body of the father is divided (partagé) among the brothers. I show how the analysis Derrida makes of Augustine in these seminars is a way of deconstructing the very concept of community and its relation to sovereignty. This is attempted by Derrida through the problem of jealousy: the brothers of milk will always be jealous of each other, being themselves the condition for the breaking of the community and their sovereignty. But the second form of community is also threatened by food: since the holy wafer is an edible thing and the act of incorporation of food is really an act of theophagy.

In: Research in Phenomenology

Abstract

To the limited extent that Arendt’s stance on Heidegger has been studied in relation to her thinking on guilt, the focus has been on her outright repudiation of Heidegger’s controversial ontologization of guilt. However, that Arendt does not simply repudiate Heidegger’s account of guilt becomes clear if we recognize that she deals with guilt, albeit less explicitly, in her theory of political action, particularly in her notion of “trespassing” as a specifically political form of harm. In this context, Arendt appropriates key features of Heidegger’s account. I argue that, in doing so, she transfers Heideggerian features into a political framework, insisting that they proceed not from individual existential indebtedness but from political intersubjectivity, or what she polemically – with a redefined Heideggerian term – calls the “with-world” (Mitwelt). This politicization testifies to Arendt’s overall approach to Heidegger’s existential analytic: a critical-transformative appropriation through her signature concepts of action and plurality.

In: Research in Phenomenology
Author:

Abstract

This article explores the idea of ‘play’ as a metaphor to understand the world as an always presupposed frame of all experiences and appearances. A large part of it is devoted to the work of Eugen Fink, who developed a notion of the world as play, as a speculative idea beyond phenomenology. This article argues firstly in favor of such an effort to understand the world as play, as an alternative to onto-theological metaphysics. However, it argues secondly, that a stronger and more convincing concept of play can be found by elaborating on the views of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Jan Patočka. Gadamer discussed ‘play’ as a metaphor for art, while Patočka worked on the notion of ‘world’ as a phenomenological idea that serves as a frame for all experiences. A combination of these two ideas may result in a better alternative to both Fink’s approach and to traditional onto-theological metaphysics.

Open Access
In: Research in Phenomenology
Author:

Abstract

For four decades John Boorman’s “Excalibur” has been either partially analyzed by scholars in Jungian categories or just described as a Jungian-inspired film in more general terms by film critics. The six-stage model of King Arthur’s personal and archetypal development in “Excalibur” was first published by Jungian analyst Al Collins in 1981, but remained unknown in mainstream scholarship. This article describes this significant absence and argues for a shift to significant presence, merging many Jungian approaches to “Excalibur” with Piotr Toczyski’s own depth-psychological vision of Boormanian quasi-Jungian Arthurianism. The scholars globally may get further inspiration to relaunch new interpretations of this classic Arthurian retelling in terms of dynamics of conscious and unconscious, meeting the shadow, coping with anger, underlying projections, withdrawal of projections as the moment of lysis similar to psychotherapy, and the self-awareness of archetypes. The process of projection withdrawal is the hero’s journey on its own, bringing some similarities with well-known Joseph Campbell’s post-Jungian model.

In: International Journal of Jungian Studies
Author:

Abstract

Jung’s conceptualization of synchronicity has a relation to his engagement in astrology began in roughly 1906. Jung’s conceptualization of varieties of synchronistic experiences can be divided into non-divinatory and divinatory experiences. Among the divinatory sources, he overlooked the differences between I-Ching divination and astrology. His neglect caused a logical discrepancy in his early synchronicity theory. Forty-six years after his first engagement in astrology, his essay on synchronicity (1952) possesses a long section for his astrological experiment. In his astrological experiment, his problematic understanding of metaphysical and methodological issues behind the experiment led to the failure of his statistical part of the experiment. The case study part of it turns to support his meaningful chance version of synchronicity theory and leads to the acknowledgement of the standard version of synchronicity theory: meaningful chances.

Open Access
In: International Journal of Jungian Studies